Seong Soo Park

We discuss some of the relations between virtuality, digitality, and fictionality. We are interested in the questions of whether virtual worlds are real or fictional, and in what sense. Chalmers (Disputatio 9, 2017, Disputatio 11, 2019, Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, 2022) argues that virtual worlds are authentic realities on a par with ordinary reality because they are grounded in data structures. We analyze his argument and contend that virtual worlds are, in an important sense, fictional. In many cases, virtual Fs (e.g., apples, chairs) are not genuine Fs due to their digital nature. They are artificially designed to invite users to pretend that they are Fs, and this pretense is crucial for immersive and interactive VR experiences. In this sense, virtual objects are attributively fictional. It will thus be argued, pace Chalmers, that the digital nature of virtual reality implies its fictionality. Along the way, new light will be shed on the nature of virtual properties.

In this paper, I aim to argue that Fine’s semantic relationism faces several issues. To this end, I classify Fine’s view into two phases: the initial and the later. The distinction, on my interpretation, concerns the question of where coordination relations obtain. I then argue that both the initial and later views encounter difficulties in adequately individuating the meanings of expressions. More specifically, I argue that the initial view struggles to individuate the contents involving three distinct co-referential terms, as the contents it assigns are too coarse. By contrast, the later view and its variant struggle to individuate the contents involving demonstratives, as the contents they assign in this case are too fine-grained. Based on these considerations, I conclude that neither view succeeds in properly individuating meaning, and I articulate the dilemma that Fine’s theory faces.

This paper addresses the debate surrounding bound uses of names. My primary aim is to argue that bound interpretations of names do not provide evidence that names semantically have bound uses. I begin by outlining the motivation for the view that names do have semantic bound uses, then offer several reasons to reject this view. Chief among them is my argument based on the cancellability test. I then consider whether a potential strategy that variabilists might be tempted to adopt is promising. The lesson to be drawn is that bound interpretations of Bambi sentences are pragmatic rather than semantic.

According to Rettler, there are three types of control that we should consider in relation to the legitimacy of doxastic blame: Intention-based, reason-based, and influence-based control. Rettler argues that among these, influence-based control is the only type of control that is necessary and sufficient for fulfilling the control con-dition required for legitimate doxastic blame. The aim of this short discussion paper is to critically assess Rettler’s view of doxastic con-trol. By doing so, I attempt to defend the reason-responsiveness view from Rettler’s criticism and cast doubt on whether influence-based control has a positive epistemic influence on beliefs.

According to two-dimensional semantics, primary intension and secondary intension can play the role of reflecting the cognitive aspect of an expression like Fregean sense does. The aim of this paper is to argue that this role is likely a myth. To argue for this, I attempt to show that cognitive aspects of fictional names cannot be explained within the framework of two-dimensional semantics. To be more specific, I consider four ontological theories about fictional characters that two-dimensional semanticists might be tempted to choose. And then, I argue that none of them can be combined with two-dimensional semantics in a satisfactory way.

This paper summarizes the evolution of analytic philosophy in Taiwan, examines its impact within and beyond academia, and discusses the future of the discipline. The roots of modern philosophy in Taiwan can be traced back to the Japanese colonial era, and analytic philosophy was introduced to the country in the late 1940s when many intellectuals in China moved to Taiwan. However, massive curbs were imposed on philosophy during Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship, and the discipline began to thrive again only after Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s. Nonetheless, since its introduction in the colonial era, modern philosophy has made significant contributions in Taiwan, encouraging interdisciplinary engagements, advancing civic education, and promoting the spirit of democracy and political liberation. Philosophy has played a key role in Taiwan’s remarkable transformation from an island colonized for hundreds of years to a country that recognizes democracy, freedom, and human rights. The themes of anti-colonialism and anti-domination seen in the works of modern Taiwanese philosophers not only reflect the discipline’s political and historical underpinnings but also signal how Taiwanese philosophy can acquire a distinct identity despite being influenced by many other philosophical traditions. While still at a nascent stage, Taiwanese philosophy has the potential to join forces with other philosophical traditions in advancing the vision of decolonizing philosophy.

This paper addresses the philosophical debate surrounding the ontological status of virtual objects. According to an influential anti‐realist view, virtual objects are merely fictional and therefore do not exist. My primary aim is to defend a realist view about virtual objects against this fictionalist anti‐realist view. I first challenge the anti‐realist view by comparing make‐believe games and virtual worlds. Then, I argue that although the debate between realists and anti‐realists about virtual objects may seem to reach a stalemate, a shared point of agreement can be used to break it. A key idea I seek to highlight is that there is no ontologically significant difference between colored objects and virtual objects. Lastly, I propose an error theory to address a potential worry with my view.

In this paper, I suggest a way of resolving the whole-part dilemma suggested in the Parmenides. Specifically, I argue that grabbing the second horn of the dilemma does not pose a significant challenge. To argue for this, I consider two theses about Forms, namely, the oneness and indivisibility theses. More specifically, I argue that the second horn does not violate the oneness thesis if we treat composition as identity and that the indivisibility thesis ought to be reinterpreted given Plato’s later dialogues. By doing so, I suggest a compositional understanding of Plato’s theory of Forms, which can resolve the whole-part dilemma.