Sergio Cermeño

La Cuestión de Molyneux (MQ por sus siglas en inglés) —si un recién vidente podría reconocer visualmente formas previamente conocidas solo mediante el tacto— sigue sin ser concluyente. La forma más común de plantear esta cuestión es en términos representacionales, es decir, si la visión y el tacto generan tipos de representación similares o si existe alguna similitud intrínseca entre las representaciones visuales y táctiles en el reconocimiento de las formas. Avances recientes en la percepción intermodal sugieren que, si las representaciones visuales y táctiles están vinculadas, una respuesta positiva a MQ es la más probable. En este artículo, exploro y presento algunas ideas que sugieren esta posibilidad. En particular, planteo la estrategia de los archivos de objetos, según la cual, si parte de la información táctil se codifica referencialmente y se almacena amodalmente en archivos de objetos, entonces los contenidos específicos de la categoría de R(visión) y R(tacto) estarán de alguna manera vinculados proposicionalmente (conceptualmente). Esto abre una amplia posibilidad para pensar que una persona recién vidente podría reconocer visualmente formas previamente conocidas solo mediante el tacto.

This paper delves into the dark side of the mind. I am interested in the underlying mechanism of implicit bias. Implicit biases are implicit attitudes that conflict with our informed beliefs, leading to prejudiced feelings, stereotyped thoughts and ultimately discriminatory behaviours. Despite receiving much attention in philosophy and psychology, the mechanism by which these biases are formed is controversial. In this paper, I review the proposed models—association-based, belief-based and mental imagery-based—and suggest that these models can be reconciled in a multifaceted account. My argument relies primarily on debiasing interventions. If implicit biases are triggered by only one mechanism, experimental manipulations based on other mechanisms will fail to modify implicitly biased behaviour. However, manipulations involving each of the proposed models successfully modify biased behaviour. Thus, implicit bias has a multifaceted character, i.e., all three models have something to say in explaining the mechanisms hidden in the implicitly biased behaviour.

The paper looks for the similarities between illusionism—a contemporary theory of phenomenal consciousness—and the Yogācāra´s philosophy of consciousness presented in Vasubandhu´s Treatise on the Three Natures. Despite substantial divergences in writing style, the commonalities between East and West regarding phenomenal consciousness are considerable. I claim that a particular reading of Vasubandhu´s Treatise on the Three Natures reflects, in many respects, the contemporary illusionist program. Furthermore, I argue that there is not only a meeting point between their postulates about the illusory nature of phenomenal consciousness but also a strong coincidence in the proposed solutions to the most pressing problems that threaten the illusionist paradigm.

The idea of pure perception —perception without any cognitive influence— is central to the science and philosophy of perception. For many, to be in a pure perceptual state is to be in a state whose content is nonconceptual, whose format is iconic, and whose phenomenology is unique. This paper explores this possibility and finds that the idea of pure perception, at least when defined in these terms, is untenable. Besides significant specific worries derived from the properties characterizing these states, I have not found empirical grounds indicating the possibility of individuating these states: neither looking inside oneself (introspection), nor looking inside others (psychology), nor looking inside the brain (neuroanatomy), suggests the existence of pure perceptual mental states.

The most natural way to distinguish perception from cognition is by considering perception as stimulus-dependent. Perception is tethered to the senses in a way that cognition is not. Beck Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(2): 319-334 (2018) has recently argued in this direction. He develops this idea by accommodating two potential counterexamples to his account: hallucinations and demonstrative thoughts. In this paper, I examine this view. First, I detect two general problems with movement to accommodate these awkward cases. Subsequently, I place two very common mental phenomena under the prism of the stimulus-dependence criterion: amodal completion and visual categorization. The result is that the stimulus-dependent criterion is too restrictive, it leaves the notion of perception extremely cramped. I conclude that even the criterion of stimulus-dependence fails to mark a clearly defined border between perception and cognition.