Sergio Parra Paine

RESUMEN El intuicionismo sostiene que las series numéricas corresponden a nuestras intuiciones del devenir temporal, siendo las operaciones y propiedades de dichos conjuntos explicadas como construcciones. Posteriormente, el constructivismo de la Escuela de Erlangen consideraría que las inferencias lógicas concebidas procedimentalmente involucran proposiciones que dan cuenta del lenguaje como una elaboración cultural. Así, el ámbito proposicional poseería un carácter subjetivo que trasciende dichas construcciones concebidas como meras descripciones procedimentales, demandando un sustrato más consistente como fundamento, por lo cual es posible responder a esta carencia apelando a la teoría cognitiva de las proposiciones de Scott Soames como un candidato plausible, puesto que concibe a las proposiciones como actos predicativos concretos. A su vez, la teoría de Soames no admite una descripción exhaustiva de los actos cognitivos de predicación que explican el contenido representacional de las proposiciones. Este trabajo se centra en desarrollar una relación complementaria entre ambas teorías susceptible de ser codificada algorítmicamente, en tanto la dimensión computacional operaría como un gozne articulatorio entre ambas concepciones que nos permita, en último término, formular una definición constructivista desde el punto de vista cognitivo de las proposiciones. ABSTRACT Intuitionism maintains that numerical series correspond to our intuitions of continuous temporal evolution, with the operations and properties of these sets are explained as constructions. Subsequently, the constructivism of the Erlangen School would also consider that logical inferences conceived procedurally involve propositions that account for language as a historical-cultural elaboration. In such a case, the propositional scope would possess a subjective character that goes beyond the conception of these constructions as mere procedural descriptions, thereby demanding a more consistent substrate as a foundation. This need can be met by appealing to Scott Soames's cognitive theory of propositions as a plausible candidate since he conceives of propositions as concrete predicative acts. In turn, Soames's theory does not admit an exhaustive description of the cognitive acts of predication that explain the representational content of propositions. Accordingly, this work focuses on developing a complementary relationship between both theories, amenable to being algorithmically coded, whereby the computational dimension operates as an articulatory hinge between both conceptions that allows us, ultimately, to formulate a constructivist definition of propositions from a cognitive point of view.

This paper focuses on the possibility of conceiving a form of ontological nihilism, starting from D. M. Armstrong’s combinatorialism. This possibility has been suggested by Efird and Stoneham, by means of proposing an alternative strategy to the ‘subtraction argument’. They claim that it is possible to sustain such nihilism trough the concepts of construction and totality state of affairs. However, this hypothesis will require the acceptance of non-instanciated universals, that is, platonic universals. Yet this is opposite to requirements that are basic for a combinatorial theory, which should uphold that universals exist only in their instantiations. Then, the assumption of platonic universals results in high costs for a combinatorial naturalism, according to which only exists what is located in space and time.