Shashi Motilal

This chapter gathers together various ethical tools included in the toolbox that has been fashioned in previous chapters. It seeks to place in perspective and examine these different tools in their application to case studies while also making a candid submission that there is always scope to add more nuanced/finer tools that newer, ‘not encountered before’ moral policy dilemmas may demand. We conclude that serious deliberation on ethical questions in the realm of governance offers no easy answers to them; however, the decision that a policy analyst needs to make is best made by taking all stakeholders on board. The process of framing policies by engaging in public practical reasoning with the concerned stakeholders will enable policy analysts to draw up a policy that will, in all probability, not be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ but ‘reasonable’ to adopt in a given situation at a given time, where a reasonable policy is the outcome of an engagement with the ethicist and practitioner. It is this fact of not being able to arrive at a clear black or white answer to a moral policy dilemma, that constitutes the moral limits of policy decisions in governance. Finally, this chapter reflects on how the toolbox might help us understand some policy decisions around the COVID-19 pandemic.

TheGovernancerole of public practical reasoning in good governance chapter seeks to establish the role of practical reason in good governance, the aim of which is to bring about a better society where this could be understood as a more fair and just society than what we find today. Stating the principles of good governanceGovernanceprinciples of good governance, it seeks to show that justice is the normative value of good governanceGovernancenormative value of good governance and that although the idea of an ideally just society is probably an ‘utopia’, good governance does help in reducing the injusticesInjustice that abound in society. In this contextContexts, the chapter delineates the role of public practical reasoning that underlies good governance. A distinction is outlined between reason, reasoning and reasonablenessReasonableness with the claim that what public policy should aim at is ‘being reasonable’ and not necessarily being the ‘most rational policy’ to hold. In that respect, it emphasizes the seven parameters of Social Choice TheorySen AmartyaSocial Choice Theory as admitted by Amartya Sen. The chapter presents an account of the dominant and alternativeAlternatives ethical frameworks wherein public policy needs to be framed and evaluated. It closely examines the steps involved in the framing of public policyPublic policysteps in public policy framing while showing how normative ethics is involved at each step. It concludes by stating the limits of the role of ethics in policy formation.

In the area of Applied Ethics, the ethics of governance raises some pertinent questions. What is the relation between ethics and governance? Should there be a deep engagement between ethics and governance making the former indispensable to the latter? Or, can the interest in ethical questions be only peripheral to the tasks of governance? The chapter seeks to understand the relation between the two in the light of the distinction between applied philosophy and engaged philosophy and that between applied public policy ethics and engaged public policy ethics. Further, how the book proposes to delineate this relation is briefly spelt out in chapter summaries presented in this introductory chapter.

This chapter focuses on outlining some of the ethical perspectivesFeminism/Feministperspective often excluded in a typical Western ethical primer, including virtueVirtuevirtue ethicsethicsFeminism/Feministethics, feministCarefeminist care ethics care ethicsCareethics, Buddhist ethicsBuddhismBuddhist ethics, Hindu ethicsHinduismHindu ethics and a few indigenous and African ethical conceptsAfrican ethical concepts. It thus allows us to decolonize our moral landscape by including perspectives originating from positionalities considered to be the margins. Our aim is not only to showcase the breadth of the ethical theories especially when we take non-Western theories into account. The views discussed in this chapter also help us identify and highlight a number of factors that are important to take into account beyond the dominant theories in Western normative ethics. This will enable us to fashion an expanded toolbox that offers more comprehensive and creative options in policy makingPolicy design/Policy making and executive decision making.

CriticizingHuman well-beingthe economic growthEconomic growthmodelDevelopment modelseconomic growth model, the social welfare and humanHuman rightsrightsCapability approachcapabilities and human rights model, the capability approach championed by Amartya Sen and Martha NussbaumCapability approachNussbaum, Martha heralds a new paradigm of understanding social justice. This chapter discusses the core ideas of ‘functionings’, ‘capabilities’Capability approachcapabilities and functionings and the notion of ‘positive freedomFreedom’ (well-being and agencyFreedomfreedomsCapability approachagency-freedom) as spelled out by Sen and Nussbaum. Acknowledging human diversity and its effects in converting primary goods into capabilities, the chapter delves into the finer nuances of a new metric of interpersonal comparisons of capabilities, which is also more gender sensitive. It emphasizes the idea that people’s socio-economic entitlements and capabilities are as important as their other interests and thus the state must endorse policies in favor of the disadvantaged groups in education, employment and political participation. In short, providing infrastructure to enhance people’s capabilities to lead the life they value should be the aim of good governance. It looks into Nussbaum's view of a cross-culturally agreeable list of human capabilities that would contribute more substantively to a theory of global social justice. Besides its pervasive influence on the language of public policy and discussion, the capability approach has also spawned policy proposals, some of which have been discussed here along with the difficulties that this approach presents in its application.

This chapterConsequence-based ethics discusses various forms of one of the dominant ethical theories in the history of Western ethical discourse, namely, Consequentialism. Traditionally, the socio-economic method of ‘cost-benefit analysisCost-benefit analysis’ has been adopted in deciding the best course of action to take among various choices open in areas of governance, particularly in aspects of policy and executive decision-making. Such a method argues from the ‘good ends’ or favorable consequences that certain courses of action would deliver to concluding that those actions are ‘right’. The consequentialistConsequentialismconsequentialist principles underlying such an approach draw from ancient and many modern sources. The main proponents have been celebrated utilitarian philosophers such as Jeremy BenthamBentham, Jeremyand John Stuart MillMill, John Start. In the hands of these philosophers, the hedonistic idea of ‘individual pleasure maximizationPleasuresmaximization’ evolved to become the idea of ‘good’ for the whole society implying ‘the greatest good of the greatest number’ and integrating further into the concepts of human and environmental ‘wellbeing’.

Ranging from damming of rivers for development, the treatment of non-human animals, specifically in terms of their use in scientific experimentation, and affirmative actionAffirmative action to combat forms of historical deprivation, the chapter offers a descriptive account of three case studies from India that warrant ethical inquiry, and presents significant governance challenges in the contemporary world. Relevant facts and figures about the cases are placed before the reader to raise ethical questions of significance to public policy and governance. These case presentations are designed to reveal the normative assumptions, values and ethical reasoningEthical reasoning that underpin the evolution of the dam-driven development paradigm, moral status and rights of non-human animals as well as the rationale of affirmative actionAffirmative action in contemporary democraciesDemocracy.

The Sardar Sarovar Project, the CPCSEA guidelines on animal experimentation and the reservation policy in India represent contemporary governance challenges that necessitate ethical reflection. In this chapter, we analyze these cases by using the ethical toolbox developed in the earlier chapters. Policy decisions are subject to the contextsContexts they are taken in, including the philosophical, more specifically, the ethical debates that surround them. The attempt in this chapter is to shed light on the ethical underpinnings of decisions taken in the public interest by applying an expanded set of ethical tools and values some of which have been conventionally sidelined but are very valuable as we shall see. It also affords an opportunity to reflect on the possible ways of enriching policy decisions.

Does a good end—the larger social good/welfare of the majority justify neglecting the rights of minorities? In the backdrop of this question, the chapter examines some dominant principle-based ethical theories, both Western and Indian, in the contextContexts of individual and institutional moralityMortalityindividual and institutional morality. Beginning with individual morality, Immanuel Kant’s absolutist conception of duty is contrasted with the relativistic conception of duty in the Bhagavad Gita to draw out a feasible understanding of duty in public service. How Kant’s lofty ethical principles justify public policy is highlighted with relevant examples expressing Kant’s idea of human rationality, autonomy and equality. In the contextContexts of institutional morality the theories of John Rawls (liberal egalitarianism) and Robert Nozick (libertarianism)Nozick, Robertlibertarianism are juxtaposed to bring out their contrasting positions with regard to the duties of the state vis-ầ-vis its people. Rawls’ idea of the welfare stateRawls, Johnwelfare state guided by his Difference Principle brings his views close to M. K. Gandhi’s approach to social justice. Through examples and case studies, an attempt has been made to show how while upholding the philosophy of a welfare state is important for good governance, free enterprise also has its advantages in promoting the good of the state. Lastly, whether the scope of ethical principles can extend to resolve global issues, with or without a world government, is also discussed in respect of different forms of cosmopolitanism while considering global policies within these realms.

The Ethics of Governance: Moral Limits of Policy Decisions offers a toolbox drawn from normative ethics which finds applications in public governance, primarily focusing on policy making and executive action. It includes ethical concepts and principles culled from different philosophical traditions, ranging from more familiar Western theories to non-Western ethical perspectives, thereby providing a truly global, decolonized and expanded normative lens on issues of governance. The book takes a unique and original approach; it demonstrates the use of the ethical toolbox in the context of actual examples of governance challenges. Taking three major case studies each representing an aspect of human-human and/or human-nature and/or human-animal relationship, the book attempts to show the significance of public practical reasoning in policy decisions with the aim of arriving at reasonable responses. Acknowledging the challenges that policy makers often face, the book highlights the fact that policy making is hardly an exercise yielding a black-or-white solution; rather it involves finding the most reasonable normative outcome in a given situation, especially employing an expanded understanding of values including well-being, sustainability, interdependence and community. This effort that helps bridge the gap between ethical theorists and policy practitioners exemplifies the necessary role of ‘engaged philosophy’ in public governance. In the major case studies, Boxes offer facts and figures along with pertinent ethical questions that have been raised and discussed. Aiming to aid the engagement of a diverse audience including non-philosophy readers, each chapter also includes Boxes containing examples, shorter case studies, at-a-glance charts, and tables with comprehensive ethical tools for a quick recap.

This paper proposes to argue that ecological justice that is rooted in an ecocentric approach to nature is the key to achieving integral human development which goes beyond ‘development that is only worth our while’. Ecological justice is achievable if there is a clear understanding of relations at two distinct levels - one, the relation among humans and another between the entire human community and other elements of the ecosystem. These relations are the basis of the alliances that we form to address issues of integral human development. The focus of the paper is the second kind of alliance that is based on an understanding of the relation between the human and the non-human realm. However, an ‘alliance’ is normally formed between partners with equal standing. Is there a sense in which both humans and the non-human world can be considered to be ‘equal partners in an alliance? The paper considers how one might establish this by examining diverse philosophical viewpoints that have addressed the issue of the treatment of non-human animals for anthropocentric ends. It discusses whether equality between parties is necessary for the formation of an alliance drawing extensively from ethical theories and examples from the world. From rights approach, recipients of justice, to care ethics, several theories offer guidance to support what would constitute a ‘humane’ approach to non-human animals. While these approaches crucially pin the broad perspective, they have not explicitly considered the role of an alliance between humans and non-human animals in achieving a basic level of wellbeing for the latter. Taking cues from the different kinds of ‘ruling over’ from Stuart Gray’s understanding of the relation between humans and non-human nature, the paper seeks to establish that an alliance between humans and the non-human realm is possible even without committing to their equal status and this could form the basis of ecological justice and well-being.

Many philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have held that the predominant modern western theories of ethics like Kant’s deontological theory and Mill’s Utilitarianism have failed to deliver as a “theory” of ethics. In other words, they are not successful as “decision procedures” whereby one can determine which action from a multitude of actions open before the agent would be right and therefore morally obligatory for him to do. In fact, the basic concepts of moral obligation, impartiality, and objectivity of moral standards has been questioned and pitted against the “personal point of view” of the agent. It has been held that the “moral goods” have to be given up for the sake of the “personal goods.” Is this a systemic fault which is linked with the normative nature of ethics? Or, can we understand ethics in a manner where it can be objective and yet not have to give up on the plurality of moral and nonmoral goods? Can ethical theory in this sense function as an “action guide to moral practice”? These are some questions that will be taken up in the paper against the backdrop of the views of the critics of ethical theory.

PurposeThis paper presumes that a public policy document must aim at protecting human rights. The question being raised is- what kind of moral reasoning or grounding can we afford to the idea that human rights are important for the whole framework of public policy. The paper aims at looking at the moral and political philosophy of Immanuel Kant as we find it in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Morals for providing this background.MethodThe paper provides an exegetical account of some of the key concepts in Kant’s moral philosophy and the application of these in socio-political contexts.Result and DiscussionThe processes involved in the framing of the document, the document itself, as well as the persons framing the document must aspire to respect and protect human rights. The implication itself rests on the principle that a moral end cannot be achieved by immoral means and protecting human rights is a moral end that all societies must seek to achieve. Hence not only the end, which in this case is the policy document itself, but the means, i.e., the processes of framing the documents and intentions of those responsible and accountable for it, must also be moral.

Eradicating poverty is one of the prime goals included in the Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations in its Post-2015 Development Agenda. Clearly, this is a mission set for the world to achieve but do humans have a moral obligation to fulfill it? In other words, is there a moral obligation on the part of the affluent of the world to help the needy poor? Drawing on the relation between a moral obligation and a moral right, one view is that if there is a moral obligation to help the needy poor of the world, then we can say that those afflicted by severe poverty have a moral right (human right) to be free from poverty. But being an example of a socioeconomic right, it is writ with problems leading some philosophers to doubt that there is such a right. On the other hand, many attempts have been made to justify such a right. The paper looks at some attempts that have been made to justify the existence of such a right on the metaethical principles of justice, humanity and the concepts of karma and dharmic duty. It further delves into the nature of the moral obligation to eradicate poverty where this philosophical exercise provides the vision and the insight into the extent and scope of the mission. Lastly, the paper suggests how in view of the complex theoretical issues involved, one can attempt to generate the conviction that there is a human moral obligation to eradicate poverty.

In what sense must global ethics be global? In one sense, it must deal with global issues. In another, it must not be parochial but inclusive of normative views from around the world. So far, global ethics has met the first standard much better than the second. Authors based in the global South contribute approximately 5% of the internationally published research on global ethics. With this in mind, the co-editors of this special issue sought to bring more perspectives, experiences, and authors from India into the international global ethics conversation, and so they launched the Indian Global Ethics Initiative. Their first step, this special issue, presents Indian experience and authors on topics including urban development, care ethics, women’s empowerment, fair trade, distorted policy research, poverty, and health. Much of this work is grounded by the authors’ experience in policy-making and advocacy for social and global justice. The co-editors invite contact from interested readers who would like to join and continue this Indian Global Ethics Initiative, as well as readers who would like to take similar initiatives in other regions.

It is an indubitable fact that our thoughts are always about something or some state of affairs in the world. Again, it is true that we use language to express some of our thoughts, and that in such a use of language which philosophers call a speech act, language also comes to be about something or some state of affairs in the world. E.g., when someone asserts that Peter is married to Mary, the sentence, 'Peter is married to Mary', comes to be about the state of affairs of Peter's being married to Mary. This property of being about something which characterizes our thoughts and speech acts is called "intentionality" by philosophers. ;In Intentionality, John Searle claims that the Intentionality of language and the Intentionality of speech acts performed by using language is derived from the intrinsic Intentionality of mental states which accompany the speech act. In the dissertation I propose to examine this claim of Searle's. ;Searle's view regarding the Intentionality of speech acts is incomplete and wrong. Searle does not show how the Intentionality of referring and predicating in a speech act is to be derived from mental reference and mental predication in the corresponding mental state. In this sense his theory is incomplete. Further, his theory is false. Taking the case of belief, I propose to show that it cannot be the source of the Intentionality of the corresponding assertion. Either a belief is a disposition and does not have any Intentionality or it is a mental act of accepting a proposition in which case the Intentionality of the belief and the Intentionality of the assertion have the same linguistic nature and the former cannot be the source of the latter. We are faced with a dilemma which shows that Searle's view cannot be correct. In the dissertation it will be argued that the Intentionality of a speech act is as intrinsic to it as the Intentionality of a mental phenomenon is to the mental phenomenon. The nature of speech act referring and predicating, mental referring and predicating, linguistic concepts and linguistic acts using those concepts will be discussed

This paper aims at understanding Sustainable Development Goals as normative ends to be achieved by normative means in the context of global ethics. It distinguishes the descriptive and the normative senses of sustainability and development and puts forward a case for exploring the role of human moral obligations as the normative means to attain the goals of sustainable development. It argues that it is only when basic human moral obligations and role-related obligations are fulfilled that human well-being and that of the non-human elements of the eco-system can be achieved. Furthermore, it also explains how such a concept can be inclusive, diverse and integrative