Scott Gravlee

This chapter examines a range of ancient Greek and Roman views regarding hope, developing themes drawn from philosophical sources—including Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoic and Epicurean schools—and discussing approaches and applications in the narratives of Thucydides and in ancient Greek medicine. Selected references to Greek and Roman literature and cultural practices are also included. Together, these ancient sources reveal complex human attitudes about the future, and the chapter considers various criteria used to make judgments about the value of hope. Themes include the relationships of hope to fear and courage, rationality and memory, emotion and pleasure, and human agency and well-being. Throughout, connections are made with current philosophical literature on hope, in the belief that familiarity with the variety and nuance of ancient attitudes can promote a deeper understanding of our own notions of hope.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is punctuated by a tension between orienting one's life towards practical and ethical goals on the one hand, and orienting one's life towards theoretical and contemplative activity on the other hand. According to Aristotle, we are political and social beings, but we also have a theoretical and divine element in us. Given these two aspects of human nature, shall we choose to cultivate one at the expense of the other, or shall we choose both--and if the latter, then how shall we explain the place each holds in a well-lived human life? ;According to Aristotle, phronesis, practical wisdom, is expressed in the ethical virtues, while sophia, theoretical wisdom, is expressed in theoria, the activity of contemplation. I resolve the apparent conflict between the practical and the theoretical by explaining first the relationship between phronesis and sophia, and next the relationship between ethical virtue and contemplation. ;Sophia is necessary to the possession of practical wisdom. In showing this, I introduce distinctions among several types of particulars and universals, and I pair these with the concepts of means and ends, in order to argue that the central characteristic of the phronimos, the person of practical wisdom, is an ability to choose, through experience which leads to self-knowledge, ends and means which are appropriate to him as a particular agent. Further, in order to choose such particular ends and means well, the phronimos must take into account a general description of human nature. Since understanding human nature is a theoretical undertaking, theoretical knowledge plays a crucial role in the practical choices of the phronimos. ;The final chapter of the dissertation explains theoria as the essence of happiness . Theoria defines and is coexistent with eudaimonia, and it explains the possibility of human eudaimonia, but it is not the sole constituent of the best human life; ethical virtue is a necessary, but non-essential, part of human eudaimonia. This understanding completes the resolution of the apparent conflict between the practical and the theoretical, by allowing ethical virtue to be a necessary part of the best human life, while simultaneously explaining the special status of theoria in Aristotle's picture of such a life

This chapter aims to illuminate ways in which hope was significant in the philosophy of classical Greece. Although ancient Greek philosophies contain few dedicated and systematic expositions on the nature of hope, they nevertheless include important remarks relating hope to the good life, to reason and deliberation, and to psychological phenomena such as memory, imagination, fear, motivation, and pleasure. After an introductory discussion of Hesiod and Heraclitus, the chapter focuses on Plato and Aristotle. Consideration is given both to Plato’s direct comments on hope and to the narrative contexts of his dialogues, with analysis of Plato’s positive and negative representations of hope, hope’s relationship to reason, and Plato’s more psychological approach in the Philebus, where hope finds a place among memory, recollection, pleasure, and pain. The chapter then reviews Aristotle’s discussions of confidence, hope, and courage, observing that although Aristotle does not mention hope as a virtue, he does note its importance to human agency and deliberation and as a foundation for the further development of virtue. The chapter concludes that discussions surrounding hope in ancient Greek philosophy are rich and challenging and can serve as a lively stimulus to further exploration of the concept of hope.

This paper explores the concept of hope in Aristotle’s philosophy. First, I note that Aristotle contrasts hopefulness with the virtue of courage, although hopefulness can be a source of courage in some contexts, because hopefulness can create confidence. Next, I examine hope in relation to fear, defending Aristotle’s claim that without hope we cannot fear, and suggesting that hope, as a foundation for both fear and confidence, is a fundamental requirement for deliberation. Finally, I look at the hopefulness that underlies Aristotle’s virtue of high-mindedness, concluding that hopefulness is a foundation for self-confidence and ethical self-improvement.