Sebastián Mejía-Rendón

El enfoque filosófico tradicional de la metacognición, que exige metarrepresentaciones y capacidades reflexivas, suele negar la posibilidad de metacognición en animales no humanos. Sin embargo, estudios en psicología comparada muestran que algunas especies de primates, como monos rhesus y chimpancés, exhiben conductas compatibles con procesos metacognitivos. Este trabajo analiza estudios del paradigma de búsqueda de información, con especial atención al denominado caso Perdue, en el que chimpancés utilizan herramientas de manera estratégica bajo condiciones de incertidumbre. Sostengo que este comportamiento constituye un caso claro de metacognición procedimental. En particular, argumento que los chimpancés no solo inhiben respuestas, sino que seleccionan activamente estrategias epistémicas —como el uso de herramientas— guiadas por sentimientos metacognitivos. Concluyo que el modelo de metacognición procedimental, concebido como un continuo que va del monitoreo básico al uso estratégico de herramientas, supera las limitaciones de las explicaciones puramente asociativas y metarrepresentacionales.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently gained considerable attention due to their ability to draw inferences from information provided by users. These neural networks appear to generate logical inferences on a probabilistic basis, often emulating patterns that resemble classical rules of inference. Traditionally, inference has been understood as a cognitive process through which conclusions are derived from premises. However, the nature of inference itself, and the possibility of extending it beyond the human domain, has long been debated. In particular, a central question arises: can the inferential capacity of LLMs be comparable to that of human beings? This article argues that the difference between human inference and the kind of inference produced by LLMs lies in the phenomenological, or affective, dimension of reasoning. More specifically, the distinction concerns the absence of metacognitive feelings that guide, monitor, and evaluate thought processes, such as reasoning or inferring. Although LLMs are capable of simulating novel inferences, their tendency to generate inferential hallucinations reveals the lack of the self-regulatory dimension that characterizes human reasoning. In contrast to the affective component present in human condition, inferential failures in LLMs can be interpreted in terms of three aspects: the reversal curse, inferential hallucinations resulting from decoding strategies, and overconfidence. Accordingly, it is concluded that one of the causes of inferential hallucinations is the absence of metacognitive feelings, including the lack of a feeling of correctness, the absence of the balance provided by a sense of reliability, and the lack of doubt.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently gained considerable attention due to their ability to draw inferences from information provided by users. These neural networks appear to generate logical inferences on a probabilistic basis, often emulating patterns that resemble classical rules of inference. Traditionally, inference has been understood as a cognitive process through which conclusions are derived from premises. However, the nature of inference itself, and the possibility of extending it beyond the human domain, has long been debated. In particular, a central question arises: can the inferential capacity of LLMs be comparable to that of human beings? This article argues that the difference between human inference and the kind of inference produced by LLMs lies in the phenomenological, or affective, dimension of reasoning. More specifically, the distinction concerns the absence of metacognitive feelings that guide, monitor, and evaluate thought processes, such as reasoning or inferring. Although LLMs are capable of simulating novel inferences, their tendency to generate inferential hallucinations reveals the lack of the self-regulatory dimension that characterizes human reasoning. In contrast to the affective component present in human condition, inferential failures in LLMs can be interpreted in terms of three aspects: the reversal curse, inferential hallucinations resulting from decoding strategies, and overconfidence. Accordingly, it is concluded that one of the causes of inferential hallucinations is the absence of metacognitive feelings, including the lack of a feeling of correctness, the absence of the balance provided by a sense of reliability, and the lack of doubt.

Este trabajo aborda críticamente la teoría clásica de la acción desde una perspectiva metacognitiva. Se argumenta que algunos sentimientos epistémicos motivan estrategias mentales que contribuyen a la planificación, fabricación y uso de herramientas. Se plantea una alternativa al antropocentrismo de la agencia al proponer una visión ampliada que considere a los animales, no solamente como agentes capaces de acciones intencionales, sino, además, como agentes técnicos cuyo comportamiento no está constreñido a los elementos lingüísticos ni conceptuales que la teoría clásica de la acción ha considerado.

Heredero de una tradición intelectualista, McDowell sostiene que los animales nohumanos carecen de orientación hacia el mundo externo debido a que la noción de experiencia depende de una segunda naturaleza, a la que ingresamos por medio del lenguaje. Esta concepción resulta desafiada por los distintos avances teóricos sobre la mente animal. El objetivo de este trabajo es esbozar una posición filosófica alternativa a la de McDowell. Para ello, tomaremos la propuesta de Bermúdez, extensible a los animales no-humanos, quien sostiene que la experiencia supone una dimensión temporal. A partir de algunos estudios empíricos sobre navegación espacial y memoria episódica, sostendremos que los animales no-humanos no sólo evidencian compresión temporal sino además satisfacen una versión desintelectualizada de las condiciones exigidas por McDowell, para trazar la distinción entre objetivo y subjetivo.

El ambiente artificial en el que se despliega la vida en el planeta potencia un conjunto de interrogantes –algunos ya clásicos, otros novedosos– sobre los modos de existencia de los artefactos, sistemas y objetos técnicos que permean cada una de nuestras acciones. Parte importante de estos interrogantes se ocupa de las transformaciones que este ambiente artificial genera en la experiencia moral, política y cognitiva de los individuos, instituciones y sociedades. El Glosario de filosofía de la técnica elabora un mapa amplio, ecléctico y heterogéneo, pero a la vez riguroso, a partir de las discusiones actuales en torno a la técnica en Latinoamérica y el ámbito hispanoparlante; abarca las discusiones canónicas dentro del campo de la filosofía de la técnica, pero también brinda un importante espacio a cuestiones emergentes, más recientes, con menos recorrido histórico, así como a conceptos que se desprenden de las agendas de indagación del ámbito local, muchas veces ausentes en las compilaciones impulsadas por el norte global y las modas académicas y editoriales. El panorama que presenta este volumen excede lo estrictamente filosófico (y sus distintas disciplinas) para incluir teoría de los medios, sociología, antropología, investigación en artes, letras y ciencias de la educación, entre otros abordajes posibles de la complejidad de la técnica como problema central de nuestros días

We examine the notion of cognitive artifact and its possible application to the animal technic. Although the issue of animal technic is not very much discussed, the case studies focused on the capacity of using and manufacturing tools suggest that some animals deploy cognitive skills. Could the tools employed by animals be considered genuine cases of cognitive artifacts? In this paper we propose a definition of “cognitive artifact” based on the notion of “proper function,” which allows us to develop a gradual scale where we place different kinds of artifacts according to the prevalence of the cognitive function (in opposition to the prac-tical one). Applying this scale to the non-human sphere, we defend the idea that there exists a range of non-human technical phenomena of use and artifacts and tools manufacturing, and that some of this artifacts have an incipient proper cognitive function. In order to defend these theses, we examine the examples of the cobwebs, the nests and the honeycombs

Animal technique has occupied a marginal position in reflections on technique, and in the philosophical literature there is no strict definition of it. However, it is of great importance to understand the limits and the distinctive features of our own technique. This work argues that it is possible to establish a solid definition of animal technique based on two definitions of human technique (prosthetic notion of technique and material culture) and one particular dimension of human tools (cognitive tools). This paper takes a naturalistic approach that enables to review different study cases focused on animals’ capacity to make and use tools.

This paper reconstructs Peter Carruthers’s arguments for criticizing the test focused on the metacognitive capacities of non-humans animals. It is possible to discuss metacognition or there are other mechanisms that being is used by animals in the metacognitive test? This paper offers an overview about the dispute about the metacognitive capacities(metaperception and metamemory) of the animals. The structure of this paper is the following: the first part presents the most relevant arguments that Carruthers offers to discuss and criticize the experiments focused on animal metacognition. The second part it reconstructs the arguments against the Carruthers’s interpretation for explaining the metacognitive test. The third part it makes a balance between the Carruthers’s approach and his critic. Finally, the fourth part, in concluding that despite to the critics, the Carrtuhers’s arguments surpass these difficulties.