Seungbae Park

Just because God is omnipotent, it does not follow that he could create the universe out of nothing. It is possible for infinitely many events to have occurred, so the universe need not have had a beginning. To say that the universe does not have a beginning does not mean that an infinite amount of time has passed. If God is a necessary being, the universe is also a necessary being. It is problematic to claim that God caused the Big Bang. If God is a timeless being, he cannot create the universe. Finally, the atheist position that the universe does not have a beginning is preferable to the theist position that God created the universe.

Stage theory holds that each field of science undergoes an unstable stage and then a stable stage. In the unstable stage, it is likely that scientists learn through trials and errors, and that an existing theory is false. In the stable stage, by contrast, it is likely that scientists no longer learn through trials and errors, and that an existing theory is true. According to stage theory, past scientists accepted a past theory because they were in an unstable stage, and current scientists accept a current theory because they are in a stable stage. This account is better than two pessimist accounts of why past scientists accepted a past theory and why current scientists accept a current theory.

I offer three objections to mathematical and moral realism, according to which we know, respectively, that some mathematical and moral statements correspond to mathematical and moral facts in the abstract world. I also offer three objections to mathematical and moral fictionalism, according to which there are no mathematical and moral facts, respectively, and hence no mathematical and moral statements are true. I argue that mathematical inferentialism avoids the three objections to mathematical realism and the three objections to mathematical fictionalism, and that moral functionalism avoids the three objections to moral realism and the three objections to moral fictionalism.

The five accounts of scientific progress are not only composed of normative assumptions but also of descriptive assumptions. Accordingly, error theory implies that the normative assumptions are false, but not that the descriptive assumptions are false. The same holds for the five accounts of moral progress. Consequently, even if error theory is true, debaters of scientific and moral progress can continue to debate over what is involved in scientific and moral progress. Moreover, there are several alternatives to error theory, and error theory has several problems.

I raise three objections to de Ray’s evolutionary debunking argument against scientific realism, and then sketch two new enhanced evolutionary debunking arguments that evolutionary debunkers might construct to overcome my three objections to de Ray’s evolutionary debunking argument. I argue that any evolutionary debunking argument against scientific realism is self-defeating, and that any evolutionary debunking argument, whether it is directed at scientific realism or other philosophical views, such as mathematical realism and moral realism, is arbitrary.

Moral skeptics argue that their evolutionary explanation is more parsimonious than moral realists’ evolutionary explanation of why we have the mental capacity to make moral judgments, and that their evolutionary explanation supports moral skepticism, according to which no moral judgment is justified. I object that there are several alternative metaethical views whose evolutionary explanations are as economical as moral skeptics’ evolutionary explanation. In addition, I offer six objections to moral skepticism and error theory, and then argue that none of them applies to several alternative metaethical views.

A template for generating philosophical problems consists of the following three steps. First, skeptics argue that some particular beliefs might be false. Second, they suggest that a general belief is required for some particular beliefs to be justified. Third, they claim that no particular belief is justified, and that those who hold some particular beliefs have the burden of justifying a general belief without relying on a particular belief. This template can be used to generate philosophical problems, such as the problem of induction, the argument from a bad lot, the argument from a brute fact, and other philosophical problems. They all result from confusing a means and an end.

The local theory of induction asserts that a set of inductions is licensed by a local uniformity principle in a domain, and that the local uniformity principle is justified by other sets of inductions and other local uniformity principles. I object that just as the global theory of induction confounds a means and an end, so the local theory of induction confounds a means and an end. Therefore, just as the global theory of induction leads to skepticism about inductions and the global uniformity principle, so the local theory of induction leads to skepticism about inductions and local uniformity principles.

This chapter aims to enrich the moral realism debate with three classic arguments from the scientific realism debate. Just as scientific realists construct the no-miracles argument for scientific realism, so moral realists can construct the no-miracles argument for moral realism. Just as scientific antirealists construct the pessimistic induction and the problem of underdetermination for scientific antirealism, so moral antirealists can construct the pessimistic induction and the problem of underdetermination for moral antirealism.

Just as Hume constructs an argument against factual inductions, so I construct a Humean argument against moral inductions. Just as Hume’s argument against factual inductions creates the problem of factual induction, so the Humean argument against moral inductions creates the problem of moral induction. The problem of factual induction spells trouble for the evolutionary debunking argument for moral skepticism. The problem of moral induction spells trouble for moral realism and cultural emotivism, but not for emotivism, prescriptivism, error theory, quasi-realism, and moral functionalism. The problem of moral induction can trigger new meta-normative debates.

I raise the following objections to Lee’s coherentist justification of induction. Coherentism is not an adequate theory of epistemic justification. It is circular for Lee to use inductions to justify the uniformity principle. It is one thing for the uniformity principle to be justified in the coherentist sense; it is quite another for the uniformity principle to be likely to be true. It begs the question against Hume for Lee to take the uniformity principle to be a default belief. Like Hume’s argument against inductions, Lee’s coherentist justification of induction confounds a means and an end.

If scientific antirealists retreated to inductive skepticism, they would have to give up their positive philosophical views, such as constructive empiricism, the selectionist explanation, the contextual theory, and the permissive view of rationality. They would also have to give up their negative arguments against scientific realism, such as the pessimistic induction, the argument from a bad lot, and the argument from indifference. The local theory of induction generates inductive skepticism and thus undermines both scientific realism and antirealism.

As a result of using inference to the best explanation (IBE), we gain confidence in the belief that a true hypothesis is more likely to be conceived than unconceived, and in the belief that the world is explainable. Therefore, the use of IBE is required for these two beliefs to be justified rather than the other way around. However, van Fraassen’s argument from a bad lot and de Ray’s argument from a brute fact presuppose erroneously that the two beliefs are required for IBE to be justified. This false presupposition results in excessive requirements on the use of IBE, in skepticism about our best scientific theories, and in backfires on van Fraassen’s use of IBE and de Ray’s use of IBE.

I raise the following six objections to Hume’s argument against inductions. (1) The faculty of reason and experience might jointly justify the conclusions of inductions. Accordingly, just because the conclusions of inductions are neither justified a priori nor a posteriori, it does not follow that they are not justified. (2) Inductions are required for the uniformity principle to be justified rather than the other way around. (3) It is self-defeating for Hume to use inductions to show that inductions are not justifiable. (4) The faculty of reason and experience might jointly justify the uniformity principle. Consequently, just because the uniformity principle is neither justified a priori nor a posteriori, it does not follow that it is not justified. (5) It is in principle impossible to construct an argument that would show that inductions are justified or unjustified. (6) Hume’s argument against inductions backfires on his positive account of why we make predictions.

This chapter defends counter-inductions against three pessimistic inductions: the classic pessimistic induction (CPI), the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA), and the problem of misleading evidence (PME). The counter-induction against CPI holds that since earlier theories were false, it is likely that contemporary theories are true. The counter-induction against PUA holds that since past scientists could not exhaust sets of alternatives, it is likely that current scientists can exhaust sets of alternatives. The counter-induction against PME holds that since the evidence for past theories was misleading, it is likely that the evidence for current theories is truth-leading.

Some moral realists suggest that morality has progressed because some individuals recognized moral facts which are causally inert. I object causally inert facts, whether moral or mathematical, cannot serve as explanantia for anything, and then provide non-metaethical and moral antirealist explanations of why morality has progressed. I argue that moral antirealists, who aim to undermine the moral realist explanation, should provide a moral antirealist explanation rather than a non-metaethical explanation of why morality has progressed. I also point out that metaethical and non-metaethical explanations have respective limitations.

What should God do to heaven-dwellers who disbelieve that he exists? What should God do to hell-dwellers who believe that he exists? Theists might give the following answers: (i) since heaven-dwellers see God, they cannot but believe that he exists; (ii) God sends disbelievers in heaven to hell and believers in hell to heaven; (iii) heaven-dwellers are so virtuous that they cannot but believe that God exists, and hell-dwellers are so vicious that they cannot but disbelieve that he exists. I argue that all of these answers are untenable.

This book is intended to be a useful philosophy of science textbook for undergraduate students majoring in science and engineering. The topics are selected on the basis of students’ interest and their contributions to class discussions. Philosophical jargons are kept to a minimum for the convenience of readers who do not major in philosophy. Renowned philosophers’ views about science are criticized and sometimes alternatives are defended. Study questions at the end of each chapter are intended to stimulate students to think for themselves about science.

Rival applied ethicists have constructed arguments for and against affirmative action independently of Rawls’s theory of justice. Those arguments do not resolve the dispute about affirmative action. I reformulate them with the use of Rawls’s theory of justice and conclude that the reformulated arguments do not resolve the dispute about affirmative action either. Therefore, Rawls’s theory of justice is not useful in resolving the dispute about affirmative action. This point applies to affirmative action in science, contrary to what some writers suggest.

Constructive empiricism implies that if van Fraassen does not believe that scientific theories and his positive philosophical theories, including his contextual theory of explanation, are empirically adequate, he cannot accept them, and hence he cannot use them for scientific and philosophical purposes. Moreover, his epistemic colleagues, who embrace epistemic reciprocalism, would not believe that his positive philosophical theories are empirically adequate. This epistemic disadvantage comes with practical disadvantages in a social world.

I raise the following six moral objections to the way God evaluates us. (i) He violates the human right to free thought. (ii) He makes the dubious assumption that it is praiseworthy and blameworthy, respectively, to believe and disbelieve that he exists. (iii) He excessively rewards believers and excessively punishes disbelievers. (iv) He only assigns to his evaluatees the two extreme grades: eternal bliss and eternal damnation. (v) He overlooks diverse factors related to the belief of God. (vi) He is silent on the issue of whether to evaluate animals. Therefore, God, who is allegedly omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, does not exist.

Causal platonism asserts that mathematical objects cause neural states in human brains. I raise the following four objections to it. (i) Quantum entanglement does not show that one object can causally affect another, although one is nontemporal, nonspatial, and unchanging. (ii) Causal platonism can neither be justified a posteriori nor a priori. (iii) To postulate mathematical media to flesh out mathematical causation is to multiply mysteries beyond necessity. (iv) To say that mathematical causation is unintelligible and inexplicable is not to complain about causation in general.

De Ray argues that relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires the metaphysical belief that most phenomena have explanations. I object that instead the metaphysical belief requires the use of IBE. De Ray uses IBE himself to establish theism that God is the cause of the metaphysical belief, and thus he has the burden of establishing the metaphysical belief independently of using IBE. Naturalism that the world is the cause of the metaphysical belief is preferable to theism, contrary to what de Ray thinks.

Van Fraassen does not merely perform Bayesian conditionalization on his pragmatic theory of scientific explanation; he uses inference to the best explanation (IBE) to justify it, contrary to what Prasetya thinks. Without first using IBE, we cannot carry out Bayesian conditionalization, contrary to what van Fraassen thinks. The argument from a bad lot, which van Fraassen constructs to criticize IBE, backfires on both the pragmatic theory and Bayesian conditionalization, pace van Fraassen and Prasetya.

Moral subjectivism is not self-defeating, contrary to what moral objectivists claim. Ockham’s Razor favors moral subjectivism over moral objectivism. It is circular for moral objectivists to say that since we construct sound and cogent arguments out of moral statements, moral statements are true. Moral subjectivism acknowledges the role that arguments play in our moral lives, contrary to what moral objectivists contend. The way in which moral objectivists attempt to establish moral objectivism ironically supports moral subjectivism.