De Re and De Dicto Explanation of ActionPhilosophia 40 (4): 783-798. 2012.This paper argues for an account of the relation between thought ascription and the explanation of action according to which de re ascriptions and de dicto ascriptions of thought each form the basis for two different kinds of action explanations, nonrationalizing and rationalizing ones. The claim that de dicto ascriptions explain action is familiar and virtually beyond dispute; the claim that that de re ascriptions are explanatory of action, however, is not at all familiar and indeed has mostly …Read more
Philosophy of Mind: Critical Concepts in Philosophy (edited book)Routledge. 2010.
A solution for Russellians to a puzzle about beliefAnalysis 64 (3): 223-29. 2004.According to Russellianism (or Millianism), the two sentences ‘Ralph believes George Eliot is a novelist’ and ‘Ralph believes Mary Ann Evans is a novelist’ cannot diverge in truth-value, since they express the same proposition. The problem for the Russellian (or Millian) is that a puzzle of Kaplan’s seems to show that they can diverge in truth-value and that therefore, since the Russellian holds that they express the same proposition, the Russellian view is contradictory. I argue that the standa…Read more
University of ManchesterDepartment of PhilosophyRegular Faculty
Faculty of Philosophy