Shanna Slank

In this paper, we aim to provide an adequate normative analysis of the phenomenon of Covid-19 vaccine refusal. We argue that all vaccine-refusers make a moral mistake on the double grounds that the act of refusing to get vaccinated is a free-riding action and a negligent one. We then introduce four archetypes of vaccine refusers in order to further explore under what conditions this moral mistake makes one blameworthy. We maintain that there are both epistemic and motivational considerations that make a difference to one’s blameworthiness for their vaccine refusal and offer some preliminary claims about which epistemic errors and which motivational errors can, in fact, ground blameworthiness. We conclude the paper with some remarks on the complicated connection between blameworthiness and blame, and on why we think the aim of normative analysis should not be to dole out blame.

There is a theorem that shows that it is impossible for an algorithm to jointly satisfy the statistical fairness criteria of Calibration and Equalized Odds non-trivially. But what about the recently advocated alternative to Calibration, Base Rate Tracking? Here we show that Base Rate Tracking is strictly weaker than Calibration, and then take up the question of whether it is possible to jointly satisfy Base Rate Tracking and Equalized Odds in non-trivial scenarios. We show that it is not, thereby establishing an even more general impossibility theorem.

The Imposter Phenomenon—i.e., the phenomenon of feeling like a fraud and like your successes aren’t really yours—is typically construed not just as a crisis of confidence, but as a failure of rationality. On the standard story, “imposters” have bad beliefs about their talents because they dismiss the evidence provided by their successes. Here I suggest that this standard picture could be mistaken, and that these “imposters” may actually be more rational than non-imposters. Why? Accounting for the non-talent causes of your successes may require you to lower your confidence in your talents, in which case, “imposter” beliefs are rational. I then go on to suggest a second reason to worry about the standard picture: It does not adequately address the possible role that one’s environment has in the production of the phenomenon. To give an example, I hypothesize that environments that host a “culture of genius” can alter our evidential landscape in a way that promotes the Imposter Phenomenon. Finally, I argue that my alternative picture of the Imposter Phenomenon should prompt us to opt for a conception of self-worth that is more deeply tied to virtues like intellectual humility than to relative talent possession.