Sayeh Meisami

After reviewing the historical, intellectual, and ideological fabric of the age of the Fatimid imam/caliph al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh, the chapter explains the highlights of Kirmānī’s cosmology against both the Greek and Islamic backgrounds. In discussing Kirmānī’s theory of the soul, the chapter highlights his use of an evolutionary narrative of the soul. For Kirmānī the rational soul is the perfection of the lower stages of one and the same spiritual substance. The analysis of Kirmānī’s theory of the soul and knowledge formation shows that while it is strongly influenced by Aristotelian and Neoplatonic discourses, his adoption of Neoplatonic narratives in his cognitive psychology is best understood in light of the Shīʿī discourse of the epistemic authority of the imam and the ranks below him within the Fatimid institution.

In this chapter, after a brief review of the historical and intellectual context of Mullā Ṣadrā’s work, the author explains Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of knowledge and the soul. Next, she analyzes his discourse of the imamate and absolute authority, which arguably rests on his theory of knowledge. Since much work has already been done on Mullā Ṣadrā’s epistemology and psychology, the analysis is focused on those concepts and narratives that lead the author to understand the potential in Mullā Ṣadrā’s synthetic discourse which she sees as playing a part in shaping the discourse of Shīʿī imamate as the source of both spiritual and political authority. In examining Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of knowledge and the human soul, primary reference is made to his Risāla fī ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa’l-maʿqūl and parts of al-Asfār.

This chapter focuses on Ḥamīd al-Dīn Kirmānī’s discussion of the imamate in relation to his theory of the soul and of knowledge formation. In this respect the author makes three arguments. First, Kirmānī constructs a conceptual scheme that accommodates a rational formulation of the imamate based on Aristotelian psychology and Plotinus’ doctrine of emanation. Second, the synthetic discourse that he employs in this respect culminates in an existential narrative of the evolution of the soul through inspirational knowledge. Third, this synthetic discourse and the existential narrative reappear and resonate in the Ismaʿili texts of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, one of the major influences on the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā.

Mullā Ṣadrā’s synthetic discourse on knowledge and authority can be interpreted as a discursive springboard for the establishment of the modern discourse of Shīʿī political authority, prominently the guardianship of the jurist (wilāya al-faqīh) in contemporary Iran. The author briefly reviews the discursive legacy of Mullā Ṣadrā in the formation and development of the discourse on the absolute religio-political authority of top jurists. The chapter follows the thread of his narrative of absolute epistemic authority as it relates to the imam and his representatives. The focus will be on the incorporation of philosophical and Sufi discourses into several influential texts from early modern and modern times, a process which culminated in the establishment of the theory of wilāya al-faqih as the dominant religio-political discourse during and after the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

This chapter provides an introduction to the discursive bond between philosophy and Shiʿism. It discusses the relation between narratives of Islamic epistemology/psychology and those of Shīʿī authority in their complex religious and political applications. The author argues that the possibility of historical confluence aside, the two fields share narratives, arguments, statements, and concepts. She also highlights the synthetic methodology which is prominent in the philosophical texts produced in a Shīʿī context. The chapter also explains the rationale for comparing Ḥamīd al-Dīn Kirmānī and Mullā Ṣadrā. The author argues that though separated by time, location, and ideology, Kirmānī and Mullā Ṣadrā belong to the same tradition of synthesizing Greek discourses on knowledge with Shīʿī discourses on the imamate. This chapter ends with notes on the author’s method of analysis and style.

_Mu__ḥ__ammad Ghazālī (d. 1111) influenced some of the key metaphysical teachings of Shia Safavid philosophers, most prominently, Mullā __Ṣ__adrā Shīrāzī (d. ca. 1636). In this paper, I argue that Mullā __Ṣ__adrā reads Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) through the lens of Mu__ḥ__ammad Ghazālī’s Sufi Ash__ʿ__arism to offer a solution to the problem of freewill in the Islamic context. In his adaptation of causal necessity from Ibn S__ī__n__ā__, Mull__ā_ _Ṣ__adrā argues that “necessity” as a concept is co-extensional with “existence” because in reality all that is the case is necessarily so. On the other hand, all things including voluntary actions and will are only relatively existent since the only independent existence is that of God. I demonstrate that like Ibn Sīnā, Mullā __Ṣ__adrā acknowledges the existence of a causal chain in which all intermediary causes including human freewill have causal power. But, similar to Ghazālī’s account, all human acts including voluntary ones are from God since in Mullā __Ṣ__adrā’s universe freewill is a lower degree of God’s Will. For Mullā __Ṣ__adrā, the acquisition of action by human beings in the case of voluntary actions, a notion that he adopts from Ghazālī, is the same as “acquiring” existence from God’s existence._.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown by Mohammad AzadpurSayeh Meisami (bio)Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown. By Mohammad Azadpur. London: Routledge, 2020. Pp. 128. Paperback $48.95, isbn 978-1-03-204868-9. It is a herculean task to put into a meaningful conversation two philosophical discourses which are centuries apart not only in time but in methods and missions. This may even be regarded as a futile attempt from the perspective of evolutionist ideology which tends to see in the temporal progress of human civilization a one-way approximation to truth. The evolutionist ideology of modernity regardless of its various manifestations and methodologies, is an epitome of modern western intellectual narcissism. For example, despite their conflicting methods and philosophical systems, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel equally follow the modernist ideology of progress culminating in the Eurocentric hegemony of scientism which treats pre-modern philosophical traditions as historical/ornamental things of the past which belong in the museums of intellectual history. However, the Eurocentric model has been exposed in its many faces and come under powerful criticisms by both western and non-western intellectuals over the past few decades. One important critical stronghold belongs to contemporary Islamic philosophers who have embarked on a revival of Islamic philosophy in its own right. The best among these philosophers do not repeat the mistake of othering; instead they work on facilitating conversations. The last two books by Mohammad Azadpur are important contributions to this endeavor. The philosophical goal of Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna, as described by its author, is to use Avicenna's texts as a shield against "the unwarranted philosophical encroachment of natural science enthusiasts on epistemology and metaphysics" (p. 4). To accomplish this goal, Azadpur offers a deep study of analytic philosophers, most prominently Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, in comparison with each other on the one hand and with the medieval Persian philosopher, Avicenna (d. 1037) on the other. He finds himself justified in this comparison as Sellars and McDowell themselves "place value on engaging the history of philosophy" (p. 1). The aim of the comparison is to show that despite the usefulness of the analytical toolkit for a more sophisticated reading of Avicenna's position on the relation between sense perception and intellection, the latter provides a more consistent view of the problem in the absence of the [End Page 1] scientism that Sellars suffers from. Meanwhile, we find Sellars under the influence of Kant and in comparison to some key figures of analytic philosophy such as W. V. Quine, Richard Rorty, and Donald Davidson. Within the confinement of these pages, it is impossible to review all the ideas and arguments in Azadpur's book, but here is what the reader can expect to find therein in a nutshell. After an informative Introduction that captures the gist of the book, the author devotes Chapter One to Sellars' criticism of an empiricist legacy in epistemology which is famously referred to as "the Myth of the Given," namely, the grounding of empirical knowledge in sensory experience without the latter having any grounds in the conceptual/linguistic space of reason. While not denying "non-inferential" knowledge about the world, Sellars rejects "the thesis that the non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact is itself unjustified by other knowledge." (p. 9). To explain Sellars' position with an example, to know what is "blue" is to recognize it as belonging to a "this-such" nexus in the space of reason/language. This means that my reception of something as "blue" is not the mere result of natural interactions between my vision and the world, but also due to the place of "blue" among a host of other concepts such as red, yellow, green in my conceptual/linguistic space of reason. In his criticism of the empiricist myth, Sellars commends Kantian epistemology for presenting sensibility and understanding in cooperation with each other. However, he does not consider Kantian theory of sense perception sufficient to explain sensory justification because he believes that in the absence of a full-fledged scientific account, Kant's theory of sense impressions lingers at the level of "empty abstractions." Azadpur strongly disagrees with Sellars' criticism...

This book is a comparative study of two major Shīʿī thinkers Ḥamīd al-Dīn Kirmānī from the Fatimid Egypt and Mullā Ṣadrā from the Safavid Iran, demonstrating the mutual empowerment of discourses on knowledge formation and religio-political authority in certain Ismaʿili and Twelver contexts. The book investigates concepts, narratives, and arguments that have contributed to the generation and development of the discourse on the absolute authority of the imam and his representatives. To demonstrate this, key passages from primary texts in Arabic and Persian are translated and closely analyzed to highlight the synthesis of philosophical, Sufi, theological, and scriptural discourses. The book also discusses the discursive influence of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī as a key to the transmission of Ismaʿili narratives of knowledge and authority to later Shīʿī philosophy and its continuation to modern and contemporary times particularly in the narrative of the guardianship of the jurist in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mulla Sadra is perhaps the single most important and influential philosopher in the Muslim world in the last four hundred years. The author of over forty works, he sought to bring to life the whole heritage of Islamic thought, from philosophy to mysticism, and create a more flexible and conciliatory approach to the problems which seemed to dissociate reason from faith. In this wide-ranging profile, Sayeh Meisami reaches beyond historical narrative to assess the true impact of the man and his ideas. This thought provoking and comprehensive account is ideal for any philosopher wanting to uncover the life and thoughts of a man who represents the climax of intellectual tradition at a crucial point in the history of Islamic civilization.