Sebastian Conte

In this thesis, I investigate whether the challenge from experimental philosophy succeeds in undermining the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE). This challenge builds on recent empirical investigations of intuitions about cases conducted by experimental philosophers. It is argued that these investigations have provided evidence suggesting that intuitions should not play an important epistemic role. Moreover, some have suggested that this, in turn, suggests that MRE should be rejected. The assumption is that intuitions play an essential epistemic role in MRE. First, I consider a response to the challenge from experimental philosophy according to which the common belief that intuitions play a significant epistemic role in philosophical inquiries is false. If most philosophers apply MRE, but do not rely on intuitions, then the challenge from experimental philosophy does not undermine MRE. I argue, however, that philosophers rely on intuitions in moral inquiries. Second, I consider whether intuitions play an essential epistemic role in MRE. I argue that they do not play an essential role in (some) wide interpretations of the ideal of MRE. Therefore, the challenge does not undermine those versions of MRE. However, I also argue that the challenge does undermine implementations of MRE according to which the assumption that intuitions play a central epistemic role is treated as fixed.