•  607
    B-Theory and Time Biases
    In Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle & Peter Øhrstrøm (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time: Further Themes from Prior, Aalborg University Press. pp. 41-52. 2019.
    We care not only about what experiences we have, but when we have them too. However, on the B-theory of time, something’s timing isn’t an intrinsic way for that thing to be or become. Given B-theory, should we be rationally indifferent about the timing per se of an experience? In this paper, I argue that B-theorists can justify time-biased preferences for pains to be past rather than present and for pleasures to be present rather than past. In support of this argument, I appeal to the doctrine o…Read more
  •  413
    Future Bias and Presentism
    In Per Hasle, Peter Øhrstrøm & David Jakobsen (eds.), The Metaphysics of Time: Themes from Prior, . pp. 281-297. 2020.
    Future-biased agents care not only about what experiences they have, but also when they have them. Many believe that A-theories of time justify future bias. Although presentism is an A-theory of time, some argue that it nevertheless negates the justification for future bias. Here, I claim that the alleged discrepancy between presentism and future bias is a special case of the cross-time relations problem. To resolve the discrepancy, I propose an account of future bias as a preference for certain…Read more
  •  152
    Future Bias and Regret
    In David Jakobsen, Peter Øhrstrøm & Per Hasle (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time: The History and Philosophy of Tense-Logic, Aalborg University Press. pp. 1-13. 2023.
    The rationality of future bias figures crucially in various metaphysical and ethical arguments (Prior 1959; Parfit 1984; Fischer 2019). Recently, however, philosophers have raised several arguments to the effect that future bias is irrational (Dougherty 2011; Suhler and Callender 2012; Greene and Sullivan 2015). Particularly, Greene and Sullivan (2015) claim that future bias is irrational because future bias leads to two kinds of irrational planning behaviors in agents who also seek to avoid reg…Read more
  •  112
    The argument from sideways music
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1): 64-69. 2020.
    Recently in Analysis, Ned Markosian (2019) has argued that a popular theory in the metaphysics of time—the Spacetime Thesis—falsely predicts that a normal musical performance is just as aesthetically valuable if it is rotated “sideways,” that is, if it is made to occur all at once. However, this argument falsely assumes that changing how something is oriented in space, and changing its duration in time, are analogous. That said, assuming they were analogous, Markosian’s argument is still unsucce…Read more
  •  58
    The access-to-justice movement broadly concerns the extent to which people have the ability to resolve legally actionable problems. To the extent that individuals seek resolution through civil litigation, they can be disadvantaged by their unmet need for legal services, particularly in high-stakes cases and complicated areas of law. In part, this is because legal services and litigation are cost-prohibitive, especially for indigent plaintiffs. As a result, these individuals are priced out of lit…Read more
  •  51
    Epistemic isomorphism
    Metaphilosophy 53 (4): 543-554. 2022.
    This paper presents and defends a novel meta‐epistemological thesis, epistemic isomorphism, according to which our relations to others and to ourselves have the same pattern of relevance to our rationality. This means that correct epistemological theorizing will give formal parity to interpersonal and intrapersonal epistemic norms, such that what holds interpersonally also holds, mutatis mutandis, intrapersonally. In addition to arguing for epistemic isomorphism, the paper presents some epistemo…Read more
  •  30
    Tom Dougherty (2013) argues that the following moral principles are inconsistent: (α) it is impermissible to benefit many people slightly rather than save someone’s life, and (β) it is permissible to risk someone’s life slightly to benefit them slightly. This inconsistency has highly counterintuitive consequences for non-consequentialist moral theories. However, Dougherty’s argument, the “Repetition Argument,” relies on a premise that ignores a morally important distinction between acting with s…Read more