Sarah Scott

Despite the call for pluralism in IS research there is a lack of multi-method research published in information systems journals. While many researchers might find the idea of using multiple methods attractive, there are barriers that prevent them from employing this approach in practice. In this paper we try to address key philosophical concerns that often deter more extensive use of multiple methods, encourage openness to innovative methodological choices, and deepen practical understanding about how critical realism can be used as the foundation of IS research designs. We begin by exploring the value of critical realism as a theoretical foundation for mixed-method information systems research. After discussing the debate surrounding quantitative methods (especially within economics) among critical realists, we propose making the identification of demi-regularities pivotal to the design of qualitative fieldwork. To provide support for this approach we present evidence from a study on the economic impact of IS innovation adoption in financial services which we believe highlights the value of multiple methods to inspire and inform the research process as it unfolds.

I reconstruct Martin Buber’s conception of grace to show its importance for unifying his religious orientation and anarchist tendencies. I first lay out an Augustinian account of grace and concomitant defense of hierarchy and submission. I then examine Buber’s anarchism and previous analyses of his notion of grace, which were incomplete insofar as they ignored his redefinition of what is given by grace and who gives these gifts. The primary gifts of grace he identifies are who we are (meant to be), moral norms and reality, each of which come to us not just from God, but also from relations with other creatures. Buber corrects the classic Augustinian notion of grace by replacing radical dependence on God with radical creaturely interdependence. Once hierarchy and submission to an inscrutable authority are no longer taken to be necessary for human flourishing, we are free to think along broadly anarchist lines.

I reconstruct the aestheticism of Martin Buber in order to provide a new way of framing his moral philosophy and development as a thinker. The evolution of Buber’s thought does not entail a shift from aesthetics to ethics, but a shift from one aspect of aesthetics to another, namely, from taking genius to be key to social renewal, to taking taste to be key. I draw on Kantian aesthetics to show the connection between Buber’s aesthetic concerns and his moral concerns, and to defend the notion that a certain aesthetic orientation may be just what is needed for moral response.

I reconstruct Buber’s conception of personhood and identify in his work four criteria for personhood— uniqueness, wholeness, goodness, and a drive to relation—and an account of three basic degrees of personhood, stretching, as a kind of “chain of being,” from plants and animals, through humans, to God as the absolute person. I show that Buber’s “new” conception of personhood is rooted in older Neoplatonic notions, such the goodness of all being and the principle of plenitude. While other philosophers have used reason and memory to distinguish persons, I find that Buber instead takes these to be specific to humanity, and I explore Buber’s account of a “fall” from a state of nature into a historical mode, such that our humanity threatens our personhood.

Martin Buber wrote his 1904 dissertation on Nicholas of Cusa, but the relationship between the two has been little studied. This article focuses on four ways in which Buber appropriated Cusa’s ideas. (1) Cusa’s theory of participation argues for the absolute worth of the individual, foreshadowing Buber’s ethics of actualization. (2) Buber takes Cusa’s model of how one may know God as other through “learned ignorance” and applies it to how one may know and adequately respond to beings as others in his distinction between “I-Thou” and “I-It” relations. (3) Buber employs Cusa’s term “coincidence of opposites” to describe what happens in dialogue. Seeing the coincidence of opposites moves subjects to adopt intersubjective perspectives and give up unhealthy relations of conflict. (4) Buber’s 1938 criticism of Cusa for maintaining that selves evolve in isolation illuminates Buber’s creation of his own dialogic philosophy.