Saniye Vatansever

ABSTRACT In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of the argumentative structure of the third Critique, which in turn clarifies the connection between its two apparently unrelated parts. I propose to read the third Critique as a response to Kant’s question of hope, which concerns the satisfaction of reason’s practical and theoretical interests. On this proposal, while the first part on aesthetics describes what we—as possessors of theoretical reason – may hope for, the second part, on teleology, describes what we – as possessors of practical reason – may hope for. The main question of the third Critique is, ‘What may we hope if we act as we should, i.e. act rationally?’ Kant’s implicit answer is, ‘to attain the ideals of reason, which leads to happiness as a consequence of it.’ This novel reconstruction of the argumentative structure of the third Critique contributes to the literature by (i) explaining how the two parts of the third Critique on aesthetics and teleology are connected, (ii) clarifying how the ideals of reason are connected to hope and happiness, and (iii) showing how the spheres of nature and freedom can be synthetically unified through the faculty of judgment.

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of the argumentative structure of the third Critique, which in turn clarifies the connection between its two apparently unrelated parts. I propose to read the third Critique as a response to Kant’s question of hope, which concerns the satisfaction of reason’s practical and theoretical interests. On this proposal, while the first part on aesthetics describes what we—as possessors of theoretical reason – may hope for, the second part, on teleology, describes what we – as possessors of practical reason – may hope for. The main question of the third Critique is, ‘What may we hope if we act as we should, i.e. act rationally?’ Kant’s implicit answer is, ‘to attain the ideals of reason, which leads to happiness as a consequence of it.’ This novel reconstruction of the argumentative structure of the third Critique contributes to the literature by (i) explaining how the two parts of the third Critique on aesthetics and teleology are connected, (ii) clarifying how the ideals of reason are connected to hope and happiness, and (iii) showing how the spheres of nature and freedom can be synthetically unified through the faculty of judgment.

This paper shows the ways in which Kant’s notions of the feeling of life and the feeling of the promotion of life may be influenced by Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis, respectively. Accordingly, getting a clear picture of Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis will help us (i) understand why Kant introduces these notions in the third Critique and (ii) why he identifies aesthetic pleasure with the feeling of the promotion of life. As I will demonstrate, the feeling of life allows us to be conscious of the harmonious interaction of our faculties with each other while the feeling of the promotion of life allows us to be aware of the harmonious relationship between our faculties and nature. Hence, the feeling of the promotion of life indicates the well-being of the subject in its relation to its environment.

Kant defines enlightenment of the individual as emergence of the individual from a self-imposed immaturity. In this definition, individuals who are not enlightened are held responsible for their failures. This is because Kant, in this text, implies that the only thing we need in order to be enlightened as individuals is to be able to use our capacity to think, which is present in every mentally fit individual. One can infer that Kant has an egalitarian understanding of enlightenment, since anyone who has the courage and determination to use their mind can be enlightened. However, when the text is examined more closely and Kant's other writings are consulted, it becomes clear that another factor beyond the individual's control plays a role in whether an individual is enlightened. This factor is the individual's upbringing and education. If Kant admits that the education one receives plays a role in one’s state of being enlightened, and if not everyone is exposed to the education necessary to become an enlightened individual, then Kant would have an elitist approach to enlightenment. In this article, I will first point out the visible tension in Kant’s texts about the enlightenment of the individual. This apparent tension, however, will be resolved by showing that Kant stands in opposition to the Platonic account of enlightenment and the elitist attitude attached to it, and instead adopts a Stoic account of enlightenment and thereby develops an egalitarian approach to enlightenment. __________________ Kant bireyin aydınlanmasını insanın kendi suçu ile düşmüş olduğu bir ergin olmama durumundan kurtulması olarak tanımlar. Bu tanımda aydın olamayan bireyler başarısızlıklarından kendileri sorumlu tutulur. Zira bu metinde Kant, aydın bireyler olabilmemiz için gereken tek şeyin –mental olarak sağlıklı her bireyde var olan- düşünme kapasitesini kullanabilmek olduğunu ima eder. Aklını kullanma cesareti ve azmi gösteren herkesin aydın olabileceğini iddia etmesi sebebiyle Kant’ın eşitlikçi bir aydınlanma anlayışını olduğu düşünülebilir. Ancak bu metne daha yakından baktığımızda ve Kant’ın diğer metinlerine danıştığımızda, bireyin aydın olup olmamasında bireyin kontrolü dışındaki başka bir faktörün daha rol oynadığını görüyoruz. Bu faktör de bireyin yetiştirilme tarzı ve aldığı eğitimdir. Eğer aydın olmamızda aldığımız eğitimin rolü varsa ve aydın bireyler olabilmek için herkes gerekli olan eğitimi alamıyorsa, Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda elitist bir yaklaşıma sahip olduğunu düşünebiliriz. Bu çalışmada bireyin aydınlanması konusunda Kant’ın metinlerinde görünür bir gerilim olduğuna işaret edilecektir. Kant’ın aydınlanma konusunda kendi dönemine hâkim olan Platoncu aydınlanma anlayışından ve buna bağlı olarak gelişen elitist tavırdan farklı olarak Stoacı aydınlanma anlayışını benimsediği ve dolayısıyla da eşitlikçi bir tutum sergilediği gösterilerek bu gerilim çözümlenecektir.

According to W. V. O. Quine's received view, Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (henceforth Aufbau) is a radical empiricist project that attempts at reducing scientific knowledge to a phenomenalistic basis. In Quine's reading, having a phenomenalistic basis is an essential part of the thesis of the Aufbau. According to Michael Friedman, on the other hand, Aufbau is a neo-Kantian project that is primarily concerned with showing the possibility of objective and unified scientific knowledge. Thus, for Friedman, Carnap's choice of phenomenalistic language is rather circumstantial. In this paper, I argue that both Quine and Friedman focus on two different aspects of the Aufbau, which as I shall suggest were equally significant and essential for Carnap's philosophical outlook at the time he was writing Aufbau. Hence, Aufbau should be appreciated for its truly ambitious objective that comprises both the radical empiricist and the neo-Kantian goals.

Bu makalede David Hume’un nedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımların akılsal gerekçelendirilmesine karşı eleştirileri incelenecek ve bu eleştirilerin geleneksel metafiziğin olanaklılığına dair temel bir probleme işaret ettiği savunulacaktır. Hume’un nedensellik ilkesine ve bu ilkenin ima ettiği zorunlu nedensel ilişkilerin varlığına dair eleştirel argümanları ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilerek, nedensellik probleminin nasıl olup da bizi tümevarımsal çıkarımlarımızın gerekçelendirilmesiyle ilgili olan tümevarım problemine götürdüğü gösterilecektir. Görüleceği gibi, Hume’a göre nedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımların ortak problemi her ikisinin de genel geçer doğrular olarak kabul edilen ancak akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyen nedensellik ilkesi ile doğanın tekdüzeliği ilkelerini doğru varsaymasıdır. Bu ilkelerin akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyeceğini göstererek, Hume aslında daha büyük çaplı bir problemin, yani metafizik probleminin varlığına dikkat çekmektedir. Hume’un asıl ilgilendiği soru metafiziğin temelinde yer aldığı düşünülen ilke ve idelerin akılsal temellendirilmesinin olanaklılığı sorusudur. Bu da bir nevi metafizik bilginin temellendirilmesi ve bu bilginin olanaklılığı ile ilgili olan metafizik problemidir. Dolayısıyla Hume’un nedensellik ve tümevarım problemlerini geleneksel anlamda metafizik anlayışına karşı bir eleştiri olarak okumak mümkündür.

Kant defines enlightenment as “man’s release from his self-imposed tutelage” (my emphasis, WiE, p. 83).This definition suggests that those who remain unenlightentened, according to Kant, are responsible for their own state of immaturity. Despite this straightforward picture, however, closer examination of Kant’s “What is Enlightenment” essay and his other writings reveal that the satisfaction of certain necessary conditions for enlightenment, such as freedom of thought and proper education is beyond individual’s control. Hence, whether individuals are capable of attaining enlightenment is usually determined by external factors. This in turn means that contrary to Kant’s definition of and recommendations toward enlightenment, individual’s inability to think for herself could not entirely be self-imposed, and cannot be overcome merely by courage and resolution as Kant claims. It seems, therefore, that Kant’s definition of enlightenment is both untennable and incompatible with his other works. In this paper, I argue that we can salvage Kant’s definition of enlightenment, if we read it in its proper frame of reference. More specifically, I argue that Kant’s conception of enlightenment (as he presents it in the “What is Enlightenment”) requires two different sets of conditions to be met for the individual and for the society. In order for the definition to apply to individual human beings, we have to assume the validity of Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom. For the same definition to apply to the human species, on the other hand, we need to assume a different kind of freedom, i.e., freedom of expression.

This dissertation project aims to solve −what I call− Kant’s “problem of empirical laws,” a problem concerning the coherence of Kant's claims that empirical laws as laws express a kind of necessity, and as empirical judgments they are contingent. In the literature, this issue is framed in the context of Kant’s relation to Hume, and formulated as a question of whether Kant agrees with Hume that empirical laws are mere contingent generalizations. The disagreement on Kant’s conception of empirical laws partly stems from attributing different goals to Kant's argument in the Second Analogy. In my dissertation, I closely examine the two most popular readings of the Second Analogy, namely the "modest" and the "strong" readings, which view the Second Analogy as responding to Hume's "problem of causation" and "problem of induction" respectively. After pointing out some textual and philosophical problems with both readings, I offer an alternative interpretation of what the Second Analogy establishes, which allows me to read Kant's apparently conflicting passages in a coherent manner, and thereby solve Kant’s problem of empirical laws.

This paper attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between Descartes’ commitments to the creation doctrine and the necessity of eternal truths by elaborating different conceptions of necessity in Descartes’ framework. More specifically, I argue that the fact that Descartes concedes the necessity of eternal truths does not compel him to assert the impossibility of their negation. Necessity, for Descartes, rather means immutability. Descartes distinguishes two kinds of immutable truths. While truths about God’s essence are absolutely immutable, truths about the essences of God’s creation are conditionally immutable, i.e., they can change if God’s will changes. Since there are different kinds of eternal truths, they express different kinds of necessity as well, namely conditional and absolute necessity. After I clarify these two kinds of necessity, I explain how Descartes coherently maintains both that eternal truths are necessary and that God could have created eternal truths otherwise without undermining their necessity.

This article presents a critical analysis of two influential readings of Kant’s Second Analogy, namely, Gerd Buchdahl’s “modest reading” and Michael Friedman’s “strong reading.” After pointing out the textual and philosophical problems with each, I advance an alternative reading of the Second Analogy argument. On my reading, the Second Analogy argument proves the existence of necessary and strictly universal causal laws. This, however, does not guarantee that Kant has a solution for the problem of induction. After I explain why the empirical lawfulness of nature does not guarantee the empirical uniformity of nature, I examine the modal status of empirical laws in Kant and argue contra Buchdahl and Friedman that empirical laws express two different kinds of necessity that are not reducible to each other.

In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in a future world. In his other writings, however, he suggests that the highest good is attainable through mere human agency in this world. Based on the apparent incoherence between these texts, Andrews Reath, among others, argues that Kant’s texts reveal two competing conceptions of the highest good, namely a secular and a theological conception. In this paper, I argue that Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of the individual humans and the domain of the human species.