Sandrine Berges

This chapter discusses the republicanism of French revolutionary, Louise de Keralio. It argues that Keralio represented a radical version of republicanism, which emphasized a large degree of self-government through local institutions and direct communication with deputies through revolutionary societies. It furthermore argues that Keralio was an important yet hitherto overlooked figure for the introduction of republicanism in the French revolution. It finally argues that Keralio took a somewhat paradoxical view of women, envisioning the role of women in a republic as being somewhere in between domestic and public life. The chapter furthermore juxtaposes Keralio’s republicanism to that of some of her contemporary men and women, including Marie-Jeanne Roland and Etta Palm d’Aelders.

In this introduction, the authors give a brief overview of the history of republican theory, both as political and institutional practice and as a set of philosophical principles that link freedom, equality, and virtue with government for the common good. They also outline the history of women’s exclusion in republican discourse, not only as citizens but conceptually in the masculine language and ideas embedded in its key terms, such as virtue, that have been transmitted across generations even where the original contexts have been lost. Thirdly, they show how, by starting with women authors as philosophers who work within but challenge and modify the intellectual paradigms they encounter, one can better appreciate their originality and philosophical contributions to republican theory. Finally, the authors place the legacy of women’s republican theorizing in current debates.

This chapter offers a detailed overview of the complex polyphony of women’s voices that arose in Italy in the late eighteenth century in support of the republican cause. Beginning with Breve difesa dei diritti delle donne [Brief defence of women’s rights], a small volume published by Rosa Califronia, a “Roman countess,” in 1794, the analysis will focus on a number of contributions written by female patriot citizens during the Jacobin Triennium, from Veneto to Milan, and from Mantua to Genoa and Bologna. More in detail, this chapter will review orations and speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper articles that helped enrich the debate on republican freedom by endowing it with a female point of view. Finally, some recurring patterns and themes will be highlighted in a fragmented yet broad landscape.

Enlightenment republicanism of the kind promoted by Catharine Macaulay and Mary Wollstonecraft, during the second half of the eighteenth century, was rooted in a providential, protestant, religious tradition, stretching back to the seventeenth century. It looked forward to a utopian political state, in which the adoption of equality before that law and the removal of excessive economic inequality would foster virtuous citizens, who would each make the common good the common care and voluntarily submit to a rational law. Early in the nineteenth century, this democratic republicanism was overtaken by the emergence of political economy that no longer sought economic equality but justified economic inequality and capital accumulation as the means to bring about the progress of civilization and the wealth of nations. This chapter introduces this pivot towards political economy, as developed in the popular writings of Jane Marcet and Harriet Martineau.

The first aim of this chapter is to argue that Mary Wollstonecraft’s approach to inequalities of property and wealth is a form of “non-intrinsic egalitarianism.” The second aim is to nudge republican political theory in our own time towards accepting this approach as part of what freedom requires. Republican theory is not fit for purpose in the contemporary world unless it acknowledges economic inequality as an instrument of domination. Non-intrinsic egalitarianism is the view that economic inequalities are bad due to their detrimental effects on states of affairs that one has reason to value morally. On Wollstonecraft’s version, the values destroyed by wealth inequalities are already egalitarian: living together in a community of equals. Inequality is a self-sustaining system of oppression which corrupts the social fabric and makes the poor subservient to the powers of the rich. These are the same reasons that republican thinkers invoke when conceptualizing freedom.

While many historians and philosophers have sought to understand the ‘failure’ of the French Revolution to thrive and to avoid senseless violence, very few have referred to the works of two women philosophers who diagnosed the problems as they were happening. This essay looks at how Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges theorised the new tyranny that grew out of the French Revolution, that of ‘petty tyrants’ who found themselves like ‘cocks on a dunghill’ able to wield a new power over those less fortunate than themselves. Both offer diagnoses and prognoses that revolve around education. Wollstonecraft argues that a revolution that is not backed by a previous education of the people is bound to result in chaos and violence. Such education, however, must be slow, and it necessitates the reform of the institutions that most shape the public’s character. A revolution, perforce, is fast, and it often takes several years, or even generations before the spirit of the reforms finds itself implemented into new institutions. Olympe de Gouges shares Wollstonecraft’s worry and she observes that the men who were once dominated quickly become tyrants themselves unless their moral character is already virtuous. But the state of being dominated leaves little room for virtue; hence, newly minted citizens need to be educated in order not to replicate the reign of tyranny onto other. Gouges suggests that the answer to the difficulty she and Wollstonecraft highlighted was to educate the people where they could be found: on the streets, or, where they could easily and willingly be gathered: in theatres. By helping organise revolutionary festivals, highlighting the ways in which citizens could be virtuous, and writing plays to awaken their virtue, and proposing a reform of the theatre, so that the production of such plays would be possible, Gouges offered a plan for the civic education of French citizens in the immediate aftermaths of the Revolution. Unfortunately, the chaos she and Wollstonecraft had sought to remedy, led by the cocks or petty tyrants, ensured that they were unable to see through their plans, with Wollstonecraft having to leave Paris and Gouges being sent to the guillotine.

This book is about the home, but from the perspective of a selection of women philosophers, from antiquity to the twentieth century, from Japan to South America, and Constantinople to Boston. One aim is to reinstate the home as a philosophical problem, worthy of inquiry. It seems that as things are, the home is absent from mainstream versions of the history of philosophy, and we would be forgiven for thinking that it was a new problem, one brought up perhaps by Simone de Beauvoir in the Second Sex. But bringing up the writings of earlier women will help debunk this myth and show that the home was only absent from (historically recorded) philosophy because the women were, and men did not regard it as a problem (why would they? It is, after all, where the food gets made that allows them to keep working). Furthermore, bringing up the perspective of women philosophers on the problem of the home will enable a study of that problem in all its historical richness and variety. The home has not always featured in our lives in the way it did when Simone de Beauvoir (or Betty Friedan) wrote about it. And although Beauvoir, like many philosophers before her, speculates about what the home was to those that came before her, we are better off in many ways reading the accounts of the women philosophers who lived in those homes.

In 1924, African American philosopher and historian Anna Julia Cooper (1858–1964) travelled to Paris from the United States to complete the doctorate she had begun in 1911, in Columbia University, and had had to interrupt to raise five grandnieces and nephews. Her research at the Sorbonne culminated in the successful defence of a doctoral thesis entitled “The French attitude to slavery during the Revolution.” Her meticulous research into the archives of the main actors in the abolitionist debate, in Paris and in Saint Domingue, does more than clarify the course of events that led to the Haitian revolution, and eventual abolition of slavery on all French territory in 1848. Cooper asks difficult questions about the power of philosophers to effectuate real change, seeing abolitionism as a real test case for the republican principles that led the Revolution.

This chapter focuses on feminist republicanism in the formative years of the Turkish Republic by comparing two prominent intellectuals and activists, Halide Edip (1883–1964) and Nezihe Muhiddin (1889–1958), who played an essential role in shaping the notion of republican citizenship and pioneered the first wave republican feminist movement, which resulted in the granting of full political rights to women, including the right to elect and be elected locally (1930) and nationwide (1934) in Turkey. In their numerous articles, books, novels, and speeches, both intellectuals stressed that women must be educated, liberated from men’s domination in the household, and able to enjoy their political and economic independence to be good and virtuous mothers and citizens. This virtue was an integral part of citizenship in a free republic where all citizens, regardless of their gender, must participate in making just laws and in open and inclusive public debate.

In the early 1830s, Black abolitionist Maria Stewart reimagined core concepts of republicanism—domination and civic virtue—to articulate a republican politics suited to the political condition of Black Americans in the antebellum United States. Stewart argued that Black Americans, both enslaved and nominally free, were reduced by the white-dominated polity to a position of servitude: as fit to serve the good of the white Americans who dominated them and without any claim upon the polity’s common good themselves. Stewart also drew a nuanced distinction between servitude and service that cast Black mothers as exemplars of republican virtue, engaged in social reproductive labour that supported the common good of Black Americans as a people, in which Black mothers themselves partook. Furthermore, Stewart emphasized the liberatory power of partial sympathy as a foundation for racialized civic virtue and solidarity, organized around the common good of Black Americans as a people.

Traditional republican theory understands freedom as non-domination of the person. In the colonial context, however, given the widespread forms of domination, freedom has a wider meaning, referring to non-domination of the person, but also to other forms of non-domination, such as that of the land and of culture. Taking the writings of Nísia Floresta as evidence, the chapter shows that these forms of non-domination constitute the meaning of freedom in a postcolonial context, forming the identity out of which an independent nation is build. Looking at the political philosophy of women in nineteenth-century Brazil through their presence in newspaper periodicals, the chapter shows women thinkers constructing a culture of freedom in the public sphere, claiming equality as a fundamental condition for citizenship. Offering a methodological contribution, the chapter motivates the idea that modern political philosophy can benefit from contextual expansion and, considering the Atlantic enlightenment, avoid Eurocentric bias.

The aim of this volume is both to introduce readers to the deep, varied, and theoretically rich history of women writing within the republican political tradition, and to produce cutting-edge research on the philosophical contribution that women have made. The authors discuss not only women philosophers whose Republican credentials are already well established, such as Catharine Macaulay and Mary Wollstonecraft, but also include many lesser known republicans, including from nations and traditions that have been underrepresented or wholly excluded by mainstream and Anglo-American republican writing (e.g. Brazilian, Turkish, Italian, African American women), covering a large period from the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries.

Caring duties, which fall particularly to women, are not always compatible with the degree of public life that republican citizenship requires. This is sometimes held as a feminist objection to republicanism. This chapter addresses this objection by focusing on the case of the mothering of infants and wet-nursing in the writings of Wollstonecraft and de Grouchy, two feminist writers of the Enlightenment period. It argues that both writers believe that mothering is central to the development of republican values and that compassion enables the growth of republican sentiments. But for Wollstonecraft this is a double-edged sword. For women to earn the status of citizens they must, if they are mothers, perform all duties attending to motherhood, including breastfeeding their children. Unfortunately, it is those duties that conflict with republican citizenship. A comparison with de Grouchy’s own views on wet-nursing will point to a possible solution.

In a 1781 book on why slavery ought to be abolished, Condorcet argued that the enslaved were not fit to enjoy liberty, because, like children, they were not capable of handling it without harming others or themselves. A version of Condorcet's argument was adopted by the Legislative Assembly in May 1791 to halt the abolition of slavery. I will start by looking at the historical and philosophical context of Condorcet's argument, showing how the argument he used, which was similar to that used by his anti-abolitionist adversaries, belonged in the Aristotelian tradition of defending slavery as natural. I call this the Childhood Argument. I then present in more detail Condorcet's own version of the Childhood Argument and its role in bringing about the conclusion that gradual abolition is appropriate. Finally, I consider objections to Condorcet's Childhood Argument from Olympe de Gouges, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Elizabeth Heyrick. Each of these was formulated in or around the time Condorcet was writing. All of them were formulated by women philosophers. I conclude that the Childhood Argument, which marred Condorcet's abolitionist views, was one that he could have avoided making.

Sophie de Grouchy (1764–1822), published her Lettres sur la Sympathie in 1798, together with her translation of Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments. This short text is presented as her critical commentary on Smith, but also offers original analyses of the relationship of emotional and moral development to economic, institutional, and political reform. Like Smith, Grouchy believes that sympathy is fundamental to social well-being. She improves on his theory by offering an account of its origin; and she argues it is the result of early relationships of dependence. The political conclusions Grouchy draws from her analysis are in tune with her republican views: social equality can only be the result of recognizing that we depend on each other. Deepening Smith’s position, Grouchy argues that inequality hinders the growth of sympathy and renders fruitful cooperation between the different strata of society unlikely or impossible. This new translation of the text is presented with an introduction divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 covers Sophie de Grouchy’s life, times, and sources. Chapter 2 discusses Grouchy’s work, with a special emphasis on the relationship of the Letters to Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which the Letters were a response to, as well as a discussion of other writings by Grouchy. Chapter 3 touches on three main philosophical themes present in the Letters: political philosophy, with an emphasis on the republican aspect of Grouchy’s thought; her legal philosophy and political economy; and her aesthetics.

In his Politics, Aristotle decreed that human beings needed to take part in politics to flourish, but that women, despite being human, needed to stay at home and away from politics. This paper offers an overview of how early modern women philosophers worked to makes their lives more political despite being constricted to the domestic sphere. Lucrezia Marinella argued that the home was like a small city, requiring quasi political skill to run, Cavendish believed that politics should cover the home and its inhabitants, not just the so-called ‘public domain’. Mary Astell, less optimistic, thought that women could compensate for the urge to be political by retreating into a well-educated mind.

This paper looks at selected reviews of women’s philosophical (and literary) works by Revolutionary author and politician Pierre-Louis Roederer. This study occasions the following remarks. Women’s works, when they raised political radical and sometimes feminist agendas were not only read and reviewed, but considered part of the general Revolutionary effort to relieve social and political inequalities. Secondly Roederer appears, from these reviews, as committed to convincing the French intellectual community that works by women ought to be taken as seriously as works by men, and to combat the prejudices which meant that they often were not. I will highlight in particular his reading of Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman as both a fictionalized continuation of the philosophical programme of her Vindication of the Rights of Woman, and as a contribution to the philosophy of emotions – for which he compares it to Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy. I will also look at an unpublished draft in which he compares and contrasts Grouchy, Germaine de Staël, Emilie du Chatelet and Suzanne Necker’s writings on love.

Telling the story of three overlooked revolutionary thinkers, Liberty in Their Names explores the lives and works of Olympe de Gouges, Sophie de Grouchy and Manon Roland. All three were thinking and writing about political philosophy, especially equality and social justice, before the French Revolution. As they became engaged in its efforts, their political writing became more urgent. At a time when women could neither vote nor speak at the Assembly, they became influential through their writings. Yet instead of Gouges, Grouchy and Roland, we speak of Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot. Sandrine Bergès examines the lives and writings of these trailblazing women philosophers, and their impact on philosophical thought during the French Revolution. Featuring pictures, a timeline and a bibliography of their works, this book offers exciting new insights into the history of political philosophy and of the French Revolution.

Although William Godwin in his biography of his late wife Mary Wollstonecraft suggested that she died an atheist, there is no evidence to support this. It seems on the contrary that throughout the evolution of her moral and political thought, despite some very obvious tensions between theism, feminism, and republicanism, Wollstonecraft maintained a religious perspective. This chapter looks at the evolution of her religious thinking and some of the ways in which she could have, but did not, become an atheist. It argues further that Wollstonecraft worked on her theological views to consolidate her moral and political ones. In particular, far from allowing them to be an obstacle to her radical feminism (as later feminists have supposed) she adapted her religious arguments to support those against the oppression of women.

Interest in the contribution made by women to the history of philosophy is burgeoning. At the forefront of this revival is Mary Wollstonecraft. While she has long been studied by feminists, and later discovered by political scientists, philosophers themselves have only recently begun to recognise the value of her work for their discipline. This volume brings together new essays from leading scholars, which explore Wollstonecraft's range as a moral and political philosopher of note, both taking a historical perspective and applying her thinking to current academic debates.

Olympe de Gouges, though a well-known historical figure, has not been investigated as a philosopher until quite recently. Yet, many of her writings have philosophical import, whether they are written in the genre of the philosophical treatise, drama or political pamphlets. In the three main sections, the author gives an overview of some of her arguments, showing their originality and their relevance to debates contemporary to her and to us. In the introduction, the author addresses the question of genre and argue that Gouges should be read as a philosopher, as well as a playwright and political writer. In the conclusion, the author draws out the relevance of her work for contemporary philosophers.

We encounter autonomy in virtually every area of philosophy: in its relation with rationality, personality, self-identity, authenticity, freedom, moral values and motivations, and forms of government, legal, and social institutions. At the same time, the notion of autonomy has been the subject of significant criticism. Some argue that autonomy outweighs or even endangers interpersonal or collective values, while others believe it alienates subjects who don't possess a strong form of autonomy. These marginalized subjects and communities include persons with physical or psychological disabilities, those in dire economic conditions, LGBTI persons, ethnic and religious minorities, and women in traditional communities or households. This volume illuminates possible patterns in these criticisms of autonomy by bringing to light and critically assessing the contribution of women throughout the history of philosophy on this important subject. The essays in this collection cover a wide range of historical periods and influential female philosophers and thinkers, from medieval philosophy through to contemporary debates. Important authors whose work is considered, among many others, include Hildegard of Bingen, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Wollstonecraft, Susan Moller Okin, Hélène Cixous, Iris Marion Young, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Women Philosophers on Autonomy will enlighten and inform contemporary debates on autonomy by bringing into the conversation previously neglected female perspectives from throughout history.

In this article, I present the arguments of three republican women philosophers of eighteenth-century France, focusing especially on two themes: equality (of class, gender, and race) and the family. I argue that these philosophers, Olympe de Gouges, Marie-Jeanne Phlipon Roland, and Sophie de Grouchy, who are interesting and original in their own right, belong to the neo-republican tradition and that re-discovering their texts is an opportunity to reflect on women’s perspectives on the ideas that shaped our current political thought.