Shawn E. Klein

Designed to spark necessary conversations about ethics in college sports, this collection focuses on the kinds of ethical concerns that arise at the intersection of athletics and education, such as fairness, athletic excellence, and athlete well-being. The first chapters examine college sports at a systematic level, considering the ways we can evaluate college sport as a whole, as well as how we ought to structure college sports in ways that are fairer and better tests of athletic excellence. The second section looks more closely at the interplay of the academic institutions and athletics, arguing that since college sports programs are part of institutions of higher learning, we need to consider the purposes of these institutions when evaluating college sports. Moreover, the well-being and protection of college athletes is central to an ethically defensible college system. The last section of chapters explores several controversial issues in college sports, including gender inequality and transgender participation. It is clear that over the coming decade the landscape of college athletics will change dramatically. Moral philosophers will need to pay attention to these changes and examine the justification and consequences of these transformations.

Why do sports fans sometimes (often?) go crazy at sporting events and then afterwards proceed with their day as if nothing much happened? If something of genuine significance happened, something that warranted the emotional ups and downs the fan experienced during the game, why don’t its effects linger? These questions pose a version of the puzzle of sports fandom. Others have applied Kendall Walton’s theory of fiction to solve the puzzle, but Walton’s account of sports fandom fiction is unacceptably thin. Recent attempts by Nathan Wildman and Joseph Moore to address this thinness problem fail. We answer the thinness objection by explaining how sports fandom is a collaboratively authored fiction, constructed by fans, sponsors, players, teams, media commentators, and more. The stories of sports fandom fiction are passed to new generations of fans in a way more reminiscent of The Iliad or The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Sports fandom fiction is more like folklore, and less like a novel.

The dominant conception of play in philosophy of sport is that it is autotelic. This conception is the subject of important criticisms by Stephen Schmid and others. With these criticisms in mind, my paper seeks to move the discussion of play beyond the apparent dichotomy of autotelicity and instrumentality. Drawing a parallel to the role virtue and friendship have in a broadly construed (neo-)Aristotelian ethic, I argue that play is an important part of the good human life. Like virtue and friendship, play is chosen both for the sake of its importance to the good life and for its own sake. It is partly constitutive of the good life and thus chosen as part of and for the sake of the good life. At the same time, however, play is chosen for its own sake: for what it is distinct from any further ends it might bring about. Thus, play is not autotelic, but nor is it instrumental. Play should be considered, therefore, a constituent value of the good human life.

A common refrain in and outside academia is that prominent sports figures ought to engage more in the public discourse about political issues. This idea parallels the idea that athletes ought to be role models in general. This paper first examines and critiques the “athlete as role model” argument and then applies this critique to the “athlete as political activist” argument. Appealing to the empirical political psychological literature, the paper sketches an argument that athlete activism might actually do more harm than good.

In Steve Jobs and Philosophy, sixteen philosophers take a close look at the inspiring yet often baffling world of Steve Jobs. What can we learn about business ethics from the example of Jobs? What are the major virtues of a creative innovator? How could Jobs successfully defy and challenge conventional business practices? How did Jobs combine values and attitudes previously believed to be unmixable? What does it really mean to “think different”? Can entrepreneurs be made or are they just born? If Jobs didn’t make any major inventions, just what was his contribution? How is Jobs’s life illuminated by Buddhism? How does a counter-culture transform mainstream culture? What does Jobs teach us about the notions of simplicity and functionality in design? How do Jobs’s achievements alter the way we think about technology in relation to human life?

Classical Liberalism is a view that the only justifiable restraints on the actions and choices of individuals in political orders are ones necessary to preserve individual liberty. Central to this view of liberty is the individual being left free from coercive interference from other individuals and society as a whole. This view presumes the idea that the individual is, firstly, able to choose his ends and actions, and secondly, that the individual is the best judge of these. Thus, the individualism of classical liberalism presupposes a view of human consciousness that is volitional: capable of engaging in choice and individual self-direction. If this view of human consciousness is in conflict with the physical casual and evolutionary accounts of the world, then classical liberalism would seem to have serious problem. Therefore, I argue that the correct conception of volitional consciousness is consistent with the physical causal and evolutionary accounts of the world. Presenting a conception of volitional consciousness that makes the best sense of our introspective experience and knowledge of the world, I then show how such a volitional consciousness is consistent with causality and biological evolution.