Sarah Wilson

This paper critically explores how ‘chemicals at the nanoscale’ are defined under the Australian Industrial Chemicals Introduction Scheme (AICIS) and compares it with the definitions established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and European Commission (EC). Focusing on the properties of particle size and solubility, it explores how Australian regulators have translated the underlying nanoscience into their formal definitional framework. It then considers the regulatory implications that may arise from the application of Australia’s specific interpretation. This study reveals significant differences in how particle size and solubility are applied within nanomaterial definitions. AICIS structures its definitional framework around these physical properties as regulatory proxies for material risk, relying heavily on archetypal behaviours and characteristics that may not apply universally across all substances. In contrast, American and European frameworks more explicitly recognize these criteria have limited predictive capability for risk assessment and have designed frameworks that allow regulators greater flexibility in identifying and assessing nanoscale chemicals. In application, AICIS’ more simplified approach creates a narrower regulatory scope that may poorly correspond with toxicological outcomes. This has direct implications for which substances are included or excluded from more stringent regulatory oversight. Future legal research should subsequently explore how AICIS’ definition is applied in practice, focusing on how regulators pursue enforcement actions for materials that challenge these regulatory parameters.

This paper critically explores how ‘chemicals at the nanoscale’ are defined under the Australian Industrial Chemicals Introduction Scheme (AICIS) and compares it with the definitions established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and European Commission (EC). Focusing on the properties of particle size and solubility, it explores how Australian regulators have translated the underlying nanoscience into their formal definitional framework. It then considers the regulatory implications that may arise from the application of Australia’s specific interpretation. This study reveals significant differences in how particle size and solubility are applied within nanomaterial definitions. AICIS structures its definitional framework around these physical properties as regulatory proxies for material risk, relying heavily on archetypal behaviours and characteristics that may not apply universally across all substances. In contrast, American and European frameworks more explicitly recognize these criteria have limited predictive capability for risk assessment and have designed frameworks that allow regulators greater flexibility in identifying and assessing nanoscale chemicals. In application, AICIS’ more simplified approach creates a narrower regulatory scope that may poorly correspond with toxicological outcomes. This has direct implications for which substances are included or excluded from more stringent regulatory oversight. Future legal research should subsequently explore how AICIS’ definition is applied in practice, focusing on how regulators pursue enforcement actions for materials that challenge these regulatory parameters.

Healthcare workers are often assumed to have a duty to work, even if faced with personal risk. This is particularly so for professionals. However, the health service also depends on non-professionals, such as porters, cooks and cleaners. The duty to work is currently under scrutiny because of the ongoing challenge of responding to pandemic influenza, where an effective response depends on most uninfected HCWs continuing to work, despite personal risk. This paper reports findings of a survey of HCWs conducted across three National Health Service trusts in the West Midlands, UK, to establish whether HCWs’ likelihood of working during a pandemic is associated with views about the duty to work. The sense that HCWs felt that they had a duty to work despite personal risk emerged strongly regardless of professional status. Besides a strong sense that everyone should pull together, all kinds of HCWs recognised a duty to work even in difficult circumstances, which correlated strongly with their stated likelihood of working. This suggests that HCWs’ decisions about whether or not they are prepared to work during a pandemic are closely linked to their sense of duty. However, respondents’ sense of the duty to work may conflict with their sense of duty to family, as well as other factors such as a perceived lack of reciprocity from their employers. Interestingly, nearly 25% of doctors did not consider that they had a duty to work where doing so would pose risks to themselves or their families.

Most academic papers on ethics in pandemics concentrate on the duties of healthcare professionals. This paper will consider non-professional healthcare workers: do they have a moral obligation to work during an influenza pandemic? If so, is this an obligation that outweighs others they might have, e.g., as parents, and should such an obligation be backed up by the coercive power of law? This paper considers whether non-professional healthcare workers—porters, domestic service workers, catering staff, clerks, IT support workers, etc.—have an obligation to work during an influenza pandemic. It uses data collected as part of a study looking at the attitudes of healthcare workers to working during a pandemic to suggest the philosophical arguments explored. These include: being in a position to do good, the ethics of work, competing obligations to family members and in particular to children and the obligations of citizens in a state of national emergency. We also look at whether compulsory measures are justified to support a national health service during a health emergency. We conclude that even if they are, compulsion should not be restricted to non-professionals who happen to be working in the health service at the time. Rather, compulsion involving a larger pool of people with the relevant skills and abilities is more equitable.

Background To describe the preferences for disclosure of individual biomarker results among mothers participating in a longitudinal birth cohort. Methods We surveyed 343 mothers that participated in the Health Outcomes and Measures of the Environment Study about their biomarker disclosure preferences. Participants were told that the study was measuring pesticide metabolites in their biological specimens, and that the health effects of these low levels of exposure are unknown. Participants were asked whether they wanted to receive their results and their child's results. In addition, they were asked about their preferred method (letter vs in person) and format (more complex vs less complex) for disclosure of results. Results Almost all of the study participants wanted to receive their individual results (340/343) as well as their child's results (342/343). However, preferences for receiving results differed by education level. Mothers with less than a college degree preferred in-person disclosure of results more often than mothers with some college education or a college degree (34.3% vs 17.4% vs 7.9%, p<0.001). Similarly, mothers with less than a college education preferred a less complex disclosure format than mothers with some college education or a college degree (59.7% vs 79.1% vs 86.3%, p<0.0001). Conclusion While almost all study participants preferred to receive results of their individual biomarker tests, level of education was a key factor in predicting preferences for disclosure of biomarker results. To ensure effective communication of this information, disclosure of biomarker results should be tailored to the education level of the study participants

Recent discussions of genomics and international justice have adopted the concept of ‘global public goods’ to support both the view of genomics as a benefit and the sharing of genomics knowledge across nations. Such discussion relies on a particular interpretation of the global public goods argument, facilitated by the ambiguity of the concept itself. Our aim in this article is to demonstrate this by a close examination of the concept of global public goods with particular reference to its use in the context of genomic databases. We contend that the argument for construing genomics as a global public good depends on seeing it as a natural good by focusing on features intrinsic to genomics knowledge. We shall argue that social and political arrangements are relevant and that recognising this opens the door to construing the use of global public goods language as a strategic one.

Sarah E. Wilson, University of Central LancashireThis paper's account of the core issues at stake in relation to genetic enhancement is presented as an alternative to mainstream liberal defenses of enhancement. The mainstream arguments are identified as being associated with reproductive autonomy, individual choice, and a `neutral', passive interpretation of technology. The alternative account is associated with the perspective of `woman' or child-bearer, with a fundamental concern for social justice, and an understanding of society in both a global and a contextual sense. This paper adopts a theoretical framework informed by feminist ethics, particularly a feminist ethic of care. The paper begins by outlining some of the key points of the care perspective, highlighting how this contrasts with a mainstream `justice' perspective, and illustrating how this is reflected in arguments relating to genetic enhancement. The paper then turns to a consideration of how a care perspective might be applied to questions of genetic enhancement, and how this may bring forward new issues. This includes in particular a consideration of IVF technologies and how applying understandings from research into this area brings forward usually unaddressed concerns in considering genetic enhancement. The final section of the paper covers some of the questions that there is space to ask once the narrow focus on individual rights is overcome.