Saul Kripke

(1940 - 2022)

This chapter is concerned with what is called in the linguistics literature “the projection problem for presuppositions.” That problem is simply this: if we have a logically complex sentence whose clauses bear certain presuppositions, how do we compute the presuppositions of the whole? The main thesis is that the usual literature on the projection problem for presupposition ignores an anaphoric element that ought to have been taken into account. When this element is put in, there is a considerable change in the formulation of the problem.

This chapter analyzes Frege's theory of sense and reference. There is in a sense a “backward road” from references to senses. For everyone who specifies a reference must do so in some way. Then, by her awareness of how she has specified the reference, she is aware of the way the reference is fixed, and hence is aware of the sense. Frege's most explicit use of this is in the beginning of the _Grundgesetze_ (1893), where, after concluding that every term has a unique referent, and every sentence a truth-value, he concludes that every sentence of the system expresses a thought given by the way the truth-conditions are specified. Linguistic rules, and the Fregean thoughts involved, can normally be given by general directions exemplified by (α) and (β). But to apply these rules, and indeed to understand them, a user of the language or a thinker must have something very like Russellian acquaintance with directly or indirectly quoted material, senses, times, subjects, and inner mental states.

This chapter presents a puzzle about names and belief. A moral or two will be drawn about some other arguments that have occasionally been advanced in this area, but the main thesis is a simple one: that the puzzle is a puzzle. And, as a corollary, that any account of belief must ultimately come to grips with it. Any speculation as to solutions can be deferred. The first section of the chapter gives the theoretical background in previous discussion, and in the author's own earlier work, that led him to consider the puzzle. The second section states some general principles which underlie our general practice of reporting beliefs. The third section finally deals with the puzzle.

This chapter discusses some issues inspired by a well-known paper of Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,”. Donnellan's paper claims to give decisive objections both to Russell's theory of definite descriptions (taken as a theory about English) and to Strawson's. The chapter' concern is not primarily with the question: is Donnellan right, or is Russell (or Strawson)? Rather, it is with the question: do the considerations in Donnellan's paper refute Russell's theory (or Strawson's)? For definiteness, it focuses on Donnellan versus Russell, leaving Strawson aside. And about this issue it draws a definite conclusion, one which will illuminate a few methodological maxims about language.

This chapter focuses on the paradox of the surprise examination. A teacher announces that he will give an examination within the month. Examinations are always given at noon. He also announces that the exam will be a surprise exam: no student will know on the day before the exam is given that it will be given the next day. A student can then reason as follows: The teacher, if he intends to fulfill his announced promise, cannot give the exam on the very last day. If he did, after noon had passed on the previous day, we (the students) would know that only the last day was left and that it had to be the day of the examination. This would be a plain contradiction of the announcement that it was to be a surprise exam, so that day can be crossed off the calendar. But then it cannot be given on the second-to-last day either because, after noon of the day before has passed and the exam still has not been given, we will realize that only two days are left, and that since the last day is ruled out, the exam must be given on the second-to-last day. But then we would know in advance that that is the day of the exam, which is again a contradiction. It is interesting that this kind of problem is discussed as if it were a philosophical problem at all. How philosophical it actually is depends on whatever philosophical morals we may draw from it.

One of the main concerns of Kripke's previous work is the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms. A classical view which Putnam mentioned, advocated by Mill, states that proper names have as their function simply to refer; they have denotation but not connotation. The alternative view, which until fairly recently has dominated the field, has been that of Frege and Russell. They hold that ordinary names have connotation in a very strong sense: a proper name such as “Napoleon” simply means _the man having most of the properties we commonly attribute to Napoleon, such as being Emperor of the French, losing at Waterloo, and the like_. For various general terms, such as _cow_ and _tiger_ or _elm_ and _beech_, not only Frege and Russell, but Mill as well, held that they have connotation in the sense that we learn what it is to be a tiger by being given some list of properties which form necessary and sufficient conditions for being a tiger. In both these cases, both where Mill and Frege– Russell disagree and where Mill and Frege–Russell agree, Kripke has advocated the view that the consensus is largely wrong; that it is reference which is much more important here than any supposed sense. This chapter discusses one aspect of this problem, since no consideration in favor of the Frege–Russell view of proper names has seemed more conclusive than the fact that names can sometimes be empty—that, for example, they can occur in fiction. Also, even if they do in fact refer, it is intelligible to raise the question of whether the alleged referent really exists.

A problem which has arisen frequently in contemporary philosophy is: “How are contingent identity statements possible?” This question is phrased by analogy with the way Kant phrased his question “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” It has usually been taken for granted in the one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgments were possible, and in the other case in contemporary philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are possible. This chapter argues that in both the case of names and the case of the theoretical identifications, the identity statements are necessary and not contingent. That is to say, they are necessary if _true_; of course, false identity statements are not necessary. This view is defended by first distinguishing between the terms _rigid_ and _nonrigid designator_, and the notions of a prioricity and necessity.

_Naming and Necessity_ has had a great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of naming, and of identity. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here reissued in a newly corrected form with a new preface by the author. If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics, or in philosophy of language, this is it.

“Much of the philosophical work of the last half-century could not have existed without Naming and Necessity. If you read this marvelous book, you???ll find out why.”_ David Chalmers,_ University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness, NYU “Naming and Necessity represents a turning-point in the development of modern philosophy. It showed how confusions in the philosophy of language had blocked progress in metaphysics, and it provided a model of systematic philosophical theorizing informed by innovations in logic.”_ Timothy Williamson,_ Wykeham Professor of Logic Emeritus, Oxford University Since first appearing in 1972, Saul Kripke's _Naming and Necessity_ has shaped and continues to shape debates in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and adjacent areas. It overturned long-established views concerning the relationships between names and descriptions and a _priority_ and necessity, and catalyzed today's thriving essentialist metaphysics. This landmark work is here reissued for its 50th anniversary with a new preface by the author revisiting its central themes. If there is such a thing as essential reading in analytic philosophy, this is it.

Originally I had intended to revise or augment Naming and Necessity extensively. Considerable time has elapsed, and I have come to realize that any extensive revision or expansion would delay the appearance of a separate, less expensive edition of Naming and Necessity indefinitely. Further, as far as revision is concerned, there is something to be said for preserving a work in its original form, warts and all. I have thus followed a very conservative policy of correction for the present printing. Obvious printing errors have been corrected, and slight changes have been made to make various sentences or formulations clearer.

The following is a typeset copy of a letter sent by Saul Kripke to David Lewis on August 11, 1969 regarding the article “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic” (Lewis, 1968). The original letter was typeset by Mimi Foster (indicated by the initials “mf” at the end of the letter) at Rockefeller University. In consultation with Saul Kripke, we corrected some typos, filled in blank formulas, and added three footnotes. Keywords have been added before the letter, references have been added after the letter, and the original pagination of the letter is reflected in bracketed parentheticals. (The Editors.)

Wittgenstein gave a clearly erroneous refutation of Russell’s logicist project. The errors were ably pointed out by Mark Steiner. Nevertheless, I was motivated by Wittgenstein and Steiner to consider various ideas about the natural numbers. I ask which notations for natural numbers are ‘buck-stoppers’. For us it is the decimal notation and the corresponding verbal system. Based on the idea that a proper notation should be ‘structurally revelatory’, I draw various conclusions about our own concept of the natural numbers.