Sanjay Lal

In this author-meets-critics discussion, Sanjay Lal presents the main ideas of his book Violence, Nonviolence, and Moral Worth, arguing that nonviolence meets violence along a continuum where there are degrees of greater and lesser examples, including a wide range of examples that combine both tendencies. Lal defines nonviolence in terms of three components that emphasize attitudes over actions: (1) a willingness to not harm others, (2) wanting to facilitate the well-being of others, (3) and not sacrificing one’s own moral worth. Three critics share their praises and concerns: Predrag Cicovacki challenges Lal to be more specific on the definition of moral worth, on the relationship between violence and nonviolence, and on the account that he gives for value theory and value conflict. Jennifer Kling asks if beliefs can serve as pre-existing grounds for action, if reconceptualizations of pop culture are bound to any limits, and if there are good reasons for assuming that all people are approachable. Danielle Poe asks what it means to reconceptualize popular culture as an approachable resource of nonviolent insight. Answering these questions, Lal reflects on what it means to be inspired by Gandhi’s example.

Andrew Fitz-Gibbon in Pragmatic Nonviolence: Working Toward a Better World argues that a principled form of pragmatism—pragmatism shaped by the theory of nonviolence—is the best hope for our world. He defines nonviolence as “a practice that, whenever possible seeks the well-being of the Other, by refusing to use violence to solve problems, and by having an intentional commitment to lovingkindness.” In the first part of the book, Fitz-Gibbon asks what a better world would look like. In the second part, he covers what is the greatest obstacle to that better world: violence. In the third part, he examines philosophical theories of nonviolence. The fourth part examines pragmatism as a philosophy of “what works” (William James) through the lens of the principle of maximizing well-being through nonviolent practice. In response to Fitz-Gibbon’s work, critic Danielle Poe asks what a nonviolence response looks like to the Other whom we have wronged and wonders how nonviolence responds to systemic violence. Sanjay Lal asks whether pragmatism and nonviolence can be synthesized given the popular conception that the pragmatic possible seems at odds with the ideal of absolute nonviolence. William C. Gay affirms much of the text and suggests its uses in teaching. Mechthild Nagel wonders if Fitz-Gibbon’s pragmatic nonviolence is too anthropocentric and questions the absence of a consideration of systemic violence in the criminal justice system. Fitz-Gibbon then responds to the critics.

In response to widespread anxiety, disappointment, and frustration in the aftermath of the 2024 presidential election in the US, this article reviews four interrelated aspects of Gandhian thought that may serve as worthy preparations for mindful responses: (1) his conception of political power, (2) the priority he gives to moral standing, (3) his conception of self-rule (swaraj), and (4) the disavowal of consequences to his overall understanding of right action. The final part of the article focuses on Gandhi’s remarkably positive understanding of human nature, which encourages us to see prevailing winds of truth and love despite history’s interruptions.

In what follows, I question anger’s value for social activism and discourse. I focus on two little discussed aspects of anger. I argue that these aspects reflect problematic philosophical understandings that may be more serious than perhaps most events which are thought to give rise to anger. I will also argue that the functional value of anger is (at best) questionable given the role other, less damaging, human emotions are capable of playing in producing good outcomes. Additionally, I argue that one need not deny the functional value of anger altogether to reject its overall importance for motivating moral action.