Sarah Edwards

Health-related Quality of Life measures have recently been attacked from two directions, both of which criticize the preference-based method of evaluating health states they typically incorporate. One attack, based on work by Daniel Kahneman and others, argues that ‘experience’ is a better basis for evaluation. The other, inspired by Amartya Sen, argues that ‘capability’ should be the guiding concept. In addition, opinion differs as to whether health evaluation measures are best derived from consultations with the general public, with patients, or with health professionals. And there is disagreement about whether these opinions should be solicited individually and aggregated, or derived instead from a process of collective deliberation. These distinctions yield a wide variety of possible approaches, with potentially differing policy implications. We consider some areas of disagreement between some of these approaches. We show that many of the perspectives seem to capture something important, such that it may be a mistake to reject any of them. Instead we suggest that some of the existing ‘instruments’ designed to measure HR QoLs may in fact successfully already combine these attributes, and with further refinement such instruments may be able to provide a reasonable reconciliation between the perspectives

Health‐related Quality of Life measures have recently been attacked from two directions, both of which criticize the preference‐based method of evaluating health states they typically incorporate. One attack, based on work by Daniel Kahneman and others, argues that ‘experience’ is a better basis for evaluation. The other, inspired by Amartya Sen, argues that ‘capability’ should be the guiding concept. In addition, opinion differs as to whether health evaluation measures are best derived from consultations with the general public, with patients, or with health professionals. And there is disagreement about whether these opinions should be solicited individually and aggregated, or derived instead from a process of collective deliberation. These distinctions yield a wide variety of possible approaches, with potentially differing policy implications. We consider some areas of disagreement between some of these approaches. We show that many of the perspectives seem to capture something important, such that it may be a mistake to reject any of them. Instead we suggest that some of the existing ‘instruments’ designed to measure HR QoLs may in fact successfully already combine these attributes, and with further refinement such instruments may be able to provide a reasonable reconciliation between the perspectives.

Owing to unique features of their design, cluster randomized trials complicate the interpretation of standard ethics guidelines. The recently published Ottawa statement on the ethical design and conduct of cluster randomized trials provides researchers and research ethics committees with detailed guidance on the design, conduct and review of cluster trials. The Ottawa statement sets out 15 recommendations, including guidance on the justification of study design, the need for research ethics committee review, the identification of research participants, obtaining informed consent, the role of gatekeepers in protecting cluster interests, the assessment of benefits and harms, and the protection of vulnerable participants

In this paper the need for valid evidence of the cost-effectiveness of treatments that have not been properly evaluated, yet are already available, albeit in short supply, are examined. Such treatments cannot be withdrawn, pending proper evaluation, nor can they be made more widely available until they have been shown to be cost-effective. As a solution to this impasse the argument put forward recently by Toroyan et al is discussed. They say that randomised controlled trials of such resources could be done but only if resources are randomly allocated independently of a research context. Relevant outcome data could then be collected for research, given this opportunity. We agree. We disagree with Toroyan et al on a number of points. First, they claim that no ethical issue relating to equipoise arises. We disagree and this disagreement depends on our showing that equipoise should be maintained in a relationship that they do not consider. Secondly, they say that consent to data collection is always needed. Again we disagree. Thirdly, they claim that the previous two issues are the only possible ethical issues that could arise. We argue, instead, that there is a further conflict of interests that has ethical import

In this paper, we respond to Andrew Avins's recent review of methods whose use he advocates in clinical trials, to make them more ethical. He recommends in particular, “unbalanced randomisation”. However, we argue that, before such a recommendation can be made, it is important to establish why unequal randomisation might offer ethical advantages over equal randomisation, other things being equal. It is important to make a pragmatic distinction between trials of treatments that are already routinely available and trials of restricted treatments. We conclude that unequal randomisation could, indeed, be an ethical compromise between protecting the interests of participants and those of society

Tom Shakespeare’s important new book includes, among other topics, a persuasive critique of the social model of disability. A key component in his case against that model consists in an argument against the impairment/disability distinction as this is understood within the social model. The present paper focuses on the case Shakespeare makes against that distinction. Three arguments mounted by Shakespeare are summarised and responded to. It is argued that the responses adequately rebut Shakespeare’s case on this specific issue. Moreover, as the engagement with Shakespeare’s argument illustrates, his claim to employ a critical realist perspective appears to be in considerable tension with the case he offers against the impairment/disability distinction

In this article we examine ethical aspects of the involvement of children in clinical research, specifically those who are incapable of giving informed consent to participate. The topic is, of course, not a new one in medical ethics but there are some tensions in current guidelines that, in our view, need to be made explicit and which need to be responded to by the relevant official bodies. In particular, we focus on tensions between the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki, and the guidance offered by the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health , and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. We conclude with a call for these organisations to make their guidance explicit in relation to the World Medical Association Declaration

The aim of this article is to examine whether informational manipulation, used intentionally by the researcher to increase recruitment in the research study, can be morally acceptable. We argue that this question is better answered by following a non-normative account, according to which the ethical justifiability of informational manipulation should not be relevant to its definition. The most appropriate criterion by which informational manipulation should be considered as morally acceptable or not is the researcher’s special moral duties towards their subjects. We also propose that a broader definition of manipulation of information should be adopted (than that already existing in the literature) since informational manipulation can affect not only a person’s beliefs but also their desires in decision-making. We conclude that manipulation of information can either be used to protect the potential subject and facilitate the informed consent process or be used to exploit and merely use a person for scientific goals.

This paper enquires into the nature and the extent of the obligations of nurses. It is argued that nurses appear to be obliged to undertake supererogatory acts if they take clause one of the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC) Code of Professional Conduct seriously (as, indeed, they are required to do). In the first part of the paper, the nature of nursing obligations is outlined, and then the groups and individuals to whom nurses have obligations are identified. Following a brief discussion of the moral foundation of the nurse's obligations to her/his employer, a common conflict of obligations is identified. Then a distinction is drawn between ordinary and extraordinary moral standards. Appreciation of this is necessary for an understanding of the criterion of what constitutes a supererogatory act. By the definition of supererogatory acts proposed below, it is suggested that actions such as whistleblowing satisfy that definition

Current UK guidelines regarding clinical research on children permit research that is non-therapeutic from the perspective of that particular child. The guidelines permit research interventions that cause temporary pain, bruises or scars. It is argued here that such research conflicts with the Declaration of Helsinki according to which the interests of the research subject outweigh all other interests. Given this, in the context of clinical research, who is best placed to protect the child from this kind of exploitation? Is it the medical researcher, the child’s parents or the nurse advocate? This article describes the problem, possible responses to it, and closes with a consideration of, and rejection of, a defence of current guidelines that claims moral parity between clinical research and clinical education

ABSTRACT Many people argue that disagreements and inconsistencies between Research Ethics Committees are morally problematic and there has been much effort to ‘harmonise’ their judgements. Some inconsistencies are bad because they are due to irrationality, or carelessness, or the operation of conflicting interests, and so should be reduced or removed. Other inconsistencies, we argue, are not bad and should be left or even encouraged. In this paper we examine three arguments to reject the view that we should strive for complete consistency between committees. The first argument is that differences in judgement are not necessarily incompatible with ideas of justice for patients who are potential participants of research reviewed by different committees. We call this ‘the justice argument.’ The second argument is that such committees do not have access to a single moral truth, to which their judgement is supposed to correspond. We call this the ‘moral pluralism argument.’ The third argument is that the process of ethics committee review is also morally relevant and not solely the outcome. We call this the ‘due process argument.’ While we fall short of establishing exactly how much variation and on what substantive issues would be ethically permissible, we show that it is largely inevitable and that a certain amount of variation could be seen as a desirable part of the institution of medical research.

The ethics review system of research is now well-established, at least in the developed world, although there are many differences in how countries view it and go about managing it. The UK specifically is now seeking to revise its system by speeding up the process of ethics approval but only for some studies. It is proposed that only those studies which pose “no material ethical issues” should be “fast-tracked”. However, it is unclear what this means, who should decide and what should be included in this category. In this paper, we go some way towards answering these questions. While we are certain that the debate is only just beginning, we are equally certain that it will continue to run long after the system has been reformed. To stimulate this conversation and to inform a pilot project of the new system directly, we review two candidates to help give some substance to the notion of “material” ethical issues. Firstly, material could mean a certain type or degree of risk. Second, material could mean how physically invasive the research is. We conclude that there is still much work to be done on making the system of governing health and social care consistent and practicable

Clinical research under the usual regulatory constraints may be difficult or even impossible in a public health emergency. Regulators must seek to strike a good balance in granting as wide therapeutic access to new drugs as possible at the same time as gathering sound evidence of safety and effectiveness. To inform current policy, I reexamine the philosophical rationale for restricting new medicines to clinical trials, at any stage and for any population of patients (which resides in the precautionary principle), to show that its objective to protect public health, now or in the future, could soon be defeated in a pandemic. Providing wider therapeutic access and coordinating observations and natural experiments, including service delivery by cluster (wedged cluster trials), may provide such a balance. However, there are important questions of fairness to resolve before any such research can proceed.

Data is essential to governing those emerging matters of concern that confront the agrifood every day. But data is no neutral intermediary. It disrupts, exposes, and creates new social, economic, political, and environmental possibilities, whilst simultaneously hiding, excluding, and foreclosing others. Scholars have become attuned to both the constitutive role of data in creating everyday worlds, and the need to develop critical accounts of the materialities, spatialities and multiplicities of data relationships. Whereas this emerging work develops insight to the capacity for data topologies to reterritorialise the spatial performances of everyday life, it has largely reduced the associated temporal dimensions to matters of fact. The effect of these performances has been to naturalize the temporal quality of speed and elide the multiple temporalities required to enact contemporary data worlds. Applying the lenses of infrastructuring, performativity and ferality, this paper explores temporality and data in the everyday worlds produced through the New Zealand kiwifruit industry’s focus on dry matter. The paper argues that temporalities are deeply embedded in the kiwifruit industry’s data relations. We show that while temporal data relations are critical to the industry, we also highlight ways in which those relations introduce new, potentially destabilizing performances into kiwifruit relations.

Cluster randomized controlled trials (cluster RCTs) randomize whole clusters of individuals in testing two or more competing interventions. Here we will present the ethical problems raised by cluster RCTs concerning their effect on inequality. We argue that some inequalities generated by cluster RCTs are larger in scope than those generated from individual RCTs. We also argue that any cluster RCT-generated inequalities, which divide groups rather than individuals, are more problematic in type than the inequalities created in individual RCTs. These concerns should be taken into consideration when designing research at the cluster level, and those conducting the research should consider modified research design strategies in cases where they believe the risk of generating inequalities is large

Jansen and Wall suggest a new way of defending hard paternalism in clinical research. They argue that non-therapeutic research exposing people to more than minimal risk should be banned on egalitarian grounds: in preventing poor decision-makers from making bad decisions, we will promote equality of welfare. We argue that their proposal is flawed for four reasons.First, the idea of poor decision-makers is much more problematic than Jansen and Wall allow. Second, pace Jansen and Wall, it may be practicable for regulators to uncover the values that a potential research participant holds when agreeing to enter a research project, so their claim that we must ban such research projects for all if we are to ban them for poor decision-makers looks to be unmotivated. Third, there seem to be cases where the liberty to enter the sort of research project Jansen and Wall discuss is morally weighty, and arguably should outweigh concerns of egalitarian distribution. Fourth, banning certain types of research, which seem on the face of it to offer an unfavourable risk-benefit ratio, would have unwelcome consequences for all clinical research, which Jansen and Wall do not recognize

This paper discusses the distinction between disability and handicap as it is proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in their publication International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (WHO, 1993 (first published, 1980)). Following criticism of this an attempt to salvage the distinction by Nordenfelt (1993, 1983) is discussed. It is argued that neither the WHO nor Nordenfelt are successful in their attempts to preserve the distinction between disability and handicap in a theoretically wellmotivated manner. Contrary to the WHO, it is argued that what they term ‘disabilities’ and ‘handicaps’ both have external causes. And contrary to Nordenfelt's position it is shown that “basic actions” do not provide a firm theoretical foundation for the concept of disability. Moreover, the criticisms of these two sets of views reveal that attempts to describe the phenomenon of disablement which focus on the individual suffer from a serious methodological shortcoming

The COVID‐19 pandemic has reinforced the critical role of ethics and community engagement in designing and conducting clinical research during infectious disease outbreaks where no vaccine or treatment already exists. In reviewing current practices across Africa, we distinguish between three distinct roles for community engagement in clinical research that are often conflated: 1) the importance of community engagement for identifying and honouring cultural sensitivities; 2) the importance of recognising the socio‐political context in which the research is proposed; and 3) the importance of understanding what is in the interest of communities recruited to research according to their own views and values. By making these distinctions, we show that current practice of clinical research could draw on anthropology in ways which are sometimes unnecessary to solicit local cultural values, overlook the importance of socio‐political contexts and wider societal structures within which it works, potentially serving to reinforce unjust political or social regimes, and threaten to cast doubt on the trustworthiness of the research. We argue that more discerning anthropological engagement as well as wider collaboration with other social scientists and those working in the humanities is urgently needed to improve the ethics of current biomedical and pharmaceutical research practice in Africa.

Owing to unique features of their design, cluster randomized trials complicate the interpretation of standard ethics guidelines. The recently published Ottawa statement on the ethical design and conduct of cluster randomized trials provides researchers and research ethics committees with detailed guidance on the design, conduct, and review of cluster trials. The Ottawa statement sets out 15 recommendations, including guidance on the justification of study design, the need for research ethics committee review, the identification of research participants, obtaining informed consent, the role of gatekeepers in protecting cluster interests, the assessment of benefits and harms, and the protection of vulnerable participants.

Efforts to build research capacity and capability in low and middle income countries (LMIC) has progressed over the last three decades, yet it confronts many challenges including issues with communicating or even negotiating across different cultures. Implementing global research requires a broader understanding of community engagement and participatory research approaches. There is a considerable amount of guidance available on community engagement in clinical trials, especially for studies for HIV/aids, even culturally specific codes for recruiting vulnerable populations such as the San or Maori people. However, the same cannot be said for implementing research in global health. In an effort to build on this work, the Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning and University College London in the UK sought to better understand differences in beliefs, values and norms of local communities in Pakistan. In particular, they have sought to help researchers from high income countries (HIC) understand how their values are perceived and understood by the local indigenous researchers in Pakistan. To achieve this end, a group discussion was organised with indigenous researchers at Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning. The discussion will ultimately help inform the development of a cultural protocol for researchers from HIC engaging with communities in LMIC. This discussion revealed five common themes; (1) religious principles and rules, (2) differing concepts of and moral emphasis on autonomy and privacy, (3) importance of respect and trust; (4) cultural differences (etiquette); (5) custom and tradition (gift giving and hospitality). Based on the above themes, we present a preliminary cultural analysis to raise awareness and to prepare researchers from HIC conducting cross cultural research in Pakistan. This is likely to be particularly relevant in collectivistic cultures where social interconnectedness, family and community is valued above individual autonomy and the self is not considered central to moral thinking. In certain cultures, HIC ideas of individual autonomy, the notion of informed consent may be regarded as a collective family decision. In addition, there may still be acceptance of traditional professional roles such as ‘doctor knows best’, while respect and privacy may have very different meanings.