Sherry Kao

Contemporary philosophical discussions of despair have often been secondary to analyses of hope, treating despair as the opposite of hope, as something bad, irrational, and to be avoided. I will argue that it’s not necessarily the case. By providing an analysis of the rationality of despair, I will illustrate that despair, though sometimes derived from the impression that life is meaningless, can be rational and even valuable. Despair can be intrinsically valuable qua rational attitude, and instrumentally rational qua its contributions to self-understanding and the integrity of one’s practical identity, to reshape one’s goals and projects, to optimize outcomes, or to motivate actions. We thus have reason to appreciate the value of despair; to see despair as something that can make a positive contribution to our lives.

With increasing inoculations and emerging coronavirus variants, governments worldwide are challenged to adopt proper liberty-restricting measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19 and minimise grave consequences for liberty and well-being caused by over a year-long pandemic. Cameron et al ’s proposal of a selective strategy addresses this pressing issue.1 Following Savulescu and Cameron, they argue for limiting the liberty of the elderly. But, instead of claiming not doing so is an instance of wrongful levelling down equality, they argue this discriminative strategy is morally acceptable.2 I argue against the selective liberty-restrictive measures after proposing a revision of the five-limb proportionality test that plays a pivotal role in supporting their argument. The following is a reconstruction of Cameron et al ’s central argument: It is ethically acceptable to promote the best outcome. One way to promote the best outcome is to maximise utility at the population level without imposing unreasonable costs on the most vulnerable individuals. All else being equal, adopting selective liberty-restricting measures in the COVID-19 pandemic is the best way to maximise utility at the population level without imposing unreasonable costs on the most vulnerable individuals. If it is ethically acceptable to …