•  5
    Tracking reasons with extensions of relevant logics
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (4): 543-569. 2019.
    In relevant logics, necessary truths need not imply each other. In justification logic, necessary truths need not all be justified by the same reason. There is an affinity to these two approaches that suggests their pairing will provide good logics for tracking reasons in a fine-grained way. In this paper, I will show how to extend relevant logics with some of the basic operators of justification logic in order to track justifications or reasons. I will define and study three kinds of frames for…Read more
  •  15
    Two common forms of natural deduction proof systems are found in the Gentzen–Prawitz and Jaśkowski–Fitch systems. In this paper, I provide translations between proofs in these systems, pointing out the ways in which the translations highlight the structural rules implicit in the systems. These translations work for classical, intuitionistic, and minimal logic. I then provide translations for classical S4 proofs.
  •  16
    Guest Editors’ Introduction
    with Riccardo Bruni
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1): 1-9. 2019.
  •  17
    Trees for E
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 26 (3): 300-315. 2018.
  •  20
    Proof Theory for Functional Modal Logic
    Studia Logica 106 (1): 49-84. 2018.
    We present some proof-theoretic results for the normal modal logic whose characteristic axiom is \. We present a sequent system for this logic and a hypersequent system for its first-order form and show that these are equivalent to Hilbert-style axiomatizations. We show that the question of validity for these logics reduces to that of classical tautologyhood and first-order logical truth, respectively. We close by proving equivalences with a Fitch-style proof system for revision theory.
  •  161
    The Relevant Logic E and Some Close Neighbours: A Reinterpretation
    IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 4 (3): 695--730. 2017.
    This paper has two aims. First, it sets out an interpretation of the relevant logic E of relevant entailment based on the theory of situated inference. Second, it uses this interpretation, together with Anderson and Belnap’s natural deduc- tion system for E, to generalise E to a range of other systems of strict relevant implication. Routley–Meyer ternary relation semantics for these systems are produced and completeness theorems are proven.
  •  270
    Conditionals in Theories of Truth
    with Anil Gupta
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1): 27-63. 2017.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
  •  251
    Contraction and revision
    Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3): 58-77. 2016.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
  •  42
    We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the…Read more
  •  285
    On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation
    Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3): 135-158. 2015.
    In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. …Read more
  •  7
    Non-Classical Circular Definitions
    Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1). 2017.
    Circular denitions have primarily been studied in revision theory in the classical scheme. I present systems of circular denitions in the Strong Kleene and supervaluation schemes and provide complete proof systems for them. One class of denitions, the intrinsic denitions, naturally arises in both schemes. I survey some of the features of this class of denitions.
  •  47
    Review of Stewart Shapiro's Varieties of Logic (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2015. 2015.