Serap Ergin Aslan

An increasing number of research fields must expect that their projects will be classified as susceptible to misuse or otherwise security relevant, even if the reasons or criteria for this classification have not yet been uniformly developed. Research institutions will commonly distribute the obligation to predict and prevent misuse across multiple members and structures including ethics committees. However, cases of misuse occur even in spite of these precautions, raising the question of the type and distribution of responsibility for the resulting harm. This question becomes even more pressing if research ethics committees in their decisions ask researchers to provide a misuse- specific risk assessment or risk mitigation plan and thereby shift back a part of their responsibility on the researchers. While this kind of requirement may be considered as unsatisfactory by researchers, members of research ethics committees or boards and third-party funders, will argue that it fulfils two important functions. On the one hand, it makes use of the best available source for misuse risk-assessment available to most committees; on the other hand, it guarantees that the researchers at least try to take responsibility. If researchers, committee members and others involved discharge their obligation to predict and mitigate misuse risks with due diligence, any backward-looking responsibility they retain is to show agent regret for the results of their work having been misused.

Foreword The following guideline emerged from the project DUMFE: Dual Use and Misuse of Research Results (“Dual use und Missbrauch von Forschungsergebnissen”), funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF, 01GP2187). In recent years, dual use has become a significant issue in research ethics for numerous reasons, garnering considerable attention not only within the ethical community but also in the broader scientific community and among political and security circles. Among the reasons for this attention are the dissemination of scientific developments with high misuse potential, such as gain-of-function experiments (Imai et al. 2012; Herfst et al. 2012; Imperiale and Casadevall 2018); political factors, including recent shifts in the global security landscape (Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina (Leopoldina) and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 2024, 9ff.); and heightened awareness of historical misuses of science (De Block and Adriaens, 2013). There is detailed advice on the handling of dual use research of concern provided by the Joint Committee (“Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research”) of the German National Academy of Science Leopoldina and the German Research Foundation (DFG) (2022). The Joint Committee also provides networking and exchange opportunities for Committees for Ethics in Security-Relevant Research (Kommissionen für Ethik sicherheitsrelevanter Forschung), so-called KEFs. Nevertheless, additional information and guidance on handling dual use research of concern is a regular request in particular from scientists, but also a request often heard in forums with policy experts, managers and administrators of institutions in research and education. The present guideline provides such additional in-depth information on the definition, examples, legal as well as ethical issues and options for governance of dual use research. It has been written by ethicists and philosophers of technology, supported by lawyers and members of the commission for ethics in research of Forschungszentrum Jülich. It is intended to provide additional information supporting the design of and deliberation in institutional bodies dealing with ethics of security-relevant research. It aims to highlight decisions and options relevant to different institutions and refers to further sources of information throughout.

Definition of the problem “Dual use” refers to the applicability of a research result or methods for purposes that concern the internal or external security of a society. This includes research that can be used for military, intelligence, terrorist, or criminal purposes. Dual use has been an increasingly aggravating problem for many areas of the life sciences and medicine for over a decade. The main cause for this is that many of their results are capable of demonstrating how humans, but also (domestic) animals and plants, can be manipulated and attacked, and which tools are particularly suitable for this purpose. Arguments The digitalization in the life sciences has two distinguishable impacts on the dual-use problem: an intensifying and an expanding one. By enabling faster and more comprehensive research and development processes, digitalization exacerbates the existing dual-use problem because it increases the pace at which the results of this research can be utilized for security-related purposes. Moreover, the digitalization of the life sciences expands the dual-use problem, as some of the digital tools developed and used in the life sciences can themselves have military or security-relevant applications. Conclusion Therefore, a broad-based governance including wide participation of stakeholders in the research process and broader information on dual use in good scientific practice education across institutions, career stages, and disciplines is necessary.

Definition of the problem “Dual use” refers to the applicability of a research result or methods for purposes that concern the internal or external security of a society. This includes research that can be used for military, intelligence, terrorist, or criminal purposes. Dual use has been an increasingly aggravating problem for many areas of the life sciences and medicine for over a decade. The main cause for this is that many of their results are capable of demonstrating how humans, but also (domestic) animals and plants, can be manipulated and attacked, and which tools are particularly suitable for this purpose. Arguments The digitalization in the life sciences has two distinguishable impacts on the dual-use problem: an intensifying and an expanding one. By enabling faster and more comprehensive research and development processes, digitalization exacerbates the existing dual-use problem because it increases the pace at which the results of this research can be utilized for security-related purposes. Moreover, the digitalization of the life sciences expands the dual-use problem, as some of the digital tools developed and used in the life sciences can themselves have military or security-relevant applications. Conclusion Therefore, a broad-based governance including wide participation of stakeholders in the research process and broader information on dual use in good scientific practice education across institutions, career stages, and disciplines is necessary.