Sean Carroll

We put forward a quantum model of cosmology that is exactly periodic but avoids the Boltzmann Brain problem. If the universe is described by a quantum state evolving unitarily in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, its evolution will be recurrent: given enough time, the state will return arbitrarily close to its initial state. There is a worry that such a scenario cannot be phenomenologically acceptable, because the state will spend most of its time in a high-entropy equilibrium macrostate, with rare fluctuations downward in entropy, and the vast majority of observers will be minimal fluctuations away from equilibrium, or “Boltzmann Brains.” Here we show that this is not necessarily true. If the differences in energy eigenvalues are commensurable, the evolution is not simple recurrent, but exactly periodic. Moreover, if the state starts at minimum thermodynamic entropy, its evolution can feature a distinguished entropy excursion that is much more pronounced than one would expect from the conventional expression P(∆S)∝exp(−∆S). This excursion could represent our Big Bang, with relatively few Boltzmann fluctuations occurring in the subsequent equilibrium phase before a Big Crunch occurs and the cycle begins again. We speculate on the spacetime interpretation of this kind of quantum universe.

Sean M. Carroll notes that, despite popular stereotypes of existential “philosophers sitting in cafes, smoking cigarettes and drinking apricot cocktails” and neuroscientists decked out in lab coats, there is an undeniable connection between existentialism and science. This is perhaps easy to see with biology and neuroscience, but the connection goes beyond this. Carroll maintains that, “An honest grappling with the questions of purpose and freedom in the universe must also involve ideas from physics and cosmology.” He goes on to argue that if we want to create purpose and meaning at the scale of individual human lives, we must understand the nature of the larger universe of which we are a part. After discussing what modern physics can tell us about determinism, quantum mechanics, the arrow of time, and emergence, Carroll concludes by exploring the existential implications of these insights for freedom and meaning.

A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (many-worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period, it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but we argue that the temptation should be resisted. Applying lessons from this analysis, we demonstrate (using methods similar to those of Zurek’s envariance-based derivation) that the Born rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics. In doing so, we rely on a single key principle: changes to the environment alone do not affect the probabilities one ought to assign to measurement outcomes in a local subsystem. We arrive at a method for assigning probabilities in cases that involve both classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty. This method provides unique answers to quantum Sleeping Beauty problems, as well as a well-defined procedure for calculating probabilities in quantum cosmological multiverses with multiple similar observers. 1. Introduction2. Preliminaries: Many-Worlds, Self-locating Uncertainty, and Branch-counting 2.1. The many-worlds interpretation2.2. Self-locating uncertainty and the Everettian multiverse2.3. Indifference and the quantitative probability problem2.4. Against branch-counting3. The Epistemic Irrelevance of the Environment 3.1. The epistemic separability principle3.2. Deriving the Born rule4. Varieties of Uncertainty 4.1. Epistemic separability principle and indifference4.2. Mixed uncertainties4.3. Large universe cosmology and the quantum multiverse5. Probability in Practice 5.1. Betting and branching5.2. Theory confirmation6. Comparison to Other Approaches 6.1. Zurek’s envariance-based derivation of the Born rule6.2. The decision-theoretic programme7. ConclusionAppendix.