Shaun Gallagher

The concept of sedimentation, developed in phenomenology, provides a bridge between recent discussions of habit in embodied-enactive theories of cognition and skilled performance and conceptions of how habit and routine function in social practices and institutional formation. Although the notion of habit is little discussed in mainstream neoclassical economics, various theorists of institutional economics rightly suggest that institutional structures can shape individual and social habits and routines. At the same time they ignore or say very little about how individual habits and social interactions evolve into institutions. I argue that the analysis of sedimentation can provide a fuller account of the dynamical interrelations between habitual and institutional processes. With a specific focus on the way sedimentation works, I make two suggestions. First, although sedimented habits can be structurally rigid, and often difficult to change, they are also performatively flexible and adaptive in situated action. Second, this performative flexibility reflects principles of transactional plasticity that carry over to institutions.

In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in one direction or another or a sense of the pertinent affective contingencies. Before directly addressing the issue of affect in perception, we explain our peculiar, low-level conception of affect as a form of worldinvolving intentionality that modulates (minimally) bodily behavior without necessarily possessing informational value of any kind. We then address the deficiency concerning affect in enactive accounts of perception by examining some exemplary forms of bodily affect that constrain perception. We show that bodily affect significantly contributes to (either limiting or enabling) our contact with the world in our perceptually operative attentive outlook, in a kind of perceptual interest or investment, and in social perception.

In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) that is a proper part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one that, on the one hand, abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains the significance of the first-person perspective so prominent in Descartes’ account. On my view, persons have first-person perspectives essentially, and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for persons. However, persons have no inner selves or inner agents; they have no parts that are selves at all. The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real with what is in some strict sense mind-independent. The assumption, so widespread today, is that what has ontological status can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing mental or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I’ll try to show that this assumption is traceable to Descartes’ view of minds and bodies, and that it is wrong.

In this paper we review different conceptions of rationality as they apply to decision making and problem solving. We defend the notion of enactive problem solving (EPS) and we consider how it applies to the use of therapeutic chatbots. We start by recounting the development of different models of rationality, from expected value maximization, to subjective expected utility theory, and of bounded rationality from prospect theory, to simple adaptive heuristics. We then focus on problem solving. We show how the centre of gravity of problem solving shifts from the model of computational and cognitive processing, to an action-oriented pragmatic one in EPS, that is, to the possible actions that the body-environment interaction allows. We highlight a notion of the agent’s relational autonomy as part of EPS and show that this can be a problem in some chatbot designs in the therapeutic context. EPS suggests that simple early versions of therapeutic chatbots like ELIZA may be more beneficial than more recent sophisticated models involving “Belief-Desire-Intention” (BDI) architecture characterized by predetermined trajectories. The system formed between the agent plus the chatbot tool facilitates a form of enactive problem solving, reducing rigidity on the side of the agent.

In this paper I argue that self-narrative is important in two ways. First, if we understand the self as a self-pattern, self-narrative is one among a multiplicity of elements that contribute to the constitution of the self. The practice of self-narration is part of what makes us who we are. Second, self-narrative serves to mirror the other significant factors that make up the self-pattern. It has a reflective function insofar as it selectively expresses those experiences, feelings, actions and interpersonal relations that have some significance for my life, and as such it reflects who I am. I further argue that because self-narrative has this reflective function, shared self-narratives can serve as a means of access for others to gain insight into who I am. This has application in psychiatric and therapeutic contexts where patients’ self-narratives can serve as a means to an understanding of their life experiences. Since this access is not straight-forward, however, I explore some issues related to how the structure and dynamical processes of self-narration can change in cases of psychiatric disorders, reflecting changes in the self-pattern. In addition, I discuss some important challenges that constrain the interpretation of self-narratives in such disorders. These involve different forms of narrative distance and constraints connected with both psychiatric theory and hermeneutical theory. My main argument is that conceiving of self-related processes as forming a self-pattern that includes self-narrative addresses some of these hermeneutic challenges and facilitates the interpretation of self-narratives.

Drawing on digital sensory ethnographic research with potters during the Covid-19 pandemic in Britain, along with the literature on clay therapy, this paper explores how engagements with clay afford hedonic psychological wellbeing impacts. Adopting an embodied-enactive-ecological approach, we utilise Material Engagement Theory (MET) and the concept of therapeutic affordances to challenge internalist cognitive approaches and to argue for the active role of material engagements in shaping our affective states. We argue that clay’s materiality is central to such impacts and that wellbeing arises relationally through interactions between specific individuals, materials, and their environment. This paper discusses how the tactile, cohesive, and malleable materiality of clay, as well as the variability in how it can be engaged, allows for mindful, immersive and relaxing experiences, that positively contributed to the hedonic wellbeing of our participants. Additionally, we examine how interactions between potter and clay evolve through the development of skill, as their affordance space changes. Particularly, we highlight the complex nature of control with respect to the volatility of clay and pottery; we explore the tension between the desire for and the pressures of skilful production, we analyse the enjoyment of the processes of making, and discuss the permeability of distinctions between hedonic and eudemonic wellbeing.

Intersubjective interactions are highly complex processes that integrate a variety of contextual aspects—physical, pragmatic, social, cultural, normative, institutional—into which embodied individuals, with varying emotions, intents, desires, and motivations, enter. We elucidate the role of context in different varieties of social understanding. We defend a pluralist approach to social cognition and in that framework consider the limited role of mindreading understood as a form of theoretical inference or simulation, as well as the importance of embodied interaction. We argue that all of these practices need to be considered in order to comprehend the rich effects of context on social cognition. We exemplify the bidirectional influence between social understanding and context specifically by focusing on communicative practices and material engagements.

In Chapter 8, the authors explore the notion of _relational authenticity_, arguing that to understand existential authenticity we must not return to the individuality celebrated by classical existentialism nor look for a reductionist explanation in terms of neuronal patterns or mental representations that would simply opt for a more severe methodological individualism and a conception of authenticity confined to proper brain processes. Rather, they propose, we should look for a fuller picture of authenticity in what they call the “4Es”—the embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended conception of mind. They argue that one requires the 4Es to maintain the 4Ms—mind, meaning, morals, and modality—in the face of reductionistic tendencies in neurophilosophy. The 4E approach, they contend, gives due consideration to the importance of the brain, taken as part of the brain-body-environment system, incorporating neuroscience and integrating phenomenological-existentialist conceptions that emphasize embodiment and the social environment.

The sense of agency (SA) is phenomenologically complex, involving various kinds of intentions and levels of experience—the basic aspects of sensory-motor processing, as well as higher levels of intention formation and retrospective judgment. After reviewing various aspects of this complexity, this chapter argues, first, that the way that these various contributory elements manifest themselves in the experience of agency generates an ambiguity in that experience—an ambiguity that is in fact part of the phenomenology. Second, most studies of SA in philosophy of mind and action theory fail to consider the role of social and intersubjective factors. Embodied action happens in a world that is physical and social and that often reflects perceptual and affective valences. The effects of forces and affordances that are both physical and social contribute to the ambiguity.

Cognitive architectures are simplified models of complex neural and behavioral processes, designed to equip artificial agents with flexibility and adaptive behavior. To enhance context-awareness and autonomy in humanoid robots, it is essential to address the role of temporality. The temporal dimension extends far beyond its association with memory, encompassing the continuity of self and identity over time, along with cognitive processes such as intention formation and action planning. This article focuses on the concept of intrinsic temporality as a prereflective structural feature underlying human perceptual experience and motor system activity.Drawing on Husserl’s retentional-protentional dynamic, as interpreted in phenomenology and applied in predictive processing approaches, this article suggests that intrinsic temporality underlying prereflective self-monitoring can be adapted to enrich the design of a cognitive architecture for humanoid robots.

Th e neurophilosophical project, as envisioned by Churchland, involves intertheoretic reduction, moving from (or eliminating) theories formulated in terms of common sense and folk psychology, to theories that have stood the test of scientific experiment. In her view, folk psychology, as well as introspective phenomenology, will be eliminated in favor of neuroscience. Neurophenomenology holds that phenomenology (as a practice)is not only possible, but is in fact a useful tool for science; and that phenomenology is ineliminable if the project is to pursue a neurobiology of consciousness. Clarification of these issues rests on an understanding of how phenomenology can be an alternative source of testable theory, and can play a direct role in scientific experiment. Rather than talking in the abstract about the role of theory formation in science, I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.

Assisted reproductive technology (ART) is a growing global industry, projected to reach $37.7 billion by 2027. Predominantly offered in private healthcare settings, concerns have been raised about the potential negative impacts of commercialization on ART services. Despite numerous accounts of these impacts, a comprehensive synthesis and critique of arguments are lacking. This scoping review aims to provide a nuanced understanding of commercial impacts on ART by exploring how commercial forces have been identified, studied, and evaluated, and what strategies have been suggested for their management in health-related journals. PubMed, Web of Science, Cinahl, and Scopus were searched between January and July 2023 for articles addressing commercial impacts on ART. Database searches identified 11,873 articles, with 163 articles included in the final review. Commercial impacts on ART were most frequently mentioned in discussions of “add-on” interventions (40/163; 25 per cent of articles). Many articles were critical of commercial impacts on ART; however, several suggested that there may be benefit in the delivery of ART by the private sector. This review offers a number of proposed strategies for the mitigation of potential adverse effects of commerce on ART that may be useful to service providers and policymakers. These include improving patient information, enhancing informed consent processes, and increasing regulatory oversight. The review also alerts us to potential challenges that might arise in the context of regulatory reform and reminds us that enhanced regulation is not universally supported.

Pablo Silva Lopez et al. provide an informative survey of 4E approaches to psychiatry which clearly signals both the richness and the theoretical diversity of such approaches. On the one hand, if this rich diversity seems a somewhat confusing set of philosophical disagreements among the different approaches, it arguably represents a lively and developing research paradigm which for some might count as a theoretical virtue. On the other hand, from the perspective of clinical/therapeutic practice this may appear less a virtue and more like an unhelpful map of unsettled debates. What can psychiatric practitioners take from this rough theoretical landscape?Rather than starting on the side of theoretical differences... Read More.

In this chapter, we begin by explaining the concept of embodied cognition and the “4Es” and an embodied approach to social cognition known as interaction theory. Then, through an examination of work at three clinics, we show how these concepts are important in their application to various clinical settings. We conclude by discussing two innovative models of embodied psychotherapy practice involving the use of intersubjective group encounter and new applications of virtual and mixed realities. We argue that these practices have relevance for studying the relationship of body, brain and environment in the clinical neuroscience of neuropsychiatric disorders.

_The Phenomenological Mind_ is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making _The Phenomenological Mind_ an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

This Element discusses contemporary theories of embodied cognition, including what has been termed the '4Es' (embodied, embedded, extended and enactive cognition). It examines diverse approaches to questions about the nature of the mind, the mind's relation to the brain, perceptual experience, mental representation, sense making, the role of the environment, and social cognition, and it considers the strengths and weaknesses of the theories in question. It contrasts embodied and enactive views with classic cognitivism, and discusses major criticisms and their possible resolutions. This element also provides a strong focus on enactive theory and the prospects for integrating enactive approaches with other embodied and extended theories, mediated through recent developments in predictive processing and the free energy principle. It concludes with a brief discussion of the practical applications of embodied cognition. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Conversation is, first of all, an event, something that happens. But the concept of conversation has also been appropriated by various thinkers as a model or metaphor of hermeneutical experience, of communication, political discourse, the acquisition of knowledge, and so forth. As an event it has been analyzed within the hermeneutical tradition, from Schleiermacher to Gadamer, and in this analysis it has been tied to Romantic conceptions such as the universality of language, "linguistic heritage" (Angeborenheit der Sprache ), and what von Humboldt called "the common denominator of human nature," the universal and spiritual humanity that we all share.1 So conceived conversation has been made a model of hermeneutical experience. Gadamer, as is well known, characterizes reading as a conversation or dialogue with a text. This is more than metaphor, he tells us. Interpretation means bringing the text "into the living present of conversation" (TM 368), restoring it to an original condition.

Kathy Wilkes’s essays on explanations and representations, and especially her interaction with Daniel Dennett, raise questions about whether some notion of representation can explain action intention. Wilkes is not sure whether subpersonal representations are real, but she thinks that the most pragmatic strategy is to take the intentional stance and accept the usefulness of personal level intentions, even if we have to worry that this does not give us a scientific explanation. Wilkes’s skepticism about subpersonal representations, and even about the appropriateness of the notion of subpersonal levels of explanation, seems to fit with more recent embodied-enactive approaches to cognition. Considerations about the nature of cognitive mechanisms and animal intelligence prevent her from moving in that direction, however. These insights suggest that Wilkes’ analysis continues to be directly relevant to contemporary discussions.

The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition introduces fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. One of the outstanding books in the field, now translated into eight languages, this highly regarded exploration of phenomenology from a topic-driven standpoint examines the following key questions and issues: what is phenomenology? phenomenology and the cognitive sciences consciousness and self-consciousness time and consciousness intentionality and perception the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity. This third edition has been revised and updated throughout. The chapter on phenomenological methodologies has been significantly expanded to cover qualitative research and there are new sections discussing important, recent research on topics including phenomenology and emotion, social cognition, race and gender, collective intentionality and selfhood. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.