Sergey Trofimov

We introduce topomatics, a formal framework for the analysis of normative interaction between actors. Each actor is defined by an axiomatic code Ω(A) = ⟨O(A), F(A)⟩: a finite weighted system of obligations and prohibitions interpreted over a finite set of possible worlds. The normative significance ρᴀ(Oᵢ) of each obligation is defined as the total weight of prohibitions logically violated by its non-fulfilment, inducing an endogenous ranking of the code from which the normative core Oᶜᵒʳᵉ(A, θ) and the target world W*(A, θ) are derived at each threshold θ ∈ (0, 1]. We prove four theorems on the normative core: (T1) W*(A, θ) is anti-monotone in θ; (T2) the maximum feasible threshold Θᴀ = sup{θ : W*(A, θ) ≠ ∅} is well-defined and attained; (T3) core coherence is equivalent to the existence of a world satisfying all core formulae simultaneously; (T4) core incoherence implies positive internal tension Sᵢⁿₜ(A) > 0, but not conversely. For two actors A and B we define the feasibility set Φ(A, B) = {(θᴀ, θᴮ) : θᴀ ≤ Θᴀ, θᴮ ≤ Θᴮ, W*(A, θᴀ) ∩ W*(B, θᴮ) ≠ ∅} and establish: (T5) a necessary and sufficient condition for Φ(A, B) ≠ ∅; (T6) a sufficient condition for Φ(A, B) = ∅ via the mirror core configuration; (T7) a threshold asymmetry criterion identifying which actor bears the greater burden of core reduction. Theorem T8 gives the three-way structural classification: mutual feasibility (θ₀, θ₀) ∈ Φ; deferred feasibility Φ ≠ ∅ but (θ₀, θ₀) ∉ Φ; and joint infeasibility Φ = ∅. The framework is related to STIT-logic and input/output logic; its distinguishing feature is that the normative ranking of the code is derived endogenously from the conflict structure rather than imposed externally.

This essay mounts a threefold internal critique of materialism — one that proceeds entirely on materialism's own terms. Drawing on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, demographic data on differential fertility between secular and religious populations, and Kant's account of the metaphysical presuppositions of natural science, the paper argues that materialism is structurally self-refuting: it cannot simultaneously justify the reliability of reason, account for its own evolutionary disadvantage, and maintain its claim to be a non-metaphysical description of reality. The convergence of these three lines of argument points toward the transcendence of reason as a philosophical conclusion rather than a theological postulate.

This article examines the parallels between the work of Stephen King and Fyodor Dostoevsky in their treatment of political radicalism and human destructiveness. Drawing on King's early novels — Rage and The Dead Zone — alongside Dostoevsky's key texts — Demons and The Brothers Karamazov — the essay demonstrates how both authors arrive at remarkably similar literary solutions while investigating the same phenomenon. At the same time, the article reveals a fundamental divide between them: where Dostoevsky finds a supreme moral authority that holds him back from the abyss, King has no such anchor. This difference, rooted in the opposition between a religious and an atheistic worldview, ultimately determines the difference in their artistic outcomes — what is a warning in Dostoevsky becomes an instruction manual in King.

What drives humanitarian military intervention? This essay proposes that women's rights as casus belli is not a rational ethical argument but a libidinal one — and that this distinction changes everything. Introducing the concept of libidinal war, the essay argues that the structure of contemporary intervention reproduces an archaic logic in which women function not as subjects of liberation but as currency in an economy of conquest between male groups. The liberator's indifference to the actual death of the women he claims to free is not hypocrisy — it is structural. The dead woman has simply fallen out of the libidinal schema.

The relationship between the United States and Israel presents a structural anomaly that conventional political analysis has failed to adequately explain. Material asymmetry runs in one direction; deference runs in the other. Standard explanations — lobbying resources, shared values, strategic alignment — correctly identify proximate mechanisms but leave the deeper grammar of the relationship unaddressed. Why does asymmetric obligation persist across administrations, political cycles, and shifting strategic environments? Why does American alignment with Israeli preferences feel, to observers across the political spectrum, less like alliance management and more like a constitutive condition of political legitimacy? This essay argues that these questions cannot be answered within the categories of interest-based analysis. They require a political-theological framework. Specifically, the essay examines whether the biblical dispositif of prophetic authority over royal power — as articulated in the First Book of Samuel — provides a structural template that illuminates what secular frameworks consistently miss: the nature of the legitimating claim that organizes this relationship at a level deeper than interest, strategy, or lobbying. The analysis does not evaluate the theological validity of this framework nor the political desirability of the relationship it describes. It asks a prior question: what kind of relationship is this, structurally speaking — and does political theology recover explanatory power that political science has lost?

Why do great powers repeatedly suffer defeat in asymmetric conflicts against demonstrably weaker opponents — even when possessing overwhelming military superiority? Standard explanations appeal to information asymmetries, commitment problems, and the underestimation of costs. We argue that these explanations capture symptoms, not the mechanism: they do not explain why kinetic pressure systematically fails to convert into a political result precisely within a specific class of conflicts. The article proposes a mechanism — topomatics. Its central argument: in existential-type conflicts, actors possess structurally incompatible spaces of possible outcomes. The world the offensive actor is obliged to create is a world the defensive actor is ontologically not entitled to permit — not by virtue of preferences, but by virtue of the normative code constituting its identity. Kinetic means alter the material parameters of conflict, but not the opponent's normative code: military victory and political result lie in different ontological spaces. We introduce two measurable indices. The Internal Tension Index S explains why some actors are structurally offensive while others are defensive. The Code Density Index D explains why some defensive actors are resilient to kinetic pressure, whereas others collapse upon the destruction of their institutional carrier. The central result is a graduated theorem of topological unattainability: for actors with low S and high D, no sequence of kinetic actions attains the offensive actor's target world. The theorem is verified on historical cases — Afghanistan, Algeria, Vietnam, Lebanon 2006, Ukraine, Panama.

This article brings to light a largely overlooked intellectual connection: the study of Kant by Iranian thinkers and its resonance in the constitutional architecture of the Islamic Republic. Focusing on the philosophical interests of figures such as Ali Larijani, it reveals how Kant’s critical project, the Enlightenment dispute over pantheism, and the search for a “third way” between pure rationalism and anti-modern obscurantism came to inform the post-revolutionary state’s unique structure. By tracing this intellectual lineage, the essay opens a new perspective on the metaphysical underpinnings of Iran’s political experiment, without reducing it to the familiar categories of Western political science.

This paper builds on the critique of equilibrium models developed in Against the Metaphysics of Equilibrium. While the concept of an axiomatic code ⟨O, F⟩ (obligations and prohibitions) and its complexity S explain what a political subject can or cannot do, it remains static. To capture the dynamics of existential conflicts, we introduce a formal model combining Kripke’s possible worlds semantics with filtering by the axiomatic code. A tree of possible worlds ⟨W, R⟩ distinguishes deterministic (controllable) transitions from nondeterministic (uncontrollable) branching, where branching reflects strategic uncertainty. The axiomatic code acts as a filter: worlds and transitions that violate core obligations or absolute prohibitions are excluded. We define metrics – minimal path length, number of nondeterministic nodes, and favourable branching coefficient β – to classify strategic attainability as guaranteed, probabilistic, practically unattainable, or ontologically unattainable. Applying the model to the US–Iran conflict reveals a fundamental asymmetry. For the US, regime change is practically unattainable: every path requires uncontrollable branchings (e.g., quick victory, stable puppet regime) and is blocked by absolute prohibitions (casualties, protracted war, nuclear escalation). For Iran, regime survival is guaranteed because the current world already belongs to the target set. The model yields testable predictions: no US full‑scale war, no regime change in Iran, and a protracted freeze that constitutes Iran’s victory and US defeat. Asymmetric conflicts are thus explained not by resource balances but by the internal structure of the axiomatic code and the topology of possible worlds.

This paper challenges the dominant paradigm of equilibrium-based modeling in political science and international relations. From game theory to rational choice, from neorealism to sophisticated fuzzy bimatrix constructions, these models share a fundamental assumption: that political actors seek equilibrium, that their preferences are commensurable, and that conflict resolution tends toward mutually acceptable outcomes. The spectacular failure of such models—exemplified by Iranian scholars' formally impeccable game-theoretic analysis of nuclear negotiations that predicted equilibrium while reality chose war—reveals not a computational flaw but an ontological crisis. We argue that equilibrium thinking represents a metaphysical imposition on a reality that operates by different logic. Political actors, particularly in existential conflicts, do not seek compromise; they seek survival and dominance. Their goals are often incommensurable (regime survival cannot be traded against nuclear capability on a single utility scale), their preferences are internally contradictory, and their capacity for action is determined not by external resources but by the internal structure of what we term the axiomatic code—the stable set of obligations (O) and prohibitions (F) that constitute the actor's identity and limit its strategic options. We introduce the concept of axiomatic complexity (S) as a measure of internal contradiction within this code. S increases when: • high-priority obligations lack corresponding prohibitions (asymmetry); • significant goals conflict such that achieving one precludes another (incompatibility); • the space of permitted actions expands beyond strategic focus (entropy). Drawing on Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process, we formalize the measurement of goal priorities and conflict matrices, demonstrating the approach through a comparative analysis of Iran and the U.S./Israel in the current confrontation. The analysis reveals a fundamental asymmetry: Iran exhibits a hierarchically coherent code with a dominant priority (regime survival, w = 0.65) and moderate internal conflicts (μ ≤ 0.4); the U.S./Israel displays a fragmented code with three competing high-priority goals (non-proliferation, electoral victory, casualty minimization) locked in severe conflict (μ = 0.6–0.8). This internal structure generates a testable prediction: Iran will not be defeated, regime change will not occur, and the most probable outcome is a protracted freeze—which constitutes strategic victory for Iran (survival achieved) and defeat for the U.S. (regime change failed). Unlike equilibrium models that would posit a "mutually acceptable compromise," our framework explains why the same outcome carries opposite meanings for the two sides. The proposed theory does not reject formalization but redirects it: from searching for equilibria in external interactions to diagnosing the internal coherence of the actor. We introduce the Zermelo filter as a mechanism of axiomatic reduction—the capacity to prune contradictory imperatives, exemplified by revolutionary movements that achieve strategic superconductivity through minimalist codes. The paper concludes that the key to political prediction lies not in balancing forces but in measuring the weight of an actor's own contradictions. Goliath falls not because David is strong, but because Goliath is torn apart by his own imperatives.