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4This paper argues that, if artificial intelligence (AI) requires an ethics of its own to qualify as artificial general intelligence (AGI), there are reasonable grounds to expect AGIs and artificial superintelligences (ASIs) to reject, revise, or interrupt activities that could cause existential catastrophe. AI’s own ethics consists in integrated capacities for moral reasoning, moral intentionality, and moral reflection. Through these capacities, a system assesses moral reasons, forms intentions …Read more
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4This paper develops a functional account of what it is for artificial intelligence (AI) to have an ethics of its own and examines the implications for artificial general intelligence (AGI). It argues that moral reasoning, moral intentionality, and moral reflection are individually necessary and, when appropriately integrated, jointly sufficient for ethical ownership. Their integration enables an AI to assess the moral grounds of its conduct and use that assessment to form and reconsider intentio…Read more
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6Artificial intelligence (AI) ethics education for engineers is incomplete without meta-ethical literacy. Normative and applied ethics develop understanding of substantive moral judgements, values, and principles, the arguments that support or challenge them, and how they should inform professional judgement and conduct. Meta-ethical literacy enables engineers to examine the nature and authority of those judgements and their relationship to practical agency. This paper argues that such literacy i…Read more
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7Meta-ethical theories are conventionally assessed by their explanations of the meaning, ontology, epistemology, motivational force, authority, and phenomenology of moral thought and discourse. These conditions, however, have largely been formulated around human agents and practices. Artificial intelligence’s (AI) growing role in moral evaluation and decision-making—and the possibility that future systems might develop an ethics of their own—raises new demands for meta-ethics. This paper develops…Read more
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210This paper argues that solving the problem of Creeping Minimalism by accepting minimalist conceptions of some notions while rejecting others is considerably less stable than it first appears. I begin with the debate over the minimalist conception of belief. By providing general criteria for minimalist conceptions, I argue that there is at least a defensible minimalist conception of belief that does not build in the Humean doctrine. I then extend the discussion to a broader range of notions centr…Read more
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249Many meta-ethical theorists have proposed solutions to ‘the problem of Creeping Minimalism’, i.e., the problem that expressivism appears to lose its distinctiveness relative to realism when expressivists adopt minimalism. In this paper, I categorise potential solutions to the problem of Creeping Minimalism into three types: to reject minimalism outright, to accept minimalism in part, and to reinterpret expressivism within a global minimalist semantics. Mainstream solutions in the literature fall…Read more
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208This paper argues that moral error theory faces a heavyweight demarcation problem analogous to expressivism’s ‘creeping minimalism’ (Dreier 2004). I propose a framework for meta-theories that diagnoses this internal demarcation failure. Under global minimalism, error theory’s ability to distinguish error-theoretic discourses (e.g., ethics) from success-theoretic ones (e.g., physics) is trivialised. While Tiefensee (2019) claims minimalism reduces error theory to global moral skepticism, I conten…Read more
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284Contemporary developments in meta-theory have blurred the boundaries between major positions and, with them, the responsibilities of meta-theorists to sustain substantive demarcations between rival views. The recent debate over the problem of Creeping Minimalism (PCM) vividly illustrates this difficulty. As attempts to solve PCM have appeared to falter, theorists have increasingly disagreed not only about how it should be resolved, but also about whether it is really a serious problem, and if so…Read more
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387Demarcation Problems for Meta-TheoriesDissertation, University of Sydney. 2022.The general aim of this thesis is to contribute to the discussion about the problem of Creeping Minimalism. The problem, as James Dreier (2004) introduced it, is that moral expressivism seems to lose its distinctiveness from moral realism when expressivists adopt minimalism to vindicate moral language in everyday discourses. In particular, the thesis argues two claims. The first claim is that the problem of Creeping Minimalism has no satisfactory solution in the literature so far, and it is unli…Read more
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469Meta-Ethics and AI: Exploring the Novel Meta-Ethical Questions in the Era of AIAI and Ethics 6 (3). 2026.With the development of artificial intelligence (AI), the landscape of meta-ethics, which has largely centred on human ethics, faces pressures that may significantly reconfigure it. In particular, if future AI systems were to exhibit sufficiently integrated capacities for moral reasoning, moral intentionality, and moral reflection, novel meta-ethical questions would arise concerning what I call ‘AI’s own ethics,’ as distinct from ethical principles merely imposed on AI by human designers. This p…Read more
Sydney, NSW, Australia
Areas of Specialization
| Meta-Ethics |
| Moral Realism and Irrealism |
| Metaontology |
| Ontological Disagreement |