Seunghyun Song

This paper establishes a structural approach to epistemic reparation, thereby establishing a concept of structural epistemic remedy. I achieve this by employing the structural injustice approach, which identifies unjust or objectionable social structures that enable various types of injustices at a collective level and, importantly, articulates suitable remedies for these unjust and objectionable social structures. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I will establish an intergenerational rights-based approach to epistemic reparation. While doing so, I will identify a gap in the rights-based approach, resulting in a defense of an alternative structural injustice approach. I argue that the rights-based approach and structural injustice approach combined will result in a more complete epistemic justice after wrongdoing. Second, I articulate the structural injustice approach, thereby establishing a concept of structural epistemic remedy. I demonstrate that a successful implementation of epistemic remedy necessitates the acquisition of specific knowledge. I identify three types of knowledge that are required for a genuine structural remedy: One must know (1) which social structures require remedy, (2) how those social structures should be changed, and (3) whether additional reparations must be paid beyond structural remedies. Finally, I will argue that individuals may have distinct types of responsibility, what I call the structural-epistemic responsibility, for obtaining this knowledge for epistemic remedy.

© 2017 Nature Publishing Group, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited. All Rights Reserved.X-ray crystallography at X-ray free-electron laser sources is a powerful method for studying macromolecules at biologically relevant temperatures. Moreover, when combined with complementary techniques like X-ray emission spectroscopy, both global structures and chemical properties of metalloenzymes can be obtained concurrently, providing insights into the interplay between the protein structure and dynamics and the chemistry at an active site. The implementation of such a multimodal approach can be compromised by conflicting requirements to optimize each individual method. In particular, the method used for sample delivery greatly affects the data quality. We present here a robust way of delivering controlled sample amounts on demand using acoustic droplet ejection coupled with a conveyor belt drive that is optimized for crystallography and spectroscopy measurements of photochemical and chemical reactions over a wide range of time scales. Studies with photosystem II, the phytochrome photoreceptor, and ribonucleotide reductase R2 illustrate the power and versatility of this method.

Assessing the credibility of asylum seekers’ testimonies is central to immigration officers’ decisions regarding their claims for refuge. This asylum procedure is fraught with epistemic injustices beyond the basic role of truth assessment to determine what counts as valid asylum claims. This paper identifies a specific type of epistemic injustice, so-called the presumption of dishonesty, which is encountered by asylum seekers. We develop our concept by examining the credibility assessment of gay and lesbian asylum seekers in the Netherlands, where such individuals undergo a specific credibility assessment. The presumption of dishonesty, we argue, stems from the prejudice that labels asylum seekers ‘bogus’ claimants -– ‘needy’ individuals who allegedly fabricate asylum claims for personal gain. This specific form of testimonial injustice entails that hearers attribute compromised credibility to speakers, assessing their testimonies against an ‘ideal’ or ‘truthful answer’. For gay and lesbian asylum seekers, this entails providing testimony about their journey of self-acceptance, awareness, and experiencing negative emotions such as shame and guilt, based on Western stereotypes of gender and sexual orientation. Focusing specifically on the position of these asylum claimants as ‘needy’ individuals, helps to understand why testimonies may still be dismissed, even when asylum seekers’ testimonies align with the stereotypical standards of evaluation held by the hearers. We contend that this is a testimonial injustice that is aimed at those who are perceived as the ‘needy’. Consequently, the hearer’s suspicion persists despite the presentation of trustworthy testimony, making it practically impossible to navigate the insurmountable standards of evaluation imposed.

This paper establishes a structural approach to epistemic reparation, thereby establishing a concept of structural epistemic remedy. I achieve this by employing the structural injustice approach, which identifies unjust or objectionable social structures that enable various types of injustices at a collective level and, importantly, articulates suitable remedies for these unjust and objectionable social structures. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I will establish an intergenerational rights-based approach to epistemic reparation. While doing so, I will identify a gap in the rights-based approach, resulting in a defense of an alternative structural injustice approach. I argue that the rights-based approach and structural injustice approach combined will result in a more complete epistemic justice after wrongdoing. Second, I articulate the structural injustice approach, thereby establishing a concept of structural epistemic remedy. I demonstrate that a successful implementation of epistemic remedy necessitates the acquisition of specific knowledge. I identify three types of knowledge that are required for a genuine structural remedy: One must know (1) which social structures require remedy, (2) how those social structures should be changed, and (3) whether additional reparations must be paid beyond structural remedies. Finally, I will argue that individuals may have distinct types of responsibility, what I call the structural-epistemic responsibility, for obtaining this knowledge for epistemic remedy.

Linguistic justice is concerned with the just way of politically regulating linguistic diversity. Today, the linguistic-justice debate may be differentiated into three different domains: interlinguistic justice, intralinguistic justice, and global linguistic justice. Each of these domains has, to a significant extent, attracted different authors and debates, although the normative system underlying them is structurally similar. This introductory piece aims to provide context for our symposium dedicated to linguistic justice and migration by, first, giving an overview of linguistic justice, second, linking linguistic justice to migration, and, finally, providing an overview of the various papers in the symposium, situating them against the background developed in the first two sections.

This paper develops a concept of structural linguistic injustice. By employing the so-called structural-injustice approach, it argues that individuals' seemingly harmless language attitudes and language choices might enable serious harms on a collective level, constituting what one could call a structural linguistic injustice. Section 1 introduces the linguistic-justice debate. By doing so, it establishes linguistic diversity as the context in which phenomena such as individuals' language attitudes, language choice, and language loss occur. Moreover, the paper illustrates why employing the structural-injustice approach might be beneficial for the linguistic-justice debate. Section 2 conceptualizes individuals' (certain types of) language attitudes and language choice as (objectionable) social structures. Section 3 provides a concept of structural linguistic injustice. Section 4 suggests one possible remedy for structural linguistic injustice. Section 5 concludes the paper.

This article argues that linguistically endangered minority groups often face endangerment due to structural linguistic injustice that arises from past injustices and ongoing unjust social processes. Language revitalization is often a justified way of reforming unjust social structures. I connect this discussion to another debate, namely, whether historical injustice (and the requirement for its correction) may be superseded. I ask: which changing circumstances might lead to the supersession of structural linguistic injustice? Of the many reasons to reform unjust social structures, I focus on dignity-based concerns. Historically-sensitive dignity-based concerns are relevant for judging whether supersession of structural linguistic injustice has occurred. My view is largely present-oriented, but history still plays a role in deciding the strength of justificatory bases for structural reformation.