Are we responsible for the unintended consequences of our actions? The ethical significance of this question becomes clear when we concede that sometimes we unknowingly fail to meet an obligation, think through the consequences of a decision, or reflect on how habits influence what we do. To posit an answer, I turn to the thought of G. W. F. Hegel in order to develop an account of self-determination that incorporates the heterogeneous conditions necessary for an agent to commit herself to an end…
Read moreAre we responsible for the unintended consequences of our actions? The ethical significance of this question becomes clear when we concede that sometimes we unknowingly fail to meet an obligation, think through the consequences of a decision, or reflect on how habits influence what we do. To posit an answer, I turn to the thought of G. W. F. Hegel in order to develop an account of self-determination that incorporates the heterogeneous conditions necessary for an agent to commit herself to an end, and a corresponding account of responsibility that is attributed in virtue of what the agent commits herself to.
The first part of the argument contrasts two ways that we often think about human action. I identify a first (broadly Kantian) conception as individualistic, and a second (broadly Hegelian) conception as holistic. Where the Kantian agent acts freely in spite of inclinations, habits, second nature, and social commitments, the Hegelian agent acts freely only in virtue of these conditions. From these considerations, I conclude that the Hegelian approach offers a more realistic conception of agency.
Expounding on this, the second part investigates how human beings are determinative of what they do. The possibility to act arises in the convergence between external conditions and our own potentials to act. These potentials (comprised of biological attributes, habituation, and education) combine to orient practical life by influencing what we notice, what we neglect, what reasons we have, what occurs to us, and so forth. While these potentials ground the possibility of acting, they also delimit what an agent is attentive to when she acts.
In light of this inclusive view of self-determination, the third part argues that an agent is responsible for what is expressed in her actions even if she was blind to these consequences. Restricting responsibility to what an agent is consciously aware of when she acts consigns us to a solipsistic ethics where ignorance exculpates the agent. To avoid this, I claim that mature human agency necessitates committing oneself to ideas, projects, and other people; and consequently, that an agent is responsible when her action contravenes her commitments.