-
The Myth of the Mental (Illness)In David Boersema (ed.), Dimensions of Moral Agency, Cambridge Scholars. pp. 30-37. 2014.Thomas Szasz has wrestled with the following question: Does mental illness even exist? Here, I sketch two provocative papers by Szasz and detail his reasons for criticizing the concept ‘mental illness.’ I will proceed to highlight where I think Szasz’s writing is philosophically dubious, despite its role in forcing us to think critically about ‘mental illness.’ I will conclude that his argument is best left behind as an antiquated take on neurodivergence. Finally, I will propose what I think is …Read more
-
The Myth of the Mental (Illness)In David Boersema (ed.), Dimensions of Moral Agency, Cambridge Scholars. pp. 30-37. 2014.Thomas Szasz has wrestled with the following question: Does mental illness even exist? Here, I sketch two provocative papers by Szasz and detail his reasons for criticizing the concept ‘mental illness.’ I will proceed to highlight where I think Szasz’s writing is philosophically dubious, despite its role in forcing us to think critically about ‘mental illness.’ I will conclude that his argument is best left behind as an antiquated take on neurodivergence. Finally, I will propose what I think is …Read more
-
Normative practices of other animalsIn Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.
-
Normative practices of other animalsIn Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.
-
1The Myth of the Mental (Illness)In David Boersema (ed.), Dimensions of Moral Agency, Cambridge Scholars. pp. 30-37. 2014.Thomas Szasz has wrestled with the following question: Does mental illness even exist? Here, I sketch two provocative papers by Szasz and detail his reasons for criticizing the concept ‘mental illness.’ I will proceed to highlight where I think Szasz’s writing is philosophically dubious, despite its role in forcing us to think critically about ‘mental illness.’ I will conclude that his argument is best left behind as an antiquated take on neurodivergence. Finally, I will propose what I think is …Read more
-
8This paper addresses the killing of Freya the Walrus by the Norwegian fishing authorities in August 2022. Freya became famous for sunbathing on boats in the marina in the Oslo fjord, but she was soon euthanized in the name of public safety. Her death caused international outrage, and the aim of our paper is to demonstrate using philosophical argument why her death was unjust. We examine her plight through frameworks developed by animal ethicists involving co-sovereignty, capability, and individu…Read more
-
7Commentary on Catriona Mackenzie's “Autonomous agency, we‐agency, and social oppression”Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1). 2023.After a brief summary of Mackenzie's major claims, I offer questions to promote ongoing conversation, most especially regarding they‐ and we‐narratives.
-
1177Normative Practices of Other AnimalsIn Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 57-83. 2018.Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when n…Read more
-
From False Beliefs to True Interactions: Are Chimpanzees Socially Enactive?In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, Routledge. pp. 280-288. 2017.In their 1978 paper, psychologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff posed the question, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” They treated this question as interchangeable with the inquiry, “Does a chimpanzee make inferences about another individual, in any degree or kind?” Here, we offer an alternative way of thinking about this issue, positing that while chimpanzees may not possess a theory of mind in the strict sense, we ought to think of them as enactive perceivers of practical and soci…Read more
-
50Interspecies Intersubjectivity: On its Possibilities and LimitationsSouthwest Philosophy Review 31 (1): 139-146. 2015.The present work explores interspecies intersubjectivity, including its content and limitations, through the paradigmatic instances of such relationships that are present among companion species. I aim to defend the claim that meaningful relationships are possible and do in fact occur between humans and nonhuman animals by appealing to both philosophical and empirical literature. I will also begin to delineate the content and limitations of these interspecies relationships.
Buffalo, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
Moral Psychology |
Areas of Interest
Animal Minds |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Aesthetics |
The Badness of Death |