Shannon Brick

This paper defends two main claims. First, that political philosophy deserves a central place in AI Ethics’ curricula. This is a claim about the content of the AI Ethics class. The second claim is about the form of the AI Ethics class: namely, that considerations originating in political philosophy must inform the way in which AI Ethics is taught. The basic idea animating both claims, is that AI has powerful political implications and that preparing students to navigate these implications, requires paying close attention to both the cognitive and practical learning goals of the AI Ethics course.

This paper substantiates a distinction, built out of Gricean resources, between two kinds of communicative act: showing and telling. Where telling that p proceeds by recruiting an addressee’s capacity to recognize trustworthy informants, showing does not. Instead, showing proceeds by presenting an addressee with a consideration that provides reason to believe that p (other than the reason provided by an informant’s credibility), and so recruits their capacity to respond to those reasons. With this account in place, the paper defends an account of one way in which authors can show their readers that certain moral states of affairs obtain both inside, and outside of, their fictions. It is argued, moreover, that this kind of showing gives addressees access to more than just reasons for moral belief–it also gives them access to the sorts of reasons that enable agents to increase their moral understanding. In virtue of these latter capacities, the showing identified is a way of communicating about morality that is markedly different from the sort of moral testimony that many philosophers have been increasingly interested in of late.

According to the E-Functional Account of moral assertion, the practice of making moral assertions persists because moral assertions help their addressees gain moral understanding. Proponents of this view have taken it to support the existence of an evaluative norm of moral assertion, as well as a prescriptive norm of moral assertion. According to the latter, moral assertions must be accompanied by an explanation. For instance, if I am to tell you that eating meat is wrong, I should also tell you why it is wrong. After situating the E-Functional Account in the context of recent work on moral testimony, this article defends an extant objection to the prescriptive norm that the account is taken to support. A further, deeper objection to the E-Functional Account is then raised. This deeper objection targets the claim the practice of moral assertion persists because it enables addressees to gain moral understanding. This deeper objection is mounted by taking a closer look at a particular sub-class of moral assertions that are dubbed Emotionally Forceful Moral Assertions.

This article argues that we ought to reject Gregory Currie’s “Trace Account” of documentary film. According to the Trace Account, a film is a documentary so long the majority of its constitutive images are traces of the film’s subject matter. The argument proceeds by considering how proponents of the Trace Account could respond to Noel Carroll’s charge that their analysis is radically revisionary. I argue that the only responses available are either implausible or show that a fully worked out version of the Trace Account collapses into Carroll’s own, rival definition of documentary. I then consider how advocates of the Trace Account might attempt to rescue the theory by reframing it as an account of a genre or as a theory of evaluation and argue that neither attempt would succeed. Given this, we ought to embrace Carroll’s own account of documentary, according to which a film is documentary if and only if it is a film of presumptive assertion.

José Medina's previous book, The Epistemology of Resistance (2012), examined epistemic practices as forms of political resistance. His latest book, The Epistemology of Protest, takes up an obviously political action and examines it as a distinctly epistemic phenomenon. He argues that from an epistemic perspective, protest does much more than convey knowledge, and it is more than an action from which new knowledge might emerge. Instead, protest is a group action by which new forms of epistemic and communicative agency are brought into being. It is a kind of group action, moreover, with respect to which all people shoulder obligations—to listen and, sometimes, to join. Medina's account seeks to clarify the... Read More.