Saša Josifović

In the history of Chinese and European philosophy, metaphysics has played an outstanding role: it is a theoretical framework which provides the basis for a philosophical understanding of the world and the self. A theory of the self is well integrated in a metaphysical understanding of the totality of nature as a dynamic process of continuous changes. According to this view, the purpose of existence can be conceived of as the development and realization of the full potential given to the individual by its nature. In regard to human nature specifically, this idea of self-realization includes the development of all cognitive faculties as well as of the moral character. Metaphysics has, however, suffered a loss of importance in current debates, especially in ethics. As a result, we observe the emergence of such philosophical views as moral skepticism and even nihilism. The consequence of this tendency has been the renunciation of a claim to understanding and to providing a solid ground for ethics. Yet an intercultural dialogue can provide us with some hope as the consolidation of debates on crucial topics of our traditions might indeed serve as the basis for a more powerful philosophy in the future

In this text the author argues that the major achievement of Schelling’s aesthetics in his System of Transcendental Idealism consists in its contribution to the theory of self-consciousness. He emphasizes that a detailed interpretation of the underlying concepts of intellectual and ideal (vollkommen) intuition provides an adequate approach to the understanding of the systematic function of the philosophy of art within the system of knowledge including the unconscious sphere of self knowledge and self realization.

Hölderlin’s „Urteil und Sein“ is certainly one of the most intensively discussed fragments in German Idealism. Since Dieter Henrich’s influential interpretation from 1965 it is firmly believed that Urteil und Sein represents a key reference for a unique and „courageous attack“ on Fichte’s principle of philosophy, the „Ich“ of the intellectual intuition. According to Henrich and his followers, Hölderlin argues that the principle of philosophy ought to be „Sein“ instead of „Ich“. In contrast to Henrich, I believe that Urteil und Sein does not contain any kind of critical remarks on Fichte’s philosophy at all. To follow my argumentation, it is only required to avoid the confusion between the content of the intellectual intuition and self-consciousness.Hölderlins Fragment Urteil und Sein zählt zu den bedeutendsten Dokumenten der klassischen deutschen Philosophie und ist seit Henrichs wirkungsmächtiger Interpretation 1965/66 von nahezu allen namhaften deutschen Idealismusforschern Henrichkonform interpretiert worden. Es gilt als einmalige Referenz für eine ebenso einmalige Kritik am Subjekt als Prinzip der Philosophie – namentlich an Fichtes Prinzip. In diesem Diskussionsbeitrag werfe ich die Frage auf, ob dies wirklich der Fall ist, und vertrete die These, dass in Urteil und Sein keinerlei Kritik an Fichtes Philosophie nachweisbar ist. Meine Argumentation beruht auf der Unterscheidung zwischen dem „Ich“ als gedanklichen Gehalt der intellektuellen Anschauung und dem Selbstbewusstsein als Ausdruck der reflexiven Gewahrwerdens seiner selbst im Bewusstsein, nämlich „Ich bin Ich“.