Sarah Borden

Despite some of his own unfortunate comments, Aristotle and Aristotelian thought more generally have profound resources for thinking about both sex and gender. Our bodily, material life is a good for Aristotle, yet we are not understood simply as bodies; sex and gender can be seen as central to our identity, while still accounting well for both variability in these and human commonality. This essay will not unpack those resources in any detail, but I would like to contribute to hylomorphic conversations regarding sex and gender by, first, sketching a very general account of sex and gender, rooted in Aristotle and hylomorphic metaphysical conversations (what I will call here a “recipe for sex and gender”) and then briefly unpacking further questions that need to be addressed in order to turn this Aristotelian sketch into a more holistic picture (what I call here a “map for conversations”).

One striking feature of Finite and Eternal Being is Edith Stein’s exceedingly rare use of the term “metaphysics.” She uses the term “formal ontology” numerous times, but the term “metaphysics” only appears a handful of times in the body of the text, and even those references are themselves a bit surprising. This could be explained in several ways, some of which may be quite innocent and have nothing to do with whether she understands her project as metaphysical. In the following, however, I would like to explore a differing explanation and argue that (at least, in part) her reason for avoiding describing her work as metaphysical is connected with the type of philosophical critique she wants to make of traditional metaphysics. I will not argue that Finite and Eternal Being should ultimately be read as a phenomenological analysis of being rather than any sort of metaphysical treatise, but I will argue that Stein has explicitly phenomenological reasons for being cautious about using the term “metaphysics.”

This book articulates the theoretical outlines of a feminism developed from Aristotle’s metaphysics, making a new contribution to feminist theory. Readers will discover why Aristotle was not a feminist and how he might have become one, through an investigation of Aristotle and Aristotelian tradition. The author shows how Aristotle’s metaphysics can be used to articulate a particularly subtle and theoretically powerful understanding of gender that may offer a highly useful tool for distinctively feminist arguments. This work builds on Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’ in a more explicitly and thoroughly hylomorphist way. The author shows how Aristotle’s hylomorphic model, developed to run between the extremes of Platonic dualism and Democritean atomism, can similarly be used today to articulate a view of gender that takes bodily differences seriously without reducing gender to biological determinations. Although written for theorists, this scholarly yet accessible book can be used to address more practical issues and the final chapter explores women in universities as one example. This book will appeal to both feminists with limited familiarity with Aristotle’s philosophy, and scholars of Aristotle with limited familiarity with feminism.

Stein develops a tri-partite account of being, distinguishing three types of being: actual being, mental being, and essential being. The third—essential being—is particularly significant for Stein’s project of bringing together phenomenology and medieval meta­physics; it provides a response to a weakness Stein sees in the classic account of potency; it accounts for the deep intelligibility of all that is; and it plays a role in Stein’s understanding of artistic truth. In this piece, I lay out Stein’s understanding of essential being and a few of the reasons she posits this notion of being. I then contrast her account of essential being with at least one interpretation (a ‘thin-essence’ existential reading) of Thomas Aquinas on essence. Although Stein’s account of essential being offers many advantages and answers certain difficult questions, I end with challenges that her view faces, including what I see as a problematic reliance on an overly spatial metaphor for being.

In her later philosophical writings, Stein works to synthesize the medieval scholastic tradition and contemporary phenomenology. Stein draws heavily fromThomas Aquinas’s work so that the prevalence of positive references to Thomas have led many to read Stein as a Thomist. On critical questions regarding beingand essence, however, Stein is not a Thomist. In addition to mental and actual being, she also affirms essential being, which is properly the being of intelligibilitiesas well as potencies. Essential being is never separate from an entity with either mental or actual being, but it is a distinct type of being. In this essay, I attempt tocontrast briefly Stein’s account of being and essence with Thomas’s position and to bring out the way in which Stein’s affirmation of essential being leads her ina more Scotist than Thomist direction, at least on questions related to essences and universals.

The primary goals of my dissertation are, first, to present Stein's metaphysical claims, particularly her understanding of being and essence; secondly, to situate Stein's claims regarding individual forms within her more general metaphysical framework, looking particularly at the way in which individual forms function as principles of individual uniqueness; and, finally, to evaluate her use of individual forms. ;The first chapter of the dissertation presents Stein's claims regarding individual forms and suggests several concerns motivating her inclusion of individual forms. The second through fourth chapters focus on an explication of Stein's metaphysical claims, comparing her claims regarding essence and being with those of Husserl, Scotus, and Aquinas. In the last three chapters, I argue, first, that the relation between the individual and universal form, as Stein presents it, can best be understood if we import Husserl's mereology and, secondly, that once this is done, Stein's theory is more successful than Scotus's in explaining how the species-form retains its integrity while also being truly united to the individual form. In chapter six, I argue, however, that despite this success, there are still fundamental problems with Stein's claims regarding individual forms. In the final chapter, I present points at which Stein's own text is in tension with the interpretation I have presented, arguing that Stein herself was not fully satisfied with her own position on individuality and individual forms.

This essay looks at Edith Stein’s descriptions of the fundamental equality, yet distinct differences between women and men, and attempts to make clear the ontology underlying her claims. Stein’s position—although drawing from the general Aristotelian-Thomistic position—differs from Thomas Aquinas’s, and she understands gender as tied significantly to our form or soul. The particular way in which gender is “written into” our soul, however, differs from the way in which both our humanity and individuality are tied to our soul. Thus, Stein wants to account for gender in a way that does not attribute it primarily to biology, nor does she understand gender as merely socially-constructed. Rather, gender is a significant part of our soul, yet not in such a way that either our common humanity orour distinct individuality are compromised.