Sebastian Sander-Oest

Self-assembly and self-organization are central concepts in theories of how patterns form in natural systems. However, literature on the topic has for long been riddled with inconsistent uses of these concepts, which often conflate their meaning or define them idiosyncratically. This is problematic as it struggles to make sense of the ubiquitous interaction between self-assembly and self-organization in chemistry and biology. The thermodynamic account is an attempt to draw up clear definitions of the concepts using thermodynamics as the appropriate framework for distinguishing the two concepts from each other. In this paper, I challenge this account and argue that self-assembly shouldn’t primarily be understood in terms of thermodynamics. I offer a philosophical analysis of core conceptual challenges for self-assembly and self-organization and argue that the thermodynamic approach follows a misguided conceptualization strategy. Drawing on recent philosophical work on scientific definitions, I propose an alternative account that treats the concept as a conceptual tool that directs our attention towards the kinds of features that are explanatorily relevant for the pattern-formation process and towards the features the resulting pattern itself will possess.

How to understand definitions of polysemous concepts in the sciences has generated significant philosophical debate. In this paper, I extend pragmatist and inferentialist theories of scientific concepts to definitions and propose a processual approach to definitions, which views definitions as consisting of the activity of defining. I develop this into a specific framework called ‘the multiplex theory’ according to which defining is an organized process by which concept users integrate semantic resources into certain tasks in a way that regulates and develops the meaning of the concept. The theory is then exemplified by applying it to a case study in the origins-of-life debate.

In this paper, I argue that explaining spontaneous phenomena in biology requires multiple types of scientific explanations. First, I contend that explaining spontaneity necessitates citing both topological and nomological features as explanans. Second, I assert that the context-sensitivity of spontaneity complicates mechanistic localization, necessitating the inclusion of functional and network features to account for mechanistic operations. To develop this argument, I present two models of activated self-assembly and their roles in explaining two cases of biological structures: virus capsids and microtubule dynamics. This approach reveals a complex explanatory landscape that spans multiple levels of generality. I term this structure of explanations an “explanatory reservoir.”

In this paper, I argue that explaining spontaneous phenomena in biology requires multiple types of scientific explanations. First, I contend that explaining spontaneity necessitates citing both topological and nomological features as explanans. Second, I assert that the context-sensitivity of spontaneity complicates mechanistic localization, necessitating the inclusion of functional and network features to account for mechanistic operations. To develop this argument, I present two models of activated self-assembly and their roles in explaining two cases of biological structures: virus capsids and microtubule dynamics. This approach reveals a complex explanatory landscape that spans multiple levels of generality. I term this structure of explanations an “explanatory reservoir.”

In this paper, I argue that current attempts at classifying life–mind continuity (LMC) feature several important ambiguities. We can resolve these ambiguities by distinguishing between the extensional, categorical, and systematic relationships that LMC might encompass. In Sect. 1, I begin by introducing the notion of LMC and the theory behind it. In Sect. 2, I show how different ideas of mind shape different approaches to continuity and how to achieve its aim. In Sect. 3, I canvas various canonical formulations and classifications of LMC; I then demonstrate that they retain important ambiguities. Section 4 builds on this by arguing that we must conceive of the extensional and categorical aspects of continuity independently. In Sect. 5, I show further that current literature has underexplored multiple systematic aspects of continuity. I then take a constructive approach in Sect. 6 by providing a classification model for LMC based on extensional and categorical commitments. Here, I comment on aspects of the thesis omitted from the model but essential for a full classification and thorough comparison between various approaches to LMC. All of these arguments lay the foundation for more exhaustively classifying accounts of LMC.