Sebastian Sander Oest

In this paper, I argue that explaining spontaneous phenomena in biology requires multiple types of scientific explanations. First, I contend that explaining spontaneity necessitates citing both topological and nomological features as explanans. Second, I assert that the context-sensitivity of spontaneity complicates mechanistic localization, necessitating the inclusion of functional and network features to account for mechanistic operations. To develop this argument, I present two models of activated self-assembly and their roles in explaining two cases of biological structures: virus capsids and microtubule dynamics. This approach reveals a complex explanatory landscape that spans multiple levels of generality. I term this structure of explanations an “explanatory reservoir.”

In this paper, I argue that explaining spontaneous phenomena in biology requires multiple types of scientific explanations. First, I contend that explaining spontaneity necessitates citing both topological and nomological features as explanans. Second, I assert that the context-sensitivity of spontaneity complicates mechanistic localization, necessitating the inclusion of functional and network features to account for mechanistic operations. To develop this argument, I present two models of activated self-assembly and their roles in explaining two cases of biological structures: virus capsids and microtubule dynamics. This approach reveals a complex explanatory landscape that spans multiple levels of generality. I term this structure of explanations an “explanatory reservoir.”

In this paper, I argue that current attempts at classifying life–mind continuity (LMC) feature several important ambiguities. We can resolve these ambiguities by distinguishing between the extensional, categorical, and systematic relationships that LMC might encompass. In Sect. 1, I begin by introducing the notion of LMC and the theory behind it. In Sect. 2, I show how different ideas of mind shape different approaches to continuity and how to achieve its aim. In Sect. 3, I canvas various canonical formulations and classifications of LMC; I then demonstrate that they retain important ambiguities. Section 4 builds on this by arguing that we must conceive of the extensional and categorical aspects of continuity independently. In Sect. 5, I show further that current literature has underexplored multiple systematic aspects of continuity. I then take a constructive approach in Sect. 6 by providing a classification model for LMC based on extensional and categorical commitments. Here, I comment on aspects of the thesis omitted from the model but essential for a full classification and thorough comparison between various approaches to LMC. All of these arguments lay the foundation for more exhaustively classifying accounts of LMC.