Sarah Catherine Byers

This paper shows that the medieval concept synderesis comes from Origen’s endorsement of the Stoic theory of rational “self-affiliation” (oikeiōsis). Synderesis is a term that medieval authors inherited from Jerome, who was reporting Origen. Most famously, Aquinas made synderesis central to his moral epistemology, claiming that it is a natural mental habit whereby all humans have an implicit and vague understanding of axiomatic norms of morality. However, the identity of the original Greek word and its conceptual content have been debated since the ninth century. I show that the word must have been suntērēsis (“safeguarding”), employing as evidence recently (2012) discovered texts by Origen. I compare Origen to Chrysippus, Hierocles, and Epictetus. I also compare Aquinas to Origen. I point out three implications. First, the latest critical edition of Jerome (CCL) is incorrect, because it prints suneidēsis (“conscience”) instead of suntērēsis. Second, some of Aquinas’ core assertions about the characteristics of synderesis and its “place” within the mind are consistent with Origen’s account. Third, Stoic suntērēsis and Aquinas’ synderesis share certain metaethical associations.

Augustine’s employment of some (ultimately) Aristotelian concepts and distinctions, such as from the work _On the Soul,_ helped him to develop his own account of the human being as a single-substance body-soul compound, and a correlative theory of death. The recovery of his view involves some work, because he does not always explain how he thinks the core theses to which he is committed play out in detail. Nevertheless it is possible when we use his _Literal Meaning of Genesis_ to illuminate the _City of God_, Book 13. The former text contains the most extended presentation of Augustine’s natural philosophy. It employs concepts from classical metaphysics—such as matter, body, form, and potentiality—which, along with some of the Aristotelian categories, are recognizable again in the _City of God_, a work that he commenced as he was completing the Genesis commentary.

Confessions 13.11.12, which describes the Christian Trinity in terms of “to be, to know, and to will” and “being, mind, and life,” is a difficult passage to interpret. At the same time, it has important implications: for making sense of an assertion about Platonism in Book 7, for assessing Augustine’s originality or lack thereof in philosophical theology, and for correctly placing him in the wider history of metaphysics. As we will see, this rich passage is only fully intelligible as an engagement with Plotinus (fl. 250) that is mediated by Marius Victorinus’ metaphysics. This fact about Confessions 13.11.12 has ramifications, both particular and general. It permits us to understand what this particular passage intends to say about the Trinity – an important implication because the meaning of some of the basic terms and the relation between Augustine’s paronymous trios are not what they appear to be. Equally crucially, this feature of Confessions 13 gives us access to the reasoning behind Augustine’s claims; for Victorinus provides arguments grounded in classical metaphysics to support his trinitarianism, whereas Augustine only repeats Victorinus’ conclusions. Furthermore, it reveals that Augustine’s highly influential writings about the Trinity are not as original as is typically assumed, and it illustrates a general truth: Augustine’s common designation as “Platonist” would be more precise if it were revised to “Victorine Neoplatonist.” Again, it indicates that Augustine was exposed to a wider range of philosophical concepts and distinctions than is often supposed. Victorinus wrote in Latin but was fluent in Greek; he was in touch with Greek philosophical texts and sprinkled his text with technical terms from Greek philosophy. For example, Victorinus utilizes Aristotelian concepts that are not contained in the Categories, the only text by Aristotle that Augustine knew. So Augustine, who was not bilingual, could access this content via Victorinus. Lastly, the presence of Marius Victorinus’ thought in Confessions 13.11.12 improves our knowledge of his role in the later history of western metaphysics. Victorinus is often assumed to have had no significant influence on medieval philosophy, because his Against Arius ceased to be copied in full by the time of Alcuin (fl. 780). (That was because Jerome rightly characterized the text as inaccessible except to those with advanced training in philosophy.) However, Augustine’s sway over subsequent western thought renders his direct source, Victorinus, influential as well.

This chapter shows that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the human mind is capable of intellectual cognition because it naturally “participates” in the Divine Mind, as its image. Consequently, Bonaventure's and Gilson's claim that Augustine thought the human mind must be enlightened by special divine assistance in ordinary (non-mystical) intellectual cognition is erroneous. That is true of the whole of Augustine's writing career: earlier works such as On the Teacher and the Confessions agree with his presentation in On the Trinity 12. This resolution of a long-standing debate about how to interpret Augustine becomes possible when we pay careful attention to the ancient philosophical problems “illumination” is meant to resolve, and when we use Plotinus and the early Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus to interpret his vocabulary and claims. The recovery of this late antique context greatly clarifies Augustine’s epistemological theory and reveals its explanatory power. For the Plotinian basis of the account is a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic elements that can explain why our minds are uniquely suited to abstracting intelligibility from sensory data, and how they do so.

This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant metaphysical account of the Christian God became ascendant. It demonstrates that Marius Victorinus proposed a peculiar model of ‘consubstantiality’ that utilised a notion of ‘existence’ indebted to the Aristotelian concept of ‘prime matter’. Victorinus employed this to argue that God is a unity composed of Father and Son. The article critically evaluates this model. It then argues that Augustine noticed one of the model's philosophical liabilities but did not publicly name Victorinus when he rejected it in De Trinitate, thereby exemplifying the practice of private ‘rebuke’ (ἐλέγχɛιν).

Augustine’s accounts of his so-called mystical experiences in conf. 7.10.16, 17.23, and 9.10.24 are puzzling. The primary problem is that, although in all three accounts he claims to have seen “that which is,” we have no satisfactory account of what “that which is” is supposed to be. I shall be arguing that, contrary to a common interpretation, Augustine’s intellectual “seeing” of “being” in Books 7 and 9 was not a vision of the Christian God as a whole, nor of one of the divine persons, each of whom is equally God, according to Augustine. This becomes clear when we attend to the fact that Augustine is appropriating a specific meaning of “that which is” or “being” used by Plotinus in his account of the lover of Beauty. This resolution, however, leads to a second question. Is there anything distinctively Christian about any, or all, of Augustine’s ascents? On the one hand, it would be odd if there were not, given that the Confessions are addressed to the Christian God. On the other hand, upon close inspection we find that the allegedly specific “Christian” characteristics that modern commentators have identified in the ascents of conf. 7 and 9 also occur in the Neoplatonists. I will argue that there is in fact one important difference between Augustine and the Neoplatonists here that has not been pointed out in these prior interpretations.

G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that ‘the Hebrew-Christian ethic’ differs from consequentialist theories in its ability to ground the claim that killing the innocent is intrinsically wrong. According to Anscombe, this is owing to its legal character, rooted in the divine decrees of the Torah. Divine decrees confer a particular moral sense of ‘ought’ by which this and other act-types can be ‘wrong’ regardless of their consequences, she maintained. There is, of course, a potentially devastating counter-example. Within the Torah, Abraham is apparently commanded by God to slaughter and set fire to his innocent son, Isaac. For attempting to do so, he is praised in the Biblical passage and by later Jewish and Christian commentators. This paper examines rabbinic and early Christian analyses of the story and finds that it was not unambiguously held by these interpreters that God absolutely prohibits killing the innocent, until the time of Augustine, whose position on the story evolved over time.

Forty years ago in this journal, Herbert Spiegelberg examined Wittgenstein's direct references to Augustine in the works that were available to the public at that time. Although there are many allusions to Augustine in the portions of the Nachlass to which Spiegelberg did not have access, Wittgenstein read only the Confessions and his interest lay in a small set of topics for which certain sentences from Augustine served him as repeated proof texts. Given these facts and given how fundamentally Wittgenstein disagreed with Augustine about the nature and purpose of philosophy, it is...

I offer an interpretation of the Stoic “peculiar qualification” which provides for the identity of individuals over time and the distinguishability of discrete individuals. This interpretation is similar to but not the same as one of the strands in Lewis’s interpretation as presented by Nawar. I suggest that the “peculiar qualification”—what makes the individual be the individual—is the particular ἕξις or φύσις or ψυχή that is in an individual. That is, the peculiar quality is not the kind of πνεῦμα an entity has, nor some further qualification or disposition of the kind of πνεῦμα that it has, such as acquired characteristics of the tenor or nature or soul in its particular lived history, but simply the discrete soul or nature or tenor, extended in its own particular spatial location. The so-called peculiar quality is that portion of πνεῦμα that is proper to that individual.

Augustine made a significant contribution to the history of philosophical accounts of affectivity which scholars have not yet noticed. He resolved a problem with the Stoic theory as it was known to him: the question of the cognitive cause of "preliminary passions" ( propatheiai ), reflex-like affective reactions which must be immediately controlled if a morally bad emotion is to be avoided. He identified this cognitive cause as momentary doubt, as I demonstrate by citing passages from sermons spanning twenty-seven years in which Augustine consistently used a particular set of scriptural images and phrases as precise analogies for mental and affective states.

Writing to the young emperor Nero, Seneca elaborates a sophisticated distinction between compassion and mercy for use in forensic contexts, agreeing with earlier Stoics that compassion is a vice, but adding that there is a virtue called mercy or 'clemency.' This Stoic repudiation of compassion has won the attention of Nussbaum, who argues that it was motivated by a respect for persons as dignified agents, and was of a piece with the Stoics' cosmopolitanism. This chapter engages Nussbaum's presentation of the Stoics, examining Seneca’s On Clemency and Epictetus' use of the term prohairesis, showing that while there is some truth in her characterization, it needs to be qualified in important ways. It also analyzes Augustine's engagement with Seneca's On Clemency in the City of God 9.5, and in his letters concerning punishment for vandalism, theft, and human trafficking. It argues that Augustine has a nuanced mercy ethic that is deeply informed by Seneca's position, but that he intentionally improves upon it.

This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (lekta/dicibilia), and that this epistemology underlies his accounts of motivation, affectivity, therapy for the passions, and moral progress. Byers elucidates seminal passages which have long puzzled commentators, such as Confessions 8, City of God 9 and 14, Replies to Simplicianus 1, and obscure sections of the later ‘anti-Pelagian’ works. Tracking the Stoic terminology, Byers analyzes Augustine’s engagement with Cicero, Seneca, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, and Philo of Alexandria, demonstrating that Augustine appropriated Stoicism with greater sophistication than other religious writers. She also shows how he moved beyond the Stoics by enriching Stoic cognitivism with Platonic motivational theory, arguing that Augustine created a coherent synthesis. This newly discovered Augustinian moral psychology has elements that contemporary philosophers and psychologists have identified as important.

Seneca asserts in Letter 121 that we mature by exercising self-care as we pass through successive psychosomatic “constitutions.” These are babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus). The self-care described by Seneca is 'self-affiliation' (oikeiōsis, conciliatio) the linchpin of the Stoic ethical system, which defines living well as living in harmony with nature, posits that altruism develops from self-interest, and allows that pleasure and pain are indicators of well-being while denying that happiness consists in pleasure and that pain is misery. Augustine divides the narrative of his own development into the stages of babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus) in the Confessions, a text wherein he claims familiarity with more than a few works of Seneca (Conf. 5.6.11). Furthermore, he had access to Stoic accounts of affiliation not only in Seneca’s Letter 121, but also in Cicero’s On Goals, and in non-extant sources of Stoic ethical theory. After pointing out that Augustine endorsed the notion of self-affiliation outside of the Confessions, I raise the question of whether he also makes the notion of affiliation thematic in his philosophical autobiography. I argue that he does indeed present himself and some of his primary relationships – with his mother and his long-term girlfriend – in terms of personal and social oikeiōsis. In addition, his self-critiques in the early books of the Confessions can be more fully understood if compared to Stoic developmental theory. He depicts himself as failing to progress intellectually, socially, and morally: although he passed through the successive constitutions, becoming physically larger and cognitively capable, he did not mature correctly by the standards of his Stoic sources.