Sebastien Bishop

In a recent article, Jonathan Seglow and Matteo Bonotti develop a new kind of relational approach to free speech that focuses on the directly relational need we all have for ‘recognition’ from those around us. On Seglow and Bonotti’s account, speech plays a crucial role in facilitating recognition since it is through speech that we give and receive recognition. Here, I suggest that while Seglow and Bonotti’s account provides a promising foundation for a relational free speech account, it may not be able to provide a stern rebuke to certain cases of censorship that we would want a free speech account to rebuke. I have in mind here cases where censorship will have little to no impact on an agent’s ability to give and receive recognition, or where giving and receiving recognition is not particularly important. In addition, their relational account relies on the idea that human beings are social animals with relational needs. However, what their account does not provide, and what is indeed something of a lacuna in relational accounts more generally, is a sense of whether our social nature is a gift or a curse. Fortunately, we can respond to both problems by considering how speech facilitates other kinds of relational goods, beyond securing our need for recognition. As way of example, I discuss the integral role speech plays in enabling us to meet our moral duties to help those around us, and how this provides a relational argument for protecting certain kinds of speech that a recognition-based relational approach, by itself, may not provide. Still, this is just one example in service of a more general lesson. It is sometimes said that the best kind of free speech argument would be of a ‘patchwork’ form, stitching together different free speech arguments in favour of protecting different kinds of speech. It may be that we can stitch together a patchwork of purely relational arguments in order to provide an extensive, cohesive account of the value of speech. This is an exciting prospect for relational theorists.

According to philosophers like James Weinstein, our democratic values give us a compelling reason to tolerate hate speech. In fact, they argue that even if hate speech causes significant harms, our democratic values nonetheless sometimes call for a hands-off approach. In particular, they evoke the democratic value of citizens being free to criticize and voice dissent towards the laws that bind them. This paper seeks to establish two key points. First, that upon closer examination, the kind of arguments that Weinstein presents against hate speech regulation is less than convincing. Secondly, that by building on Weinstein's discussion of the concept of viewpoint discrimination, we can construct a more convincing objection to hate speech regulation. That said, this more convincing objection falls short of calling for the abolition of all hate speech regulation, instead highlighting the need for transparency and consistency in the way governments regulate harmful speech.

Should the government censor dangerous anti-vaccination propaganda? Should it restrict the praise of terrorist groups, or speech intended to promote discriminatory attitudes? In other words, should the government curb the advocacy of dangerous ideas and actions (i.e. 'harmful advocacy'), or should the government take a more permissive approach? Strong free speech supporters argue that citizens should be free to engage in and to hear harmful advocacy, arguing that restrictions are deeply objectionable at best, and, at worst, wholly impermissible. To support their position, strong free speech supporters have offered a wide range of arguments and ideas. One of the most interesting arguments revolves around the idea that restrictions on harmful advocacy are deeply insulting to citizens. The worry, broadly understood, is that this kind of censorship is demeaning, treats citizens as though they are stupid, or as though they are children. As such, even when censorship is effective in preventing harms to citizens, it nonetheless comes at the significant political cost of failing to properly respect the citizenry at large. By contrast, so the thought goes, an alternative political scheme that prohibits censorship, or permits it only in exceptional cases, does a better job of respecting citizens as independent, rational, morally responsible agents. This alternative political system may, sometimes, be less effective at preventing speech harms. But it is a political system where citizens can stand tall and hold their heads high. In this paper, I consider and reject three versions of the worry that censorship is insulting. To the contrary, it is argued that the best kind of censorship stems from a rich appreciation of the diverse range of capabilities, needs, vulnerabilities, and responsibilities of citizens, as well as the need for co-operation between citizens if societal flourishing is going to be achieved on a large scale. Granted, such a vision places an emphasis on the imperfections and liabilities of citizens – at least when compared to the rather solitary, highly intellectual creature one sometimes finds in the philosophical literature. Still, such a vision of citizens as imperfect falls well short of being genuinely insulting. To err is human. And there’s nothing insulting about being treated like a human.

This chapter examines two ways in which liberal thinkers have appealed to claims about disagreement in order to defend a principle of free speech. One argument, from Mill, says that free speech is a necessary condition for healthy disagreement, and that healthy disagreement is conducive to human flourishing. The other argument says that in a community of people who disagree about questions of value, free speech is a necessary condition of legitimate democratic government. We argue that both of these arguments, in their standard guises, are premised upon contestable views about the realpolitik of disagreement in a liberal society.

This review critically summarises Alexander Brown and Adriana Sinclair’s book, The Politics of Hate Speech Laws. The review proceeds by canvassing the main arguments presented in each of the book’s nine chapters, while also highlighting the book’s overarching themes and ideas. Ultimately it is suggested that the book will be of use to anyone interested in the political and philosophical aspects of the highly vexed issue of hate speech regulation. In particular the review praises the book’s pluralistic, ecumenical style, arguing that readers are sure to find arguments within the book with which they can engage, regardless of their pre-existing commitments and values. However, the review also notes that the book’s breadth-over-depth approach has several drawbacks. It is suggested, for instance, that some of the key proposals in the book would have benefited from being explored in greater critical detail.