Sebastian Montesinos

Indifference objections to the fine-tuning argument hold that the probability of fine-tuning on theism itself is very low or inscrutable, due to the vast range of alternatives God has for creating a life-permitting universe. We defend this response against a litany of recent objections. First, we develop a Bayesian model showing that one cannot relegate facts about alternative law structures into the background, since the very facts about those structures that make fine-tuning unlikely are themselves unlikely on theism in a way that cancels out any evidence from fine-tuning. Second, we point out that since God’s options for producing a life-permitting universe always exceed the naturalistic possibilities, that we find ourselves in a universe with physical parameters counts as evidence against theism. Third, we show how our model addresses important defenses of the fine-tuning argument. For instance, we respond to the charge that certain objections to the fine-tuning argument ‘prove too much’, because it would follow from these objections that miracles such as the stars spelling out ‘made by God’ would be no evidence for theism. We show both that our model has unique resources to address this objection and further that this objection is independently mistaken.

The dual stream model of the human and non-human primate visual systems remains Leslie Ungerleider's (1946-2020) most indelible contribution to visual neuroscience. In this model, a dorsal "where" stream specialized for visuospatial representation extends through occipitoparietal cortex, whereas a ventral "what" stream specialized for representing object qualities extends through occipitotemporal cortex. Over time, this model underwent a number of revisions and expansions. In one of her last scientific contributions, Leslie proposed a third visual stream specialized for representing dynamic signals related to social perception. This alteration invites the question: What is a visual stream, and how are different visual streams individuated? In this article, we first consider and reject a simple answer to this question based on a common idealizing visualization of the model, which conflicts with the complexities of the visual system that the model was intended to capture. Next, we propose a taxonomic answer that takes inspiration from the philosophy of science and Leslie's body of work, which distinguishes between neural mechanisms, pathways, and streams. In this taxonomy, visual streams are superordinate to pathways and mechanisms and provide individuation conditions for determining whether collections of cortical connections delineate different visual streams. Given this characterization, we suggest that the proposed third visual stream does not yet meet these conditions, although the tripartite model still suggests important revisions to how we think about the organization of the human and non-human primate visual systems.