Shannon Hoff

Dans « Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom », Sylvia Wynter soutient que l’auto-cognition humaine de l’Europe occidentale a pris une forme adaptative pour servir ce qu’elle appelle « Man 1 » (le sujet libre, rationnel et politique) et « Man 2 » (le sujet bioéconomique). Selon Wynter, il serait nécessaire de faire advenir une forme d’auto-cognition humaine non adaptative et universelle, n’excluant pas la majorité de l’humanité, et qu’elle appelle homo narrans. Je soutiens que la distinction établie par Wynter entre l’adaptatif et le non-adaptatif est cruciale, tout comme la nécessité de considérer les conséquences oppressives, pour le contact interculturel, de l’adaptatif. Je montre que ses arguments résonnent de manière significative avec les idées centrales de la vie éthique et de l’esprit absolu chez Hegel, et je fais référence à ces idées clés pour renforcer ses objectifs critiques, tout en suggérant de réviser son analyse de la manière dont ces modes de connaissance opèrent dans la culture humaine. Je soutiens que les pratiques de l’ homo narrans, en tant que pratiques de l’esprit absolu, sont toujours immanentes à la spécificité concrète des domaines que nous expérimentons comme notre chez-soi, et qui encourage l’adaptation dans la connaissance. Je soutiens de plus que nous mettons en œuvre des pratiques de transcendance précisément en prêtant attention à leur caractère corruptible et en favorisant le développement des contextes concrets dans lesquels elles s’inscrivent. Enfin, je me tourne vers la conception de l’ homo narrans en analysant la manière dont Hegel rend compte de la tragédie antique et moderne, et en montrant comment l’activité expressive est une capacité à raconter de nouvelles histoires qui reconfigurent les relations de l’humain avec le monde et avec lui-même, et ainsi les transforment continuellement.

In Sites of Exposure, John Russon draws on the resources of phenomenology to describe how human life, while not having a “given” form specified in advance, nonetheless takes speci?ic shape through practices by which we become committed to certain ways of living. This means that our lives are simultaneously a matter of living with a speci?ic reality—what Russon calls “home”—and having to respond to an outside to which we are “exposed.” I argue here that Russon’s analysis is especially useful for feminist philosophy and its attempt to grapple with the possibility of universal principles of justice across cultural contexts, developing this philosophical framework in conversation with Serene Khader’s efforts to furnish a set of core values for transnational feminist praxis that, while universal in their opposition to sexist oppression, are not imperialist, and with Saba Mahmood’s critique of the parochial character of Western conceptions of freedom.

Dans « Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom », Sylvia Wynter soutient que l’auto-cognition humaine de l’Europe occidentale a pris une forme adaptative pour servir ce qu’elle appelle « Man 1 » (le sujet libre, rationnel et politique) et « Man 2 » (le sujet bioéconomique). Selon Wynter, il serait nécessaire de faire advenir une forme d’auto-cognition humaine non adaptative et universelle, n’excluant pas la majorité de l’humanité, et qu’elle appelle homo narrans. Je soutiens que la distinction établie par Wynter entre l’adaptatif et le non-adaptatif est cruciale, tout comme la nécessité de considérer les conséquences oppressives, pour le contact interculturel, de l’adaptatif. Je montre que ses arguments résonnent de manière significative avec les idées centrales de la vie éthique et de l’esprit absolu chez Hegel, et je fais référence à ces idées clés pour renforcer ses objectifs critiques, tout en suggérant de réviser son analyse de la manière dont ces modes de connaissance opèrent dans la culture humaine. Je soutiens que les pratiques de l’ homo narrans, en tant que pratiques de l’esprit absolu, sont toujours immanentes à la spécificité concrète des domaines que nous expérimentons comme notre chez-soi, et qui encourage l’adaptation dans la connaissance. Je soutiens de plus que nous mettons en œuvre des pratiques de transcendance précisément en prêtant attention à leur caractère corruptible et en favorisant le développement des contextes concrets dans lesquels elles s’inscrivent. Enfin, je me tourne vers la conception de l’ homo narrans en analysant la manière dont Hegel rend compte de la tragédie antique et moderne, et en montrant comment l’activité expressive est une capacité à raconter de nouvelles histoires qui reconfigurent les relations de l’humain avec le monde et avec lui-même, et ainsi les transforment continuellement.

The intersectionality argument originating in Black feminism challenges the preponderance of “single-axis thinking” (Crenshaw), and the decolonial critique of Eurocentrism challenges the assumption of neutral universality or “zero-point hubris” (Castro-Gómez) on the part of colonial thinking. Inspired by these challenges, this paper brings decolonial, intersectional, and phenomenological thought into conversation to consider how philosophical thinking can operate in light of these risks. The first section distinguishes between the inevitable, existential condition by which we inhabit determinate forms of life, and the pernicious way in which some forms come to masquerade as universal and dominate others. The second section aids in opposing the pernicious by working *through* the existential, showing that it is our very determinacy that fosters the possibility of understanding others and working toward universality on the basis of two arguments. First, we all experience ourselves as one among many, developing inside of an interpersonal reality in which interaction guides us to sense, and this shared structure of perspective renders us different and opens us to the possibility of further transformation through exposure. Second, thinking and determinacy are inevitably linked, as each of us draws on local mechanisms available to us to give expression to meanings we experience as non-local, and the possibility of universality lies on the horizon, in answerability to other pairings of determinacy and meaning. In the course of making these conceptual arguments, the paper flags both the mechanisms by which practical reality could be structured to encourage exposure to the determinacy that supports thinking, and the challenges and hubristic risks we face in doing so.

In Sites of Exposure, John Russon draws on the resources of phenomenology to describe how human life, while not having a “given” form specified in advance, nonetheless takes speci????ic shape through practices by which we become committed to certain ways of living. This means that our lives are simultaneously a matter of living with a speci????ic reality—what Russon calls “home”—and having to respond to an outside to which we are “exposed.” I argue here that Russon’s analysis is especially useful for feminist philosophy and its attempt to grapple with the possibility of universal principles of justice across cultural contexts, developing this philosophical framework in conversation with Serene Khader’s efforts to furnish a set of core values for transnational feminist praxis that, while universal in their opposition to sexist oppression, are not imperialist, and with Saba Mahmood’s critique of the parochial character of Western conceptions of freedom.

Accounts of sexual experience, sexual oppression, and sexual violation, if they are not to lend support to the problems they are invoked to address, require the foundation of a phenomenological description of the character of experience. Relying on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I aim to provide this foundation, arguing that sexual experience is a domain not of detached, individual autonomy but of intrinsic susceptibility and exposure to the world. My description of sexual experience is intended to reveal the immanent norms that sexuality projects and thereby to critique ways of inhabiting experience that disavow what is revealed in that description. The first section discerns three ambiguities that characterize our experience in Merleau-Ponty's notion of “flesh”: that between materiality and meaning, self and others, and self and world. The second section offers a phenomenology of sexual experience based on these ambiguities. The third section, on sexual oppression and suppression, identifies two stereotypical ways in which they are evaded: what I call the stances of “withdrawal from” and “control of” sexuality as flesh. Finally, the fourth section reveals the shortcomings of the legal-juridical domain in navigating our status as flesh, and warns against the proliferation of its terms, specifically the norm of consent.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” by Mary C. RawlinsonShannon Hoff (bio)Mary C. Rawlinson, The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” New York: University Press, 2021, 215 pp. ISBN 978-0-231-19905-6Mary rawlinson shows that to be genuinely receptive to a philosophical text one must be creative, and she brings the Phenomenology of Spirit to life with her reading. It speaks of and to experience, and she makes it resound as such, matching its aptitude with her own rich descriptions of the character of experience. The reader is bound to learn a lot from her careful and vivid analyses of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, where she displays her power to digest a text that is almost impossibly unwieldy. Both students and scholars of Hegel’s philosophy will find satisfaction here: her book will spark understanding and excitement in inexperienced readers and hone approaches to complex issues of interpretation in experienced ones.Rawlinson opens The Betrayal of Substance with the provocative thesis that Hegel “writes with both hands” (xv). On the one hand, he affirms the abundance of difference in life by insisting on the material realization of the abstract concept, on the life of the singleton (her translation of das Einzelne) as the site of this realization, and on the difference intrinsic to identities (xiii). On the other hand, she says, he aims at a science of logic beyond phenomenology, where singularity has been erased and difference comprehended, such that “nothing is other to it”; this is “an unrelenting insistence on an absolute [End Page 225] detachment from life” (53). Rawlinson tracks this severance of concept and life throughout the Phenomenology: in the abandonment of sensuousness in sense-certainty; in the thing’s dissolution in perception; in “the ‘loss of reality’ of the play of forces”; in the struggle to the death, where self-consciousness “risks life absolutely” (66); in stoicism and skepticism, which “install an absolute difference between life and thought” (47). The life of the singleton is severed from the concept by the production (on the part of the unhappy consciousness) of “ethics, culture, morality, and religion as institutional infrastructures sustaining the self-transcendence of the singleton in the ‘we’ of a community” (66); by reason’s erasure of singularity in its accomplishment of a universal consciousness (68); by perpetual reference to the Bacchanalian revel, that “frenzy of the group that survives [the singleton’s] collapse” (xxx). (Indeed, one of the book’s contributions is its illumination of the prevalence of the image of the revel in Hegel’s text.)In response, Rawlinson asserts the need for a double reading of this double writing: (1) to affirm the capacious narrative that dislodges “ready-made abstractions” and engages the “thick richness of life,” because that is where the truth lies (xxix–xxx); and (2) to oppose Hegel’s “completion” of the phenomenological project and the departure from it to logic, and with it the erasure of the singleton. The book reflects the style of this double reading at each turn, in turns rebellious and appreciative, at ease with its own ambiguity toward Hegel. Rawlinson produces three central pieces of evidence for her critique, three “dangling threads [that] refuse to be woven into the completed fabric of absolute knowing[:] sexual difference, the mortality of the singleton,... and the differences of style in art and literature” (xv). Her critique of Hegel’s abandonment of life sets in relief the critical centrality of Hegel’s identification of maternal love as “the most dangerous force with which the state must contend” (68): this love is a clear instance of affirmation of the singleton over the “we” in which it is submerged. Finally, Rawlinson opposes the idea that truth is “the fully realized series of shapes of knowing and figures of truth” in which “science will have been the truth of phenomenology” with the hypothesis instead that “phenomenology will prove to have been the truth of science” (xliv).Itself beginning several times, The Betrayal of Substance thematizes Hegel’s multiple beginnings and the insight ref lected thereby...

ABSTRACT One of Derrida's most significant insights concerns the irreducibility yet interdependence of unconditioned ideal and conditioned actuality. First, relying especially on the concept of hospitality, I argue that this insight allows for the development of a powerful account of ethical and political action. Second, I show the usefulness of this account for feminist critical practice, especially with regard to the ideal of inclusion and the concept of “woman.” Third, and finally, I explore how this insight could guide feminist action in relation to two specific situations: feminism's relations to transgender issues and to reproductive freedom.

This paper aims to illuminate the ongoing significance of Locke’s political philosophy. It argues that the legitimacy of political authority lies, for Locke, in the extent to which it collaborates with individuals so as to allow them to be themselves more effectively, and in its answerability in principle to the consent such individuals should thereby give it. The first section discusses how the free will inevitably asserts its authority; the second shows the inevitability of the will’s incorporation of authority as a kind of prosthesis, which in turn transforms the operation of the will; and the third treats the issue of consent, arguing that Locke is less interested in individual acts of consent than in the ways in which structures of authority reflect their answerability to consent by being shaped so as to honour the beings whose capacity to consent is definitive for them.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Inheriting Identity and Practicing TransformationThe Time of Feminist PoliticsShannon HoffA human life unfolds over time. No moment of it can be considered apart from the others, independently of the fact that the human being was and will be, and so no moment is sufficient on its own to tell us of the nature of that identity. Each moment is insufficient as an expression of who we are, as an answer to the question of what we want to be, or as a point at which a full account of our identity could be given. And we live each moment as if afflicted by a dual blindness with regard to the past and future that lend it significance; while exercising pervasive influence in the present, this past and future are relatively inaccessible to our reflective insight. We are always “growing up,” so to speak, from out of a childhood that can never be the purely transparent object of reflection, to an adulthood or “accomplishment” of identity that is always in the mysterious future, unimaginable in the terms of the adolescence in which we find ourselves.My purpose here is to show how this issue resonates in the context of feminist philosophy, feminist critique, and feminist practice—that is, how a consideration of time and its impact on human experience allows us to highlight the accomplishments of various avenues of feminist thought, to elaborate their shortcomings in relation to each other, to perceive the reasons behind the tensions among them, and to understand the way in which they are (and should [End Page 167] be understood as) connected. I will work through the issue of what it means to live in the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future—what it means to inherit an already meaningful world, to be an individual in the present, and to be propelled into an uncertain future—so as to provide a general framework by which to interpret the history of feminist thought. I will explain these different temporal dimensions in terms of the (respective) ideas of cultivation, universality, and transformation, identifying the positive and negative significance of each and also the demand that the tensions among them be negotiated. Finally, I will show that feminist justice is in fact found here, as answerability to all three—to communities of cultivation, to the demands of universality, and to the inconclusiveness and transformability of human identity. While much feminist thinking has been committed to exploring these elements singly, in abstraction from the others, and while such work is important, it is also valuable to explicitly explore the relationships and tensions among these different aspects, to articulate how to act and think in light of this underlying conceptual context, and to do so in a more explicit and self-conscious way.There is, of course, a disadvantage to not exploring these elements on their own terms: namely, that one handles their subtleties roughly. A further and related danger is that involved in trying to draw a broad picture of a tradition with complex and conflicting elements, one that does not count itself as a tradition at times—as a “we,” a feminism, or a feminist thought.1 While I will talk about “feminism” or “feminist thought,” I do not presume that these differences do not exist; my goal is simply to explore what is involved in an elaboration of a critical interpretation of society, when the society one critically interprets is an agent in one’s formation. The description of the dynamics of human becoming, agency, and critique I develop below has the purpose of showing that it is possible to understand differences between feminist positions as complementary, a process that will lead me to underemphasize stringent divisions and charged oppositions and to focus on drawing connections. Let us turn now to a preliminary description of the conceptual framework I seek to construct.Feminism and TimeTo advance feminist purposes is, one might presume, to hope for and work toward a new and transformed reality in the future. It would seem, however, that this reality cannot be clearly envisioned in the present, since that would require the transformation of the very people envisioning it. In...

Modernity is characterized by an assertion of the individual as a singular unit of significance, and its various systems (political, legal, economic, etc.) take their lead from a commitment to the individual as the bearer of rights. While a powerful accomplishment, this idea is also problematic: it does not adequately recognize how the individual it prioritizes would itself point to other contexts of significance by which its experience is rendered meaningful. This paper explores this basic tension between these two visions of selfhood: one expressed in terms of “rights” and the other in terms of “worlds.” It will show how care for “worlds” is necessary for the very operation of rights, and it will identify various ways in which these “worlds” could be politically protected.

Frantz Fanon’s theoretical and practical challenge is to identify how self-determination is possible for a subject whose agency and significance have, through colonization, been appropriated and shaped by others, a challenge to which he responds with the invocation of “national consciousness.” In this paper I describe this national consciousness and show how its exclusivity paradoxically establishes the ground for a kind of international or universal inclusiveness. I differentiate this inclusiveness from the universality of Western political ideals, which Fanon challenges, and conclude by discussing how the tension between nation and internationalism in Fanon is illuminated by Jacques Derrida’s discussion of the idea of democracy and particular democracies in Rogues

Many feminist and other interpreters of the Phenomenology of Spirit have misconstrued the motive behind Hegel’s representation of ethical life and his assessment of Antigone’s agency in its downfall. Upon developing an alternative interpretation, based on Hegel’s challenge of ethical life’s purportedly immediate reading of the meaning of sexual difference, this paper assesses several prominent feminist interpretations in its light. Hegel’s critique of the unstable and unsustainable relationship between nature and law, or sexual difference and legal identification, is shown to constitute a valuable resource for contemporary feminist and legal approaches to the politically volatile negotiation of nature and culture and the critique and elaboration of law.