The Institute for Research In Fundamental Sciences (IPM)
University of Gothenburg
  •  177
    Neo-Meinongian neo-Russellians
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2): 229-259. 2010.
    Neo-Russellianism, which incorporates both Millianism (with regard to proper names) and the thesis of singular Russellian propositions, has widely been defended after the publication of Kripke's Naming and Necessity. The view, however, encounters various problems regarding empty names, names that do not have semantic referents. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames have defended neo-Russellianism against such problems in a novel way; to account for various intuitions of competent and rational speakers …Read more
  •  123
    Gappy propositions?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): 125-157. 2011.
    After introducing Millianism and touching on two problems raised by genuinely empty names for Millianism (section I), I provide a brief exposition of the Gappy Proposition View (GPV) and of how different versions of this view can reply to the problems in question (section II). In the following sections I develop my reasons against the GPV. First, I will try to argue that apparently promising arguments for the claim that gappy propositions are propositions are not successful (section III). Then, …Read more
  •  87
    Empty Names and Pragmatic Millianism
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 49-58. 2014.
    Millianism is the view that the semantic content of a proper name is its semantic referent. Empty names, names with no semantic referents, raise various problems for Millianism. To solve these problems, many have appealed to pragmatics, thus ‘Pragmatic Millianism’. Pragmatic Millianism employs the relation of association between names and descriptions as well as some pragmatic processes to substitute empty names with descriptions associated with. The resultant content should account for the intu…Read more
  •  56
    Pragmatics of No Reference
    Mind and Language 30 (1): 95-116. 2015.
    According to Millianism, the semantic content of a proper name is its semantic referent. Many names, however, lack semantic referent; hence, so-called ‘empty’ names. Empty names raise various problems for Millianism. T.C. Ryckman, Fred Adams, Garry Fuller, Robert Stecker, Kenneth Taylor, and Nicole Wyatt, among others, have defended Millianism against these problems by appeal to pragmatics . I introduce Millianism and the problems raised by empty names for the view, then examine Pragmatic Millia…Read more
  •  30
    Concept originalism, reference-shift and belief reports
    with Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
    Synthese 195 (1): 269-285. 2018.
    Concept originalism, recently introduced and defended by Sainsbury and Tye, Tye, and Sainsbury, holds that “atomic concepts are to be individuated by their historical origins, as opposed to their semantic or epistemic properties”. The view is immune to Gareth Evans’s “Madagascar” objection to the Causal Theory of Reference since it allows a concept to change its reference over time without losing its identity. The possibility of reference-shift, however, raises the problem of misleading belief r…Read more
  •  25
    Suhrawardi on Innateness: A Reply to John Walbridge
    Philosophy East and West 64 (2): 486-501. 2014.
    Here I shall focus on Suhrawardi’s use and conception of ‘fiṭrī’, translated as ‘innate’ by Hossein Ziai (1990), Hossein Ziai and John Walbridge (Suhrawardi 1999), and Mehdi Aminrazavi (1997, 2003),1 and will try to make some points in passing regarding Cartesian innate ideas in relation to Suhrawardi’s fiṭrīāt. I will try to explain my understanding of Suhrawardi’s i‛tibārāt ‛aqliyya (beings of reason) and their relationship to fiṭrīāt. As a relevant issue, I will touch on Suhrawardi’s distinct…Read more
  •  23
    Did Suhrawardi Believe in Innate Ideas as A Priori Concepts? A Note
    Philosophy East and West 64 (2): 473-480. 2014.
    In a past issue of Philosophy East and West (Aminrazavi 2003), Mehdi Aminrazavi, developing his ideas expressed earlier in Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination (Aminrazavi 1997), attempted to argue “that Ibn Sīnā’s peripatetic orientation and Suhrawardī’s ishrāqī perspective have both maintained and adhered to the same epistemological framework while the philosophical language in which their respective epistemologies are discussed is different” (Aminrazavi 2003, p. 203). I disagree; however…Read more
  •  20
    Avicenna on the Primary Propositions
    with Mohammad Ardeshir
    History and Philosophy of Logic 39 (3): 201-231. 2018.
    Avicenna introduces the primary propositions as the most fundamental principles of knowledge. However, as far as we are aware, Avicenna’s primaries have not yet been independently studied. Nor do Avicenna scholars agree on how to characterize them in the language of contemporary philosophy. It is well-known that the primaries are indemonstrable; nonetheless, it is not clear what the genealogy of the primaries is, how, epistemologically speaking, they can be distinguished from other principles, w…Read more
  •  14
    Ontological Trivialism?
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2): 38-68. 2017.
  • The Varieties of Gappy Propositions
    In Chris Tillman (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions, Routledge. forthcoming.