Sardar Hosseini

This paper aims to show that the skeptical realist interpretation of Hume’s theory of the mind is misguided. This claim is based on the following argument: Hume’s treatment of the mind shows that while it is not unreasonable to contend that some of Hume’s usage of the term “essence” may be construed as positing a transcendental self or core to the mind that can be regarded as something over and above succession of perceptions, it is not clear that they always should be so construed. Hume uses the term “essence” in three distinct senses: (a) in the Cartesian-Spinozistic sense as a simple substance in which perceptions inhere; (b) to refer to ultimate principles or secret powers; and (c) to refer to the most striking of several features essential to an entity or effect. An examination of the texts shows that (c) dominates Hume’s usage. The philosophical outcome of distinguishing these senses is to show that if (c) dominates Hume’s usage, then Hume ’s reference to “essence” might commonly refer to salient features of the mind rather than affirming its existence as a distinct and independent entity.

This paper aims to show that the skeptical realist interpretation of Hume’s theory of the mind is misguided. This claim is based on the following argument: Hume’s treatment of the mind shows that while it is not unreasonable to contend that some of Hume’s usage of the term “essence” may be construed as positing a transcendental self or core to the mind that can be regarded as something over and above succession of perceptions, it is not clear that they always should be so construed. Hume uses the term “essence” in three distinct senses: (a) in the Cartesian-Spinozistic sense as a simple substance in which perceptions inhere; (b) to refer to ultimate principles or secret powers; and (c) to refer to the most striking of several features essential to an entity or effect. An examination of the texts shows that (c) dominates Hume’s usage. The philosophical outcome of distinguishing these senses is to show that if (c) dominates Hume’s usage, then Hume ’s reference to “essence” might commonly refer to salient features of the mind rather than affirming its existence as a distinct and independent entity.

Abstract:This paper claims that Hume is committed to a rather sophisticated form of functionalism. This claim is based upon the following arguments: first, Hume’s characterization of objects such as vegetables and animal bodies in terms of their functional identity, and their underlying analogy with the identity we ascribe to persons or selves, implies that an absolute constancy is not part of the essential nature of persons. Rather, what corresponds to this assumed metaphysical constancy is functional identity. Second, Hume’s distinction between the question concerning the substance of the mind on the one hand, and the questions concerning the local conjunction and cause of our perceptions, on the other, has much in common with, and anticipates, the much-celebrated functionalist distinction between the ontology and metaphysics of the mind.