Shené de Rijk

In this paper, I begin a philosophical theorisation of the phenomenon of toxic positivity (TP) within the framework of social epistemology. TP is the phenomenon of people being positive and optimistic to a degree that is unreasonable in a given situation, and as such makes others feel as if their own (less than positive) feelings are invalid or in some way wrong. I begin by providing an example of TP. I then identify four features of TP: appropriate emotion, unreasonableness, dismissal, and potential harm. Following this, I discuss the possible epistemic effects of TP and argue that it can affect knowledge in three ways: doubting belief, losing belief, and undermining self-trust. Finally, I argue that TP can in some cases be a form of gaslighting and can undermine epistemic agency, both of which are epistemic injustices.

This article argues in favour of voluntary active euthanasia in human beings on the grounds that we (society in general) perform euthanasia on valued companion animals when their suffering is considered great. I argue that suffering is a morally relevant criterion that should be considered in all cases (human and animal) of euthanasia. I further argue that human beings possess autonomy, a morally relevant difference to companion animals, that allows them to reason about their futures in a way that animals cannot, which gives us more reason to grant euthanasia, if requested autonomously by terminally ill patients who are experiencing extreme suffering. I consider objections around the sanctity of human life and sufficient palliation. I argue that neither of these objections give sufficient reason to deny competent human beings euthanasia if autonomously requested.