Sevcan Gugumcu

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that virtuous actions are for the sake of the kalon. Susan Sauvé Meyer (2011) suggests that there are two distinct ways in which the kalon governs the actions that are performed for its sake. First, it determines the nature of them. She calls this ‘normative governance’. Second, it determines when, whether, and to what extent they are to be performed. She calls this ‘regulative governance’. Contra Meyer, I argue that for Aristotle, normative governance is essential to a for-the-sake-of (-the-kalon) relation.

In Metaphysics Δ.7 (1017a22-30), Aristotle claims that being per se is said in as many ways as the katēgoriai. An interpretative question, where there is disagreement among scholars, concerns what is meant by ‘being per se’ in Δ.7. I offer an answer that provides fresh insights. I argue that being per se (in Δ.7) is a being relation expressed by the ‘is’ of categorical predication. In support of this, I appeal to Aristotle’s distinction in Posterior Analytics I.22 between two ways of speaking: predicating genuinely (haplōs), e.g., ‘Socrates is walking’ and predicating incidentally (kata sumbebēkos), e.g., ‘This walking thing is Socrates’.