Santiago Ramos

The human being in the receptive position before a work of art or spectacle of some sort—the “spectator”—is a perennial subject of philosophical concern. The aesthetic and ethical issues surrounding this subject have recently been elucidated by the French theorist, Jacques Rancière, in his essay, “The Emancipated Spectator.” This paper analyzes Rancière’s formulation of the main philosophical problem regarding the spectator, as well as his own tentative solution to it. Rancière’s thought is then brought into dialogue with Gabriel Marcel’s writings on the theater which, I will argue, provide a useful supplement to Rancière’s thought. The upshot will be, I Hope, a richer, fuller understanding of the phenomenon of the spectacle, and of the ethical predicament of the spectator.

Readings of Plato’s Ion are usually guided by one of two broad assumptions about the nature of the text. The Romantic school sees the dialogue as making explicit the idea of Genius, and of the artist as a privileged seer of hidden truths. The Rationalist tendency sees the dialogue as a Socratic attack on poetry, of a piece with other dialogues—most notably, the Republic—that also critique the art. In this paper, I claim that applying a phenomenological method to the dialogue uncovers a way beyond the impasse between these two schools. Specifically, I argue that we must turn our attention away from the question of whether poetry is a human art or divinely inspired, and toward the phenomenon at the heart of the dialogue, which is poetry itself, or better put, the creative act that generates poetic language. Moreover, the Ion itself calls for such a reading.

This commentary examines Diego Garrocho’s paper, “Mythological Sources of Memory and Oblivion.” I argue that Garrocho’s thesis hinges on the assumption that two historical continuities exist between myth and philosophy. First, it supposes a continuity of understanding: between the mythical conception of memory and oblivion, and the philosophical reformulation of the same, there lies no essential difference; both the mythical and philosophical traditions share a univocal, or at least analogical, concept of memory and oblivion. Second, it supposes a continuity of appreciation: memory and oblivion are valued at various stages in the history of thought in univocal or analogical ways. I go on to see whether these continuities have taken place within the work of Plato, who, I argue, is an axial figure between myth and philosophy.

This article attempts to find common ground between Plato and Kant on the topic of beauty and aesthetic contemplation. The Kantian notion of “liking devoid of interest” is interpreted in such a way that it can be brought into harmony with two Platonic accounts of beauty found in the Symposium and the Hippias Major. I argue that both thinkers do justice to the relationship between desire and beauty, while also both asserting that the proper appreciation of beauty per se—whether in an object or as an essence—requires a disinterested stance.

Confusion has long reigned over the circumstances in which this early work by Sartre was published, as well as its place among other, better-known texts. In 1927, Sartre completed a thesis for his diplôme d’études supérieures, entitled, “L’Image dans la vie psychologique: Role et nature.” In 1936, he submitted a revised and expanded version of that thesis, simply titled L’Image, for publication in a series called Nouvelle Encyclopedie philosophique. That work consisted of a propaedeutic first half, an analysis of various philosophical and psychological theories about the imagination, and a phenomenological second half, an investigation into the various forms of imaginative consciousness. Sartre’s publisher, F. Alcan, rejected the second half and opted to publish only the first half, as L’Imagination (1936). It wasn’t until 1940 that the second half of the text appeared, as L’Imaginaire.Whether or not this has been clear to those who read Sartre in French, those who rely on English tran