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Santiago Echeverri

National Autonomous University of Mexico
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 More details
  • National Autonomous University of Mexico
    Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
    Research Professor (Investigador Titular A)
Institut Jean Nicod
PhD, 2010
Homepage
Mexico City, Mexico
0000-0003-0701-8214
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Biology
17th/18th Century Philosophy
  • My recommendations
    3
  • My publications recommended by others
    2
  • Thought and Reasoning in Non-Human Animals
    Laura Danón
    Critica 58 (172): 5-14. 2026.
    Thought and Reasoning in Non-Human Animals.
  • Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle
    Jonathan Vogel
    In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29. 1990.
  • Belief in Psyontology
    Jonathan Weisberg
    Philosophers' Imprint 20 (11). 2020.
    Neither full belief nor partial belief is more fundamental, ontologically speaking. A survey of some relevant cognitive psychology supports a dualist ontology instead. Beliefs come in two kinds, categorical and graded, neither more fundamental than the other. In particular, the graded kind is no more fundamental. When we discuss belief in on/off terms, we are not speaking coarsely or informally about states that are ultimately credal.
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