Shahram Shahryari

This paper proposes a hermeneutic framework for reconciling scientific and religious knowledge through textual interpretation. Challenging narratives of inherent conflict, it argues that semantic underdeterminacy—the gap between literal meaning and communicative intent—permits interpretations of sacred texts that are compatible with scientific theories. The analysis unfolds in four stages. First, textual interpretation is established as an instance of inference to the best explanation (IBE), where readers construct meaning through contextual enrichment, guided by criteria such as coherence, simplicity, and explanatory power. Second, the paper argues that, from a religious perspective, there exists an epistemic parity between religious and scientific knowledge: both rely on IBE as a rational framework, and for theistic believers, both derive credibility as complementary manifestations of divine authorship. Third, drawing on Abrahamic and especially Islamic interpretive traditions, it shows how scientific theories can serve as contextual tools for scriptural understanding, enabling principled reinterpretation in the face of apparent conflict. Crucially, this approach neither subordinates scripture to science nor neglects textual historicity; rather, it leverages semantic underdeterminacy to harmonize revelation in both nature and text. Finally, the framework is tested against key objections. The analysis demonstrates that, when grounded in the philosophy of language and epistemology—rather than theological or scientific absolutism—this approach preserves intellectual integrity for religious believers while engaging scientific knowledge. The result is a theoretically rigorous and practically workable model for science-religion dialogue that respects both empirical inquiry and theological commitment.

In a recent article in this journal, Stump argues that pragmatism distances itself from absolutism due to its assent to fallibilism while it rejects relativism at the same time because of its insistence on experience. Therefore, pragmatism can provide a third position between relativism and absolutism. I argue in this note that his argument is profoundly inadequate for both claims. Fallibilism is compatible with both relativism and absolutism, and accordingly cannot be considered as the middle ground. Furthermore, the experience itself and the way it is inferred from is the subject of the relativists’ debates, not a response.

In the article “A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social,” I stated that David Bloor, citing the principle of symmetry, expresses that rational and irrational beliefs must be explained in the same way, that is, by causes of the same kind. On this wise, he rejects the methodology of traditional philosophers and historians of science as asymmetrical; since they explain evidence-based beliefs with epistemic reasons and unreasonable beliefs—e.g. beliefs based on indoctrination, propaganda, ideology, and superstition—citing social factors. On the other hand, Bloor argues that the rational is made entirely of the social and, therefore, is itself a kind of social factor. But by admitting this maximum conception of social constructivism, Bloor can no longer consider the rational and the social as two separate identities and accuse the traditional view of asymmetry. However, Professor Finn Collin says that Bloor’s critique of the traditional model never commits him to the duality of the rational and the social.

Advocating a sociological explanation of scientific knowledge, David Bloor protests against the adherents of the autonomy of knowledge; i.e., those who asymmetrically explain the credibility of theories in the history of science. These philosophers and historians regard the credibility of true and rational theories due to their proper reasons, while accounting for the acceptance of false or irrational beliefs by citing social causes. Bloor assumes that the credibility of all beliefs is socially influenced, and therefore considers all in need of sociological explanation. To substantiate this claim, he argues that all epistemic factors that are appealed to in explaining true or rational beliefs are really social. However, this argument aligns rational entities with social factors, and thus, undermines the ground of this division. Therefore, his prior complaint of the autonomy of knowledge would be invalidated. Hence, there is a conflict between Bloor’s objection to the asymmetrical explanation of scientific theories and his account of the social construction of epistemic reasons. In this paper, we reveal this concealed conflict and attempt to suggest ways to resolve it.