•  17
    An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Value of Envy
    with Jens Lange
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1-20. forthcoming.
    The public and scholars alike largely consider envy to be reprehensible. This judgment of the value of envy commonly results either from a limited understanding of the nature of envy or from a limited understanding of how to determine the value of phenomena. Overcoming this state requires an interdisciplinary collaboration of psychologists and philosophers. That is, broad empirical evidence regarding the nature of envy generated in psychological studies must inform judgments about the value of e…Read more
  •  4
    The Philosophy of Envy
    Cambridge University Press. 2021.
    Envy is almost universally condemned. But is its reputation warranted? Sara Protasi argues envy is multifaceted and sometimes even virtuous.
  •  19
    Teaching Ancient Women Philosophers: A Case Study
    Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 6 (3). 2020.
    In this paper I discuss in some detail my experience teaching women philosophers in the context of a survey course in ancient Greek philosophy at a small liberal arts college. My aim is to share the peculiar difficulties one may encounter when teaching this topic in a lower-level undergraduate course, difficulties stemming from a multiplicity of methodological hurdles that do not arise when teaching women philosophers in other periods, such as the modern era. In the first section, I briefly revi…Read more
  •  136
    Happy Self-Surrender and Unhappy Self-Assertion: A Comparison between Admiration and Emulative Envy
    In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration, Rowman & Little International. pp. 45-60. 2019.
    In this chapter, I argue that a certain kind of envy is not only morally permissible, but also, sometimes, more fitting and productive than admiration. Envy and admiration are part of our emotional palette, our toolbox of evolutionary adaptations, and they play complementary roles. I start by introducing my original taxonomy of envy, which allows me to present emulative envy, a species of envy sometimes confused with admiration. After reviewing how the two emotions differ from a psychological pe…Read more
  •  546
    In this chapter I critique the contemporary Western ideal of unconditional maternal love. In the first section, I draw some preliminary distinctions and clarify the scope and limitations of my inquiry. In the second section, I argue that unloving mothers exist, and are not psychologically abnormal. In the third section, I go further and suggest that lack of maternal love can be fitting and even morally permissible. In the fourth section, I sketch some implications that lack of maternal love and …Read more
  •  1124
    Book Review of The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability by Elizabeth Barnes (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 892-894. 2017.
  •  838
    ‘I'm not envious, I'm just jealous!’: On the Difference Between Envy and Jealousy
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3): 316-333. 2017.
    I argue for the view that envy and jealousy are distinct emotions, whose crucial difference is that envy involves a perception of lack while jealousy involves a perception of loss. I start by noting the common practice of using ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ almost interchangeably, and I contrast it with the empirical evidence that shows that envy and jealousy are distinct, albeit similar and often co-occurring, emotions. I then argue in favor of a specific way of understanding their distinction: the vie…Read more
  •  427
    Invideo et Amo: on Envying the Beloved
    Philosophia 45 (4): 1765-1784. 2017.
    Can we love and envy the same person at the same time? There is an overwhelming, cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary, consensus that love and envy are deeply incompatible. In this paper, I challenge this consensus, and focus in particular on the normative thesis that true love should be void of envy proper. I first propose an indirect argument. Because love and envy thrive in the same psychological conditions, it is not unlikely to feel envy toward the beloved. If we want ideals that do not go…Read more
  •  3557
    The Fictional Character of Pornography
    In Hans Maes (ed.), Pornographic Art and the Aesthetics of Pornography, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 100-118. 2013.
    We refine a line of feminist criticism of pornography that focuses on pornographic works' pernicious effects. A.W. Eaton argues that inegalitarian pornography should be criticized because it is responsible for its consumers’ adoption of inegalitarian attitudes toward sex in the same way that other fictions are responsible for changes in their consumers’ attitudes. We argue that her argument can be improved with the recognition that different fictions can have different modes of persuasion. This …Read more
  •  13959
    Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back)
    European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1): 214-234. 2016.
    The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from different pr…Read more
  •  3226
    Varieties of Envy
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (4): 535-549. 2016.
    In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The second section propose…Read more
  •  554
    In this paper, I ask whether there is a defensible philosophical view according to which everybody is beautiful. I review two purely aesthetical versions of this claim. The No Standards View claims that everybody is maximally and equally beautiful. The Multiple Standards View encourages us to widen our standards of beauty. I argue that both approaches are problematic. The former fails to be aspirational and empowering, while the latter fails to be sufficiently inclusive. I conclude by presenting…Read more