Sheng Xu

Koyré’s investigation of the history of science finds its foundation in his seemingly irrelevant study of the philosophy of religion in his early career. Koyré obtained his insight into the unity of the infinite God and infinite universe by examining the idea of God in the works of St. Anselm and Descartes. The Platonic emphasis on the ontology of number also made him realize the hidden metaphysical framework of thinking in the modern cosmology: the notion of infinity bridges metaphysics and science. It was his reflection on the idea of infinite God that led to the achievements of his later research, as his promotion of the unity of human thinking was already perfectly exemplified in his early works on the philosophy of religion.

One of the most prominent defenders of religious pluralism is John Hick, who developed a theoretical pluralist model on the foundation of a hypothesized the Real an sich. This paper argues that although Hick is right in noticing the importance of the metaphysical meaning of religious pluralism, his model is epistemically unstable because of the circularity problem caused by his persistence on pre-existing religious truth, which itself is meaningless. Drawing on pragmatist insights, especially from William James, this paper proposes a pragmatist alternative that abandons religious realism and instead grounds pluralist normativity in the practical, melioristic functions of religious belief.