Semenyo Sun

Donald Davidson routinely argued that a certain principle of charity necessarily governs our interpretive activities. The principle implies that successful interpretation culminates in at least some understanding of one another, since successfully abiding by the principle not only culminates in correctly and justifiably attributing attitudes to one another but, also, in seeing those attitudes as constituting a subjectively rational point of view. And yet Davidson also argued that interpreters are not generally in the position of needing to interpret their own attitudes. Granting this, how might _self_-understanding generally arise, and what importance might self-understanding hold for us? I argue that non-interpretive self-understanding plays a key role in fortifying our first-person authority against interpersonal challenges, and that we might explain its origins by adapting certain theories from contemporary discussions of self-knowledge.

Confucian ethics fundamentally rejects the notion of individual physical immortality, grounded in its intrinsic generative cosmology of“shengsheng”(continuous generation and renewal) and the temporal structure of filial piety. Familial emotions, such as the“joy”and“fear”concerning parental years, along with the consciousness of filial piety, both originate from the experience of life’s finitude and the limited horizon of inner time−consciousness. Physical immortality, by contrast, would result in the rigidification of family roles, the dissolution of ethical authority, and paradoxes in the practice of filial care, thereby undermining the ethical order of generational succession. The Confucian concept of“longevity”(shou) aims at fulfilling one’s allotted natural lifespan and integrating into the flow of“shengsheng”, which differs essentially from the pursuit of physical immortality that seeks to transcend natural rhythms. Confucian efforts to attain“longevity”seek to preserve the intergenerational continuity and ethical significance of life, rather than the infinite persistence of the individual. 儒家伦理以内在的“生生”宇宙观为根基，其孝道的时间性结构决定了它在根本上拒斥个 体身体不朽的构想。家庭情感，如对父母之年的“喜”与“惧”，以及孝道意识，均源于生命有 限性的体验与内时间意识的有限视域。身体不朽则会导致家庭角色固化、伦理权威消解以及行孝 实践的悖论，从而瓦解代际更替的伦理秩序。儒家“寿”的概念以尽天年为旨归，融入“生生” 之流，与试图超越自然节律的身体不朽存在本质差异；其对“寿”的追求旨在维护生命的代际连 续性与伦理意义，而非个体的无限持存。