The Diversity Trumps Ability theorem suggests that, under certain conditions, more diverse groups outperform groups of more individually competent members. Despite initial excitement about the theorem’s application to democratic decision-making, critics have largely dismissed it as irrelevant to real-world democracies. I argue that this dismissal is unwarranted. After informally reconstructing the theorem, I explain that while it fails to literally apply in realistic cases, we can extract an imp…
Read moreThe Diversity Trumps Ability theorem suggests that, under certain conditions, more diverse groups outperform groups of more individually competent members. Despite initial excitement about the theorem’s application to democratic decision-making, critics have largely dismissed it as irrelevant to real-world democracies. I argue that this dismissal is unwarranted. After informally reconstructing the theorem, I explain that while it fails to literally apply in realistic cases, we can extract an important “baton-passing” mechanism from it that both employs a wider range of diversity and activates in more contexts than the theorem itself suggests. Most notably, it applies not only in problem-solving contexts where we share values, but also in bargaining contexts where we don’t. And it can be given a dynamic interpretation that helps explain iterative improvement over time. Diversity doesn't really trump ability, but understanding when diversity facilitates baton-passing—and when it doesn’t—can illuminate both democratic successes and democratic failures.
